Multidisciplinary design problem solving on product development teams by Bernstein, Joshua I. (Joshua Ian), 1974-
Multidisciplillary Design Problem Solving on Product Development Teams
by Joshua I. Bernstein
Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering
The Johns Hopkins University, 1996
Master of Engineering, Aeronautics and Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997
Master of Science, Technology and Policy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998
Submitted to the Technology, Management, and Policy Program in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
DOCTOR OF PI-IaOSOPHY
in lECHNOLOGY, MANAGE~NT,AND POLICY
at the
MASSACHUSElTS INSTITUlE OF lECHNOLOGY
February, 2001
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000
All Rights Reserved
Signature of Author ~=---~--------/'=
Technology, Management, and Policy
Septe~ber 15, 2000
Certified by -----'----.....;:'~~~-.....,a....~~~-""-------...;;;;~~-------------­
Thomas J. Allen
Ho~dW. Johnson Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management
Certified by---f-----...o:;....,-,Hfl-----+oI,.,~-=---~-.....:;...--------------------
Timothy G. Gutowski
Professor, Department of Mechanical ;Engineering
Certified by ---tf7f-'-b'b(~.'b"b''-'"....(,"f-ij,lu"'=""UL..'~,;;;;".....,.,<~06b-l. th~.(""f>f.I.L.",'J"::;"~+------------------------
J Warren P. Seering
Professor, Department of Mechanic,al Engineering
Certified by -......;...----:iOI:;e~j,f-1!~----.;;----.......:::II:;,~;;;.;...,;;;;;;::;;..-.;;;.,;:;;;.".:=::,.......,~21__--------------~-
J. Thomas Shields, III
Center for .Technology, Policy and Industrial Development '
Certified by --......;...)~Jb~'Hb:I:::o=--fI,.,-~):,-::V~'U'''p'A....' ...I:......~',;J!!!~~ee!!ll!!!:Jllllll!!l:lllllflJ__--------------------
Joyee M. Warmkessel
Senior Lecturer, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Accepted by ......;...__....;.;=;;;~-:.-=-=_-_...:.-~-'---...;::-::;;._.. .;:_-_-_- ----.;;_~_;...._;;....__..._()~-C------------------
F-MASSACHUSETTSINSTITUTE .Daniel E. Hastings
OF TECHNOLOGY Chairman, Techn.ology, Management, and Policy Program
·1 JUN 0 4 2001
LIBRARIES
I I
Multidisciplinary Design Problem Solving on Product Development Teams
by
Joshua I. BelTIstein
Submitted to the Technology, Management, and Policy Program on September 15, 2000 in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorof·Philosophy in Technology,
Management, and Policy
Abstract
This investigation, conducted under. the auspices of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI),
studied how engineers from different specialties interpret and communicate about technical
design problems while working on product development teams. Data was collected on 98 cases
via interviews with engineers at LAI member companies. For approximately one-third of the
cases, two engineers with different backgrounds were interviewed, allowing comparisons to be
made between theirdescriptioI1s of the problems understudy. For the remaining cases, one
interview was conducted per case.
The most important finding of this study was that engineers from different specialties do
interpret the same problem differently. Specifically, two engineers were likely to evaluate the
benefits or drawbacks of a potential solution using different sets of criteria. Thus, some design
disputes were the result not of mutually exclusive needs but of a failure to recognize the different
ways in·which engineers were evaluating solutions to the problem. Furthennore, data collected
during this study illustrated that in some cases these differences were the result of engineers
addressing related, but unique problems. Therefore, a solution to oneengineer'·s problem often
created a new problem for another engineer on the team.
A second conclusion of this study was that how design tools were used had a greater
impact on a team's problem solving abilities than what tool was used. In this context, design
tools included objects such as real or "virtual" prototypes as well as processes like simulations
and tests. The results of this investigation suggested that such tools offered their greatest
benefits when they were used in a participatory fashion in which a large fraction of a team shared
in their use. Additionally, the more elements of a problem's context that were captured in a
design tool, the greater its utility. Under such conditions, team members were able to create a
shared evaluation system to judge potential solutions to the problem they were confronting,
thereby facilitating problem resolution.
Based on these results, the traditional model of engineering communication derived from
the information.processingframework requires modification. The infonnationprocessing model
assumes that individuals have a shared understanding of meaning when they communicate. This
study, however, suggests that such shared understandings do not exist in advance, but are instead
created as part of the communication process. While the information processing model may
work wellto explain communication patterns at a high level or within a well-established group, a
model that accounts for·the active and ·dynamic creation ·of shared meaning is more appropriate
at a detailed level.
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MULTIDISCIPLINARY DESIGN PROBLEM SOLVING ON PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
TEAMS
Joshua I. Bernstein
Lean Aerospace Initiative
Massach~setts I~stitute of Technology
Executive Summary
This investigation, conducted ~nder the_auspices of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI),
studied how engineers from· different specialties. i~terpreted and .communicated about technical
design problems while working on product development teams. Specifically, the study was
aimed at improving our understanding of how engineers-can best use design tools,. such as
computer aided design (CAD), prototypes, and cOIl1puter simulations, to improve product
development processes. .
Data for this study was gathered during visits to corporate members of the Lean
Aerospace Initiative consortium. Engineers with re~ent experience on product development
teams were interviewed for thirty minutes toone hour using a critical-instant interview approach.
Depending on their time and willingness to participate, each interviewee described one to two
cases of technical problem solving on product ,development teams. Overall, ninety-six
interviews were conducted for .this research study, yielding a total of ninety-eight cases. For
twenty-six of these cases, a second perspective was obtained through a follow-up interview with
another team member.
Data was analyzed using a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. In cases
for·which two interviews were conducted, engineers were asked to.provide a list of the criteria
they used to evaluate a potential solution's benefits or drawbacks. Comparing the lists created
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by each pair facilitated the development of two quantitative metrics, the "unique criteria ratio"
and the "unique· problem ratio", to measure the extent to which the engineers' interpretations
varied. Additionally, for all cases engineers were asked to rate their satisfaction with the
solution and to estimate the solution's impact on the product's performance and cost and the
project's schedule. These data were quantified using seven-point Likert scales. Finally, the
quantitative analysis was supplemented by the case descriptions gathered during the interviews.
Several key conclusions were drawn from this investigation. First, engineers from different
backgrounds do think.differently about the same problem. ·This notion was clearly illustrated in
the cases for which paired data was collected. When asked to list the criteria they used to
evaluate the benefits or drawbacks "to potential solutions, engineers from different backgrounds
often· cited different issues. Furthennore, looking at how the engineers described their problems
more clearly revealed the origins of these differences: the engineers were often solving different
problems.
For example, one case dealt with the repair of a fatigue crack in an aircraft part. One
interviewee for the case was the design engineer. He discussed the problem in tenns of stopping
the spread of the crack and the crack's impact on the aircraft's performance. The second
interviewee was the" tool designer. He was responsible for developing a tool that could be used
in the field to repair the crack and talked about how a human being might be able to gain access
to the crack and how much space was available to move a tool. Thus, to some extent the
engineers were not even solving the same problem. The engineer framed the· issue in tenns of
the crack's impact on performance; in contrast, the tool designer framed the problem in terms of
a human reaching the crack. Similar issues were identified in many of the other cases.
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Therefore, the data· indicate that engineers from different backgrounds do think about and
analyze the same problem in different ways.
Given these ldifferences, methods are required that facilitate the creation of solutions that are
mutually beneficial from multiple engineering. perspectives. Based on the data collected during
this study,one of the most effective methods was the use of tests. As defined for this
investigation, a test may be conducted on a completed or prototype .part or may be conducted
using computer simulations. The important feature is that a design concept is developed and
then subjected to an experiment that reveals some aspect of its performance. Furthermore, as
defined in this study, to qualify as a "test," either the team as a whole had to agree to conduct the
experiment or the team as a whole had to witness its results.
Testing was a common theme among·the solution processes of many. cases. The importance
and effectiveness of testing appeared to lay in several factors. First, the engineers had to agree to
conduct the test. Further, in agreeing to the test, the engineers agreed to a standard of evaluation.
Since the test detenninedwhat data could be collected, and the type of data determined what
aspects of. a potential solution could be evaluated, agreeing on what ·test to do allowed the
engineers to first debate and then agree toa set of attributes that were mutually important for a
solution. Second, once the test was conducted, the resulting data provided a powerful counter to
any theoretical or philosophical arguments that had been taking place over the problem. A
common remark was, "The data said x, sothat's what we went with."
An important caveat, however, was that all of the conflicting parties had to be involved in
the decision about what test to conduct. ·In several cases, this participation did not exist, and the
tests were not as ·decisive.· Under such circumstances, the engineers from the excluded group
were able to say, "I don't believe the data," .implying that the test was not properly conducted.
7
11,;-
Such problems reinforced the notion discussed above,oamely, that testing is only an effective
integration tool when it facilitates the discussion over how potential solutions should be
evaluated.
These "results also shed additional light on· the concept of "boundary objects" (e.g., an
artifact such as a drawing, part, etc., that is shared between individuals from different groups or
specialties). In some sense, the results from a test can be viewed as a boundary object.
However, it is not the sharing of the results alone that was important What was also important
was the consensus that was initially required to create the object. When that agreement was
lacking, the utility of the object was reduced. Thus, one can propose two scenarios. In the first,
a boundary object is brought to a meeting by one side of a design dispute so that it can prove its
point. Based on the results of this study, one would ,expect such a presentation to be met with
considerable resistance. In the second scenario, the disputing groups as a whole first agree that it
would be worthwhile to create an object. One would then.predict that the sharing of that object
would be an effective mechanism to help resolve the dispute. Therefore, this study has provided
an additional level of guidance fOfusing boundary objects.
This .study also found that well-known, shared team objectives and team co-location were
positively correlated with team member satisfaction and product and project performance. The
significance of shared objectives reinforce's the argument that teams need· to establish a shared
system of evaluation. When project goals were well known. to the. team, its members tended to
evaluate design problems -- and their potential solutions -- more similarly than when such goals
were. not present. Therefore, team members were able to reach a consensus more easily about
how to solve the problem. Similarly, co-located teams'were able to meet regularly and easily,
allowing team members to get to know each other personally and to learn about each other's
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technical concerns. This increased understanding and awareness then facilitated effective
problem solving.
Importantly, the results also revealed that teams using frequent face-to-face meetings
. instead of co-location reported lower satisfaction and less positive impacts on product and
project performance. Thus, co-location appeared to have significant benefits that could not· be
matched simply by attempting to hold frequent meetings.
Finally, the results of this research lend support to the concept of design-build-test cycles.
This model of the product development process suggests that engineers should work in short,
rapid cycles in which a design concept is first generated, and then a real or virtual prototype
created and tested. Proponents of this model usually cite its potential to reduce technical
uncertainty as its greatest benefit. This study, however,· also suggests that teams using the
design-build-test approach should be more effective from a social standpoint as well. Thus,
future investigations might explore how well teams using design-build-test approaches solved
problems compared to those not using suchan approach.
In summary, this study has clearly illustrated that engineers from different specialties or
backgrounds interpret and evaluate design problems differently. ·Purthennore, these differences
in interpretation are often due to the fact that the· engineers are .actually solving related, but
physically different problems. Therefore, processes are required that facilitate the creation of a
shared interpretation of,orevaluation system for, the design problem. The results of this
investigation have indicated that the design and execution of tests, either real or "virtual," are an
effective means of incorporating such processes into a product development project.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1. Motivation
Developing a product that can succeed in the market is a task fraught with a diverse set of
challenges. Thus, companies are continuously seeking to improve their product development
capabilities, whether it be better·predicting market needs or enhancing their·products' technical
performance. As· will be discussed, a variety of studies have shown that a key element of
developing successful products··is·the··ability to successfully integrate· the many technical views
and needs. represented by different elements of a product development organization. The better
these groups can work together, the better the products they will produce.
To that end, this research project .. aimed to improve the ability of product development
organizations to integrate their technical disciplines to deliver successful products. This broad
issue was studied in detail by ·investigating. how multidisciplinary product development. teams
solved specific design problems durio.g the course of larger development efforts. Since this
project was sponsored by the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), it has endeavored to investigate
issues of special concern to the development of large, complex systems such as those developed
for the United States Air Force.
As this paper will argue, successfully integrating a product requires that the many diverse
subgroups within an organization effectively communicate with one another. Thus, improving a
company's ability to integrate its products requires improving its ability to communicate. The
goal of this project was to improve our understanding of what makes for effective
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communication between specialty groups, and, with that understanding, improve a company's
ability to deliver well-integrated products to the market place.
1.2. Project History and Evolution
The Lean Aerospace Initiative's mission is "[t]o enable fundamental change within industry
and government operations that supports the continuing transformation of the US .aerospace
enterprise towards providing aerospace systems offering best life-cycle value" (Murman, 2000).
To support that goal, this project was originally intended to investigate the transition of a product
!~~l;~~t~~~:-:(,
development project from the des~gn phase to the manufacturing phase of the development
process. This initial objective was based a variety of studi~s and expert opinion within the LA!
community that suggested that this transition process progressed far less smoothly in Department
of Defense (DOD) projects than in comparable commercial projects (see, for example, United
States Air Force, Engineering Directorate, 1998; United States General Accounting Office,
1998). DOD products were confronting significant: manufacturing and performance. problems,
resulting in increased development costs and delayed schedules.
Preliminary investigations,however, rapidly shifted the project's focus. Industry feedback,
acquired during discussion sessions at LAI team meetings and conferences during 1998,
suggested that the "transition point" as imagined for the study was not nearly as well-defined in
practice as initially thought. Furthermore, industry representatives noted that the concept of a
well-defined transition between phases was not consistent with the integrated product and
process development (IPPD) methods they were attempting to implement. Instead,
manufacturing input was being provided throughout the design phases of. new products, even
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during early conceptual development. This more continuous back-and-forth communication
pattern was inconsistent with the notion of a clearly defined transition point.
Several other concepts suggested that the· transition. point itself was not the proper place. to
solve the problems being seen at the shift from design to manufacturing. First, several studies
have indicated that. manufacturing quality is a function of design quality (Clark and Fujimoto,
1991; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; WomackUet ai, 1991). ·That is, products that are designed
with manufacturing issues taken into account in the design itself are less likely to have
manufacturing problems when they begin production. Concepts such as design for
manufacturing and design· for assembly (Boothroyd and Dewhurst, 1994;· Ulrich and Eppinger,
1995) have been developed specifically in response to this realization. Thus, if manufacturing
quality is driven by the design process, no amount of tinkering with the transition point will be
able to fix the problems that were designed·· into a product earlier in its development. This
thinking is consistent with systems .theory, 'which. notes that the ·sources of problems are often
displaced from the point at which the problem is revealed (Senge, 1990; Sterman, 2000).
If the transition .point was not the proper focus of study, and previous work had already
developed concepts such as design for manufacturing and assembly, ·the question then became,
UWhat is preventing manufacturing knowledge from being incorporated into the design of new
DOD products?" With the problem now framed in this context, the focus of this study gradually
shifted to understanding how engineers from different specialty groups (such as design and
manufacturing) work together to solve a design problem that requires knowledge from several
different perspectives. This work represents the investigation undertaken to understand these
issues.
25
1.3. Fit with Lean Frameworks
This research fits well within the broader frameworks of lean product development that
hClve been evolving in both academia and industry. Two perspectives are discussed: the
Womack and Jones framework and the Lean Enterprise Model.
1.3.1. The "Lean Thinking" Framewor~
From an industry perspective, the best known lean. framework is the one presented by
Womack and Jones (1996) in Lean Thinking. Their conception of lean has five primary aspects:
1. Understand value from the customer's perspective
2. Eliminate waste
3. Make the product flow
4. Control the flow using pull
5. Strive for perfection.
This fram~work can be enhanced by considering the different levels within and between
organizations at which lean concepts might be applied. Figure 1.1 illustrates these levels in the
shape of a pyramid. At the base are the individual people who make up an organization. People
are then brought together on teams,. and teams work together ·on a specific project (or program).
Above projects are a company's divisions and then its corporate executive organizations.
Multiple organizations then come together at the top of the pyramid toforrn the extended
enterprise.
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Lean
Organization
Figure ,1.1: The different levels of the extended enterprise.
The goals of this research can be understood by combining this perspective of the
extended enterprise with Womack and Jones' framework, as shown in Figure 1.2. First, this
study aimed to understand how individuals on product development teams defined value and
how such definitions can vary. With an understanding.of value, waste in communication can
then be identified and efforts directed at reducing, it. The ,heart of this research fits across the
notions of flow and pull: this investigation identified tools, techniques, and methods for
improving communication on design teams, or, put another way, 'for facilitating the flow and pull
of product development information. Finally, the models of communication developed through
this study represent a new model of perfection for product development information sharing.
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Lean Principles
Lean
Organization Value Waste Flow Pull Perfect.
1.3.2.
Figure 1.2: The goals of this study relative to Womack and Jones' principles, and the
organizational level to which this study applies.
The Lean Enterprise Model
The Lean Enterprise· Model (LEM). is a framework for lean that was developed by the
Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT. It provides a mechanism for both organizing research results
as well for guiding lean implementation efforts. The LEM's core is formed by twelve
Overarching Practices (OAPs). These practices are listed and defined in Table 1.1 below.
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.Table 1.1: TheLEM's Qverarching practices (adapted fr9ffi LAI, 2000).
Overarching Practice Definition
Optimize the flow of products and services, either affecting or within the process,
Identify and Optimize Enterprise Flow from concept design throuah point of use.
Provide '" processes for seamless and timely transfer of and access to present
Assure Seamless Information Flow information
Optimize Capability and Utilization of
People Assure, properly trained people are available when needed
Design the organizational structure and management systems to accelerate and
Make Decisions at Lowest Possible Level enhance decision makina at the Doint at knowledae application and need.
Create products through an integrated team effort of people and organizations
which are knowledgeable of"' and responsible tor all phases of the product's life
Implement Integrated Product and cycle from concept definition through development, production, deployment,
Process Development (I PPD) operations, and support.
Relationships Based""on 'Mutual Trust.and Establish stable and on-going ,cooperative· relationships within the ·extended
Commitment enterprise, encompassing both customers and suppliers.
Proactively understand and respond to.the needs of the internal and external
Continuous' Focus on the Customer customers.
Promote Lean Leadership at All Levels Align and involve all stakeholders to achieve the enterprise's lean vision.
Maintain Challenges of Existing Ensure a culture and systems that use quantitative measurement and analysis to
Processes continuously improve processes.· '
Provide for the development and growth of bothorganizationsl and individuals'
Nurture a Learning Environment . support of attainina lean enterprjse aoals.
Ensure Process Ca'pabilityand Establish and maintain' processes capable of consistently designing and, produc'jng
Maturation key characteristics of the product or service.
Maximize Stability in a Changing Establish strategies to maintain program stability in a changing, customer";driven
Environment environment. .
Given this investigation's focus, its'results address the followirig OAPs:
• Assure Seamless lnfonnation Flow.' The results from" this study contribute to product
developers' understanding of why communication c'an be difficult, thereby improving their
abilities to overcome such ch~llengesandfacilitating improved infonnation flow throughout ,an
organization.
• Make Decisions at the Lowest Possible Level. As will be discussed, this study found that
problem solving performance was highest when teams were able to solve problems on their own
without management intervention. The results of this investigation, therefore, provide guidance
as to how to facilitate such lOW-level decision making.
• Implement Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD). By its very nature, IPPD
requires individuals from'differ.ent technical specialties to work together. The focus of this study
wason enhancing such skills by improving communication practices,on IPPD teams.
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• Relationships Based on Mutual Trust and Commitment. The techniques and methods
discussed in this study provide practical approaches for product developers to build such
relationships while working on multidisciplinary teams.
• Nurture a Learning Environment. An important component of learning on product
development teams is enhancing team members' appreciation of what is ·important to other
members on the team. The results of this study provide ·guidance on how to facilitate such
learning.
1.4. Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized essentially according t~ how the project itself evolved. The
next two chapters develop the theoretical foundations for this work. Chapter 2 provides an
understanding of the underlying concept of this project: integration. It begins by first developing
a definition for a system, and then using that definition to clarify the meaning .of the term
"integration". Building on the product development management literature, the chapter goes on
to argue that integration is a social process. The origins of differentiation within organizations
are explored, as is the resulting need for integration.
Chapter 3 then reviews the dominant model of organizational communication, the
information processing framework, and suggests why this model is not adequate for addressing
the problems studied in this investigation. A new communications model is then developed,
based.primarilyon the·theory of abstraction. This revised model better captures the need for two
individuals to actively create a shared system of meaning during their communication exchanges,
and, therefore, provides a better understanding of·the social challenges of integration as well as
suggesting methods for overcoming these challenges.
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Chapter 4 describes the experimental methods used to study problem· solving practices on
multidisciplinary design teams. First, it reviews integration tools and techniques that have been
identified by' other researchers. Given these past findings, the specific issues to be· investigated
during this project are presented, along with the methods used to acquire data related to these
issues. Three hypotheses are developed, along with the measures that are used to support or
refute them.
Chapter 5 reviews the key findings of this project. It first discusses factors identified
during this study that facilitate or hinder the problem solving process. Then, the data's
implications for each of the three hypotheses are discussed in tum. Several additional
observations, pertaining to issues not originally intended to be. studied during this project,are
then reviewed.
Chapter 6 provides recommendations to both product development practitioners and
researchers. Based on the conclusions from this study, a variety of practical suggestions are
presented that could be used to improve communication, and integration, on product
development teams. Additionally, several recommendations are made to researchers, both
regarding improvements to communication models as well as potential avenues for future
research. The dissertation·then concludes by returning· to where it had begun, arguing ·that
integration, and hence, product development perfonnance, is a function of communication.
Finally, appendices provide supplementary information, primarily details of data
analyses. Also included as an appendix is a brief tutorial describing how to implement improved
versions of the data collection methods used for this study.
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2. SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: TOWARDS ASOCIAL
PERSPECTIVE
The following two"chapters will establish the theoretical foundations for this research, which
are based on two major streams of literature: 'systems integration and theories of communication
and knowledge. 'This. chapter 'will' address the topic of integration. While the challenges of,
integration .are often discussed in engineering'circles, -these discussions tend to' focus solely on
technical issues, disregarding the human dynamics that occur on .design teams. Prior to delving
into such asocial perspective, a more· technical...;oriented view of integration will first be
presented.
2. 1. Systems Integration
"Integration" is a term that often takes on a new meaning with each piece of literature
written about it, and this wide range of definitions complicates and confuses discussions about
the concept. Such confusion is especially troublesome, because, as will be discussed below, how
well a product's.elements are "integrated" can be a significant indicator of a product's success in
the market place. Furthermore, since integration is a central theme to this work, it is worthwhile
to develop a specific and clear definition for the term. In order to define integration, however,
the concept of a system must first be explored.
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2.1.1. Definition of a System
Many authors have attempted to provide definitive definitions·of a "system." Following is a
brieflist of some of these attempts (listed chronologically by date of publication):
Morton (1971): A system is "an integrated assembly of specialized parts acting together Jor a common
purpose" (p. 12).
Blanchard and Fabrycky (1981): "A system isa set of interrelated components working together toward
some common objective" (p. 4).
Grady (1994): Systems are "combinations of parts that together perfonn some function that no subset of the
parts could achieve" (p.16).
Martin (1997): A system is "a setof integrated end products and their enabling products" (p. 17).
IEEE Std 1220~1998: A system js "[a] set or arrangement of elements (people,products [hardware and
software] .and processes [facilities, equipment,material· and procedures]) that are related and whose
behavior satisfies customer/operational needs, and provides for the life cycle sustainment of the products"
(p.8).
Sage and Lynch (1998): A system is "a connected structured set of elements that perform functions that
serve some intended purpose" (p. 177).
Two pervasive themes emerge from these definitions. First,a system consists of multiple parts
connected in.some fashion. Second, when connected, these parts are acting to achieve a common
goal that they could not achieve on their own.
All of these themes are perhaps best captured by Ackoff (1974), who defines a system as "a
set of two or more interrelated elements of any kind," that satisfies the following three
conditions:
1. The properties or behavior of each element of the set has an effect on the properties or behavior of
the set taken as a whole.
2. The properties and behavior of each element, and the way they affect the whole, depend on the
properties and· behavior of at least one other element in the set. Therefore, no part has an independent
effect on the whole and each is affected by at least one 'other part.
3. Every possible subgroup of elements in the set has the first two properties: each has a
nonindependent effect on the whole. Therefore, the whole cannot be decomposed into independent
subsets. A system cannot be subdivided into independent subsystems. (p. 13)
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A system, therefore, is characterized primarily by the fact that is composed of multiple elements,
and the system's performance depends on the interaction between those elements and the
enviro'nment in which they function.
As an example of this definition of a system, consider the hurnanbodyl. Every •organ in
the body affects the body's (the system's)perfonnance (property 1). Furthermore, the heart's
behavior and performance, an element of the body, is affected by the behavior and perfonnance
of the lungs, another element (property 2). Finally; removing a heart from the body effectively
destroys the performance of the entire body (property 3). Thus, the human body, since it
satisfies all three· conditions, can be considered a system.
A system can also be defined in tennsof its structure, junction, or purpose (Rechtin and
Maier, 1997; Sage and Lynch, 1998). Ackoffs definition focuses primarily on the structural
perspective - that a system is composed' of individual elements and depends on the interaction of
those elements for its operation. Similarly, Simon (1969) defines a hierarchic system as "a
system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in tum, hierarchic in
structure..." (p. 87). A functional definition of a system, in contrast, focuses on what a system
does, while a purposeful definition focuses on its goals. Thus, a structural definition of a desk
chair might describe how the wheels are connected to the base, the base to the frame, the frame
to the cushion,etc.; a functional definition might describe how a person moves from a standing
to a seated position using the chair; and a purposeful definition might state that the goal of the
.chair is provide a comfortable place to sit while working at a desk. All of these' definitions are
important, and, in fact, illustrate why a system and its meaning can become so complicated: Not
only are all of different definitions of a chair correct, they are all needed to fully define the chair.
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Modifying Ackoff' sdefinition slightly, the following definition of a system will be used for
the remainder of this .work:
A system is defined as a set of two or more interrelated elements of any kind working togetherfor a common
purpose that satisfies the following three conditions:
1. The properties or behavior of each element of the set has an effect on the properties or behavior of the
set taken as a whole.
2. The properties and behavior of each element, and the way they affect the whole, depend on the
properties and behavior o/at least one other element in the set. Therefore, no part has an independent
effect on.the whole and each is affected by at least one other part.
3. Every possible subgroup of elements in the set has the first two properties: each has a nf?nindependent
effect on the whole. Therefore, ·the whole cannot be decomposed into independent subsets. A system
cannot be subdivided into independent subsystems.
2.1.2. Definition of Integration
i
As the above discussion suggests, a key element of a system is the manner in which its
elements are connected, i.e., how the system is "integrated". Unfortunately, many definitions of
integration are quite vague. While Ackoffsdefinition of. a system provides for a testable
standard (e.g., if and only if an object meets all three conditions can it be called a system), most
definitions of integration are so general that they shed little light on the problem embodied in the
concept. For example, Grady (1994) defines system integration as "the art and science of
facilitating the marketplace of ideas that connects the many separate solutions into a system
solution" (p. 3). Similarly, Sage and Lynch (1998) define integration as "efforts to ensure
) This example is based on Ackoff (1974), p. 13.
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appropriate communication betwe'en elements - including technology, human, and
organizational-that are supposed to work together" (p. 176). While not especially ·clear, these
definitions do illustrate a common theme in most writing about integration - integration is
viewed as a process.
-Rather than relying on sllchgeneral descriptions of integration, however, the definition of a
system can be used to generate a more refined definition 'of integration. As noted above, for
something -to 'qualify as a system, it must meet' three requirements. In general, these
requirements state that a' system is able to do things that its components alone cannot do, and that
-the components each have an effect on each other. Therefore, integratio.n can be. defined as:
The process of combining a set of elements such that the combination exhibits properties not exhibited by any
element independently.
Note that this definition is testable: If a combination of components can function together to
implement a function no single component can do on its own, the combination can be called
"integrated." Also note that this definition does not specify any requirements for the "quality" of
the integration. Therefore, several components might be "integrated," but might not be "well
integrated." However, such qualitative descriptions are dependent upon the perspective of the
individual judging the process,and, therefore, need not be part of the fonnal definition. Finally,
as is true for the definition of a system, no restriction is placed on what the "elements" mightbe
- anelementmight be a bolt, a tube,anengine, a person, a muscle, a musical instrument,etc.
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2.1.3. The Importance of Integration
Although a precise definition of integration is difficult to find in the literature, examples of
the process's importance are not. Two primary lines of research provide excellent evidence for
the need to focus on integration: .product development research illustrating the impacts of
integration on product performance, and. innovation management studies· that demonstrate the
importance of one particular type of integration process, architectural innovation.
Some of the most comprehensive research on integration has been conducted by lansiti.
His research has emphasized a particular type of .integration activity, which ,he refers to as
"technology integration:" "the set of investigation, evaluation, and refinement activities aimed, at
creating a match between technological options and application context" (Iansiti, 1998, p. 21).
Thus, technology integration consists of those decisions that lead a company to combine several
technologies to create a new .product. lansiti's research suggested that this skill, more than. any
other (such as project management, leadership, or organization) was the most important in
determining the success of new product development effort (Iansiti and West, 1997).
Essentially, early decisions about what technologies should be combined frame the problem to.be
addressed by the product development process. If the selected technologies can be combined
easily, the product development effort as a whole is more likely progress smoothly. If, on the
other hand, the technologies cannot· be readily combined, the development process will be
difficult, no matter the skill level of the project' steam.
A series of studies in the automotive industry, most notably those by Womack etal (1991)
and Clark and Fujimoto (1991) also demonstrated the importance of integration. Both of these
investigations revealed the significance of design for manufacture and assembly. Specifically,
the researchers found that the more the product's design took into account the capabilities of·the
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manufacturing system·that would produce the product, the better the final product's quality. In
addition, Woma<;k et al (1991) demonstrated that the better· integrated the product and its
manufacturing system, the better the manufacturing system's performance. Again, the point is
clear: the better integrated the system (in this case, the "system" being the product and its
manufacturing'facilities), the better the system's perfonnance.
Similarly, a study of phannaceutical development projects in, the United States and Europe
by Pisano and Wheelwright (1995) also demonstrated the importance of integratingprodu"Ct and
process design. In this study, the authors attributed the root ·cause of many delayed product
launches or products suffering from limited success· to "senior managers' belief that process
[manufacturing] technology was not very. important" (Pisano and Wheelwright, 1995, p. 94).
Essentially, managers tended to focus their attention .on designing the product, rather than on
designing the manufacturing system. However, many·of the product's final performance
parameters were controlled by the manufacturing process. ,Therefore, although the product's
design may have matured, the manufacturing techniques used to the produce the product had .oot.
This lack of maturity in manufacturing then led to delays and problems with the product, .. which
in turn had a dramatic impact on the overall success of the development effort. As in the case of
automobiles, the basic issue was a failure to effectively link the manufacturing processes and the
product design to create an overall successful development effort.
These same problems' exist in government programs as well. In a study comparing defense
acquisition practices to product development practices in the commercial world, the United
States General Accounting Office (1998) found that, in general, defense programs took longer
and carried greater amounts of risk through their development than· comparable commercial
projects. Furthermore,ffiuch of the risk in DOD programs tended to lie between major program
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elements, such as product design and manufacturing system development. The GAO found that
many DOD projects tended to ignore manufacturing concerns until just prior to the start of
production. The result of this delayed consideration was that many programs experienced
significant problems once production began and design flaws related manufacturability were
finally revealed. Thus, as in the automotive and phannaceutical industry studies, the failure to
integrate the product and manufacturing systems designs led to significant downstream
development· problems.
The United States Air Force Engineering Directorate (1998) came to a similar series of
conclusions about the problems it was observing during its development programs, especially at
the transition point from product design to production. In particular, the Directorate noted that a
key factor in many of the· delays and manufacturing quality' problems stemmed from a failure to
understand "the linkage between key·.design requirements, the [manufacturing] processes needed
to support them, and the impact on product performance, supportability, and cost." While
specific technologies or manufacturing processes may have been developed to a significant
degree independently, the interactions between these elements had not been considered - the
programs had failed to consider integration issues.
Another view of the importance of integration can be gained by considering the concept of
architectural innovation. Henderson and Clark (1990) provide a good foundation of definitions
for architectural innovation. First, they define a "component" as "a physically distinct portion of
the product that embodies a core designconcept~ .. and performs a well-defined function" {p.ll).
Thus, a component is analogous to Ackoffs "element". Next, a product's "architecture" refers
to how the components of the product are connected and combined. Therefore, "architectural
innovations" are "innovations that change the way in which the components of a product are
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linked together,while leaving the core design concepts ... untouched" (Henderson and Clark,
1990, p. 10). Essentially,.architectural innovation changes the way a product's components (a
system's elements) are linked (are integrated) without changing the components themselves.
, The market significance of architectural innovation is not trivial. As Abernathy and Clark
(1985) note,architectural innovation tends to open up.new markets and entirely new industries.
These conclusions -have been supported by Clayton Christensen,whohas>done some of the most
comprehensive research in this field. In his studies of the computer hard drive industry,
Christensen has developed the notion of "disruptive technologies," a special case ·ofarchitectural
innovation (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen 1992b;Christensen, 1997). Like an
architectural innovation, -a disruptive technology is a product that -combines existing components
in a new fashion. Typically, a disruptive technology has lower performance along traditional
performance measures than does a more conventional product. However, disruptive
technologies are characterized by enhanced performance relative to a new measure of
performance along with rapid improvement in performance relative to old measures. Thus, a
disruptive technology offers new features and capabilities to its customers.
Christensen found that when a disruptive technology entered a market, it eventually
replaced the traditional product. Furthermore, the disruptive technology was often developed by
a new entrant firm, that, with the rise of the new product, often replaced the old market leaders as
the dominant player in the industry. As this research indicates, the fashion in which a product's
components were combined -- the fashion in which they were -integrated --affectednot just the
perfonnance ofa given product and its development effort, but the entire marketplace of which
that product was-a part.
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2.2. Differentiation and Integration in Organizations : A Social Perspective of
the Integration Process
The above studies all demonstrated the importance of integration as a critical factor in the
success of product development efforts. However, all of the investigations described above
tended to focus on theintegratiori. of the technologies involved in the design of a new product,
such as the product components or the product and its manufacturing system. The process of
integration, however is not simply a technical one, but a social one as well. During a product
development effort the different technologies that must be integrated are often represented by
different people. Integrating those technologies then becomes a function of the social
relationships between those individuals and their ability to effectively share and exchange the
knowledge and expertise they have related to the development of the product. Thus, integration
problems can be viewed as social problems. Consequently, improving a firm's ability to
integrate the various technologies in its products requires improving the communication skills
within a firm. Understanding this social perspective of integration first requires an
understanding how the different technologies needed for a new product come to be represented
by different groups within and organization,a concept referred to as "differentiation".
2.2.1. The Need for Differentiation and Integration
Like any other type of system, an organization is created to enable its elements (people) to
achieve goals they could not achieve alone. In addition, like any other system, the people within
an organization are not homogeneous, and may, in fact, be quite heterogeneous. This
heterogeneity can arise from a variety of factors.
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Perhaps the first· cause of heterogeneity, or "differentiation" (Lawrence and LaTsch, 1967),
relates to the need for an organization to take in and process a wide variety of infoffilation from
its environment. This environment is likely filled with complexity, uncertainty, and equivocality
(Weick, 1976). In· order to process all of the various signals it may take in, an organization must
create an information receiving network whose complexity matches that of the environment.
This notion, of matching the complexity of the receiver to the complexity of the signal, is known
as requisite variety (Morgan and Ramirez, 1983; Van de Yen, 1986; Weick, 1976). Thus, as the
uncertainty in an organization's environment increases, the members of the organization tend to
take on more and more specialized roles (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Utterback, 1982). Such
specialization allows an organization to take large, complex, unmanageable problems and divide
them into smaller ones that can be addressed and solved "more readily (Adams, 1998; Grady,
1994; Krishnan, 1997; Simon and March, 1966).
Although they did not refer to the concept as requisite variety, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
did one of the most definitive studies of its importance. In their investigations, the researchers
found that·high performing organizations tended to more closely match their complexity to that
of the environments which they faced. Thus, high performing organizations in dynamic or
complex markets tended to be highly differentiated -- composed of a large number of specialized
subgroups ...- which, tqgether, were able to execute all of the diverse functions needed to operate
effectively in their environment~ Similarly, high performing organizations in less fluid
environments tended to lack this differentiation and had a more homogeneous make-up. Lower
performing organizations failed to recognize these .distinctions or to organize appropriately for
them. Therefore, the researchers concluded that the ability to effectively differentiate was a
significant factor in predicting organizational perfonnance.
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Differentiation is also driven by the increasing knowledge base that is created by each
successive generation of human innovation (Morton, 1971). As Norman (1993) observes:
Each new advance of technology added to the powers and abilities. of human society; each new advance also
added to the amount of knowledge that newer generations would have to learn... The background knowledge
required more and more learning, thereby leading to specialization. (p. 8)
Thus, as technologies become more advanced and complex, an individual's ability to master
multiple disciplines is reduced. Consequently, an organization requires more people with more
specialized skills so that in total it has all of the knowledge required to me~t its ends.
The needs for an organization to match the complexity of its environment or knowledge
base are not the only factors driving it to differentiate, however. Another important reason for
the heterogeneity of an organization's members relates to its ability to innovate. As many
researchers have noted, diversity of talents tends· to foster the development of new ideas.
Leonard-Barton (1995), for example, refers to "creative abrasion," the productive conflict that
can occur between different groups that helps to dislodge old concepts and create new ones.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) make a similar observation based on their studies of new product
development projects, noting that " ... it is precisely such a conflict that pushes individuals to
question existing premises and to make sense of their experiences in a new way" (p. 239).
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Senge (1990) also stress the importance of conflict and
diversity of opinion, although they both note that conflict can also become "dysfunctional"
(Senge, 1990). This need for heterogeneity is recognized in many finns, and Honda and Toyota,
for example, specifically seek to create teams that include people with a range of backgrounds
and expertise (Nelson et aI, 1998; Sobek et aI, 1998).
Finally, differentiation may also be driven by such "mundane" factors as people's
interests. As both Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Leonard-Barton (1995) observe, individual
people are different and, consequently, they have varied interests and skills. These individual
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differences create .diversity in any organization, no, matter how simple or complex its
environment. Furthennore, an organization must often define its skill sets and disciplines based
on "the structures of trades. and .professions in the broader social environment" (Simon and
March, 1966)., Thus, the diversity of skills in an organization is also driven by the society in
which the organization is situated, as well as the specific interests and talents of its members.
Given the potential for differentiation within an organization, its ability to integrate, or
"reintegrate" (Pioreetal, 1994), the skills and knowledge of its members is of extreme
importance. Thus Van de Yen (1986) observes, "[p]erhaps the most significant structural
problem in managing complex organizations ... is the management of part-whole relationships"
(p.598). In the Lawrence and LOTsch study cited above, in fact, the high performing
organizations not only more successfully matched the complexity of their environments, they
also better integrated their diverse specialty groups than did the low performing organizations.
Similarly, in a review of management of innovation literature, Pavitt (1990) identified the
capacity·to integrate·knowledge from multiple disciplines as an important success indicator. In
addition, Kogut and Zander (1992) found that a firm's "combinative capabilities," a firm's
ability to combine old knowledge in new ways or with new ideas, was a key factor·in successful
innovations. Weick (1976) notes that a primary purpose of organizing, in fact, is to facilitate a
method of exchanging ideas between different individuals or groups, a conception supported by
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) as well. laositi and Clark ,( 1994) also warn that an underlying need
in many organizations is the ability to merge, or integrate, the different streams of knowledge
within a firm. And Sethi (2000), in a survey of marketing managers leading new product
development teams, found that "information integration" was positively related to new product
quality . Thus the central question for the remainder of this work is, how can the different
45
knowledge bases of an organization's. individuals or subgroups be combined such that the
organizational as a whole can achieve more than any of the individuals or subgroups can achieve
alone?
2.2.2. The Consequences of Differentiation
While the previous section identified many reasons for and benefits of differentiation within
an organization, there are also signif~cant drawbacks. "The "integration process is fraught with
difficulties, and conflict between subgroups is a frequent occurrence in many organizations.
Fundamentally, these problems can be traced to the identities that individuals create for
themselves based on their designated or selected specialty disciplines. As Lawrence" and Lorsch
(1967) explain:
When people "live day in and day out in a specialized role, they tend to see their own organizational
surroundings in terms of that role. The more personally involved in their jobs they become, the more this is
true. Such involvement often leads them to personalize the conflicts that arise with representatives"of other
organizational units. Of course they know logically that an organization needs different kinds of
specialists, but they forget the full meaning of this when they run into a particular person who is
'impossible to work with.' Then they all too readily tum to an explanation based on personality traits that
writes off the individual as an oddball and justifies their own withdrawal from or forcing of the conflict. (p.
216)
Similarly, Leonard-Barton (1995) describes "signature skills," which are skills or abilities by
which a person tends to identify him- or herself. The development and cultivation of these skills
tends to become "emotionally tied to people's egos and identities" (Leonard-Barton, 1995), and,
consequently, any changes that "might threaten these skills is viewed as "bad".
For example, Morison's (1966) study of naval gun improvement efforts found that
individuals' resistance to change was tightly linked to their narrow definitions of their own roles
and responsibilities. Although a ne·w aiming innovation significantly improved the accuracy of
naval guns, many officers staunchly refused to implement the new technology. Their resistance
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originated from theirperceptio,n that the new aiming system threatened to replace the manual
skills they had originally cultivated when they joined the navy. Therefore, the technology
threatened their own self-identities,. and, to preserve their sense of purpose and status in the navy ,
these experienced officers tried to block the acceptance of the new aiming system. .This
personalization of technical decisions often, results in disagreements between specialty groups
rapidly acquiring "the aspect of ideological disputes" (Burns and Stalker, 1961,p. 11).
These disputes 'are perpetuated within an organization because each of the subgroups, will
evolve to have its own ends and goals (Allen, 1988; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Carlile, 1997;
Dougherty, 1992). Thus, a product development organization',S design group will place utmost
priority on a product's performance, while manufacturing will worry almost exclusively aboutits
ability to meet its production quotas, and marketing will be concerned with meeting ,sales goals
(Carlile, 1997; Dougherty, 1992). These different goals will color how individuals from each
group view the world and how problems should be prioritized and addressed. As Simon and
March (1966) note, when these different views are combined with mutual dependence (e.g.,
manufacturing is dependent on design to create products for it to produce and design is
dependent on manufacturing to manufacture its designs) conflict. is a likely outcome.
Resolving these conflicts becomes all the more difficult because the division of labor that
may exist between an organization' ssubgroups .is arbitrary. As Piore et al {1994) explain,
differentiation is often based on four false assumptions: (1) that there is a unique way to divide a
problem, (2) that thepartitioningofa given problem is based on nature, (3) that the cost of
divisionis equal to the cost of integration, and (4) that integration is straightforward. The
consequence of decisions based on these incorrect assumptions is .that knowledge and skills that
should reside within one part of an organization are split between several areas (Boland and
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Tenkasi, 1995; Krishnan et aI, 1997). As a classic example, Bohn (1994) and Klein (1994) both
note that the application of Taylorism to factories resulted in the splitting of the knowledge
needed to understand why a factory is arranged the way it is (knowledge that became resident
with engineers) and the knowledge needed to actually operate the factory (which resided with
the. factory workers themselves). In reality, however, these two knowledge bases interact, and a
complete understanding of a .factory's performance requires both. In this case, the process of
differentiation led to the false impression that two separate bodies of knowledge existed in
nature, when in fact the division was created by humans.
Another consequence of differentiation, and the organizational divisions it creates, is that
it can inhibit the ability of a finn to think in new ways (Adams, 1998; Henderson and Clark,
1990;Piore etal, 1994). To some extent, what a firm "knows" is embedded in how it is
organized (Dougherty, 1992; Fiol, 1994; Klein, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992). As described
above, for example, knowledge of.how to operate a factory lies with one group, while knowledge
about how to design the factory resides with another. These divisions can lead to "islands ·of
knowledge" (Leonard-Barton, 1995) across which the flow of ideas is inhibited.
Furthermore, organizations tend to departmentalize themselves as· if the world were static
(Simon and March, 1966). The world, however, is actually dynamic, and, as a consequence of
this mismatch, organizations can be slow to adapt to changes in their environments. In fact, in
studies by Imai et al (1985) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), researchers found that successful
finns were often characterized by a willingness to forget what they had learned in the past and to
abandon practices that had been successful on previous projects. As noted above, organizational
structures tend to create rigidity to a finn's practices (Weick, 1976; Senge, 1990), however,
inhibiting its ability to make such changes.
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As this discussion has highlighted, differentiation is critical to a firm's ability to succeed
J
in. the marketplace, but unless ·sufficient attention is paid to integration processes, differentiation
can also be a significant contributor to a firm's failure. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider
inter-group communication processes in greater detail in order to better understand how an
organization's subgroups may be integrated.
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3. THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE
As discussed in the previous chapter, a firm's success in developing new products' hinges on
its ability.to first. differentiate itself such that its complexity matches that of its environment and
to then recombine the skills and talents of the differentiated units to deliver a final, integrated
product. Therefore, the effectiveness of the communication processes between specialized
subgroups of an organization represents a· critical element in delivering successful products or
services.
This chapter .willconsider the communications problem in detail. First, the current dominant
model of communication, the information processing framework, will be reviewed, as will its
shortcomings. Then an alternative theory will be developed, which will be used as the primary
theoretical framework forthe remainder of this 'work.
3.1. The./nformation·Processing Framework
The .information processing framework for communication within an organization. is based
on the theories.of communication first developed by Shannon and Weaver during the late 19405.
(Shannon and Weaver, 1963). This framework has helped to facilitate many improvements in
inter- and intra-organizational communication practices, but, as will be described, this theory
does not account for some significant and problematic features of human communication.
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3.1.1. Overview of the Information Processing Framework
The major components of the information processing framework are illustrated in Figure
3.1. An information source pulls information from its environment and composes a message that
is to be sent. The transmitter is the device used to send the message, in the form of a signal.
During transmission, noise may be inserted into the signal by a noise source, potentially
damaging elements of the signal. A receiver acquires the received signal, consisting of the
original signal plus any noise that may have been inserted into it. The receiver decodes the
signal into the message, which then arrives at its intended destination.
Information
Source Transmitter Receiver Destination
.. .. .. ...
Message Signal A~ Received Message
Signal
Noise Source
Figure 3.1: Shannon and Weaver's model of a communication system (adapted from Shannon
and Weaver, 1967).
Figure 3.2 applies this model to two people talking to each other. In this case, both the
information source and the destination are people. The first person to speak, the source,
composes a message based on his observations of the environment. Themessa,ge is then
transmitted by the person's voice, the signal taking the fann of sound· waves of spoken words.
Noise may be introduced into the signal, such as background sounds in the room, a. person's
accent, etc. The received signal is then heard by the destination person's ears. She then decodes
the signal, receiving the original message.
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Information
SOurcel
Transmitter
Signal with
Noise
Received
Message Recelverl
Destination
Figure 3.2: A depiction of human communication based on Shannon and Weaver's model.
This illustration highlights some of the key assumptions of the information processing
model. First, and perhaps most important, both the source. and the destination share a common
understanding of how to translate between signals and messages, e.g., they both share the same
definitions for the words they speak and hear. Furthermore, because of this shared
understanding, the receiver is able to filter out any noise that is inserted into the signal, a. second
important assumption. Finally, this model assumes that both actors are rational, i.e., the model
assumes the. actors will act dispassionately, and emotions will not color their interpretation of a
message or their choice of what message· is sent.
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This framework has been the dominate model of organization communication for more than
fifty years (C.arlile, 1997; .Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). For example, Bums and Stalker (1961)
viewed an organization .as an "interpretive system," which receives information from the
environment, carries OU.t operations on that information, ,and then retransmits it. Similarly,
Simon (1969) conceived of learning within an organization as closely resembling Shannon and
Weaver's information processing model. Galbraith·(1973)·also used·the infonnati~n processing
analogy, describing organizations as "information-processing networks." And Clark and
Fujimoto (1991), in their comprehensive study of product development practices in the world
automotive industry, used an "information perspective," stating that "product development is a
process by which. an organization transforms data on market opportunities and technical
problems into infonnationassets for commercial production" (p. 20).
Given this view of the human mind and communications as resembling the operation of a
computer (Suchman, 1990; Walsh, 1995), many authors have focused on defining different
"types" of knowledge. The goal of categorizing knowledge in this fashion is to facilitate the
creation of the. clearly understood definitions that help facilitate the communication process,
improving cross-discipline integration and organizational perfonnance. Table 3.1 lists some of
the many "types" of knowledge identified in the literature, along with descriptions of each.
Table 3.1: "Types" of knowledge.
Nelson (1959)
Facts or data: .That which is observed in
reproducible experiments
Theories: Man-made concepts that create
relationships between facts
Henderson and Clark (1990)
Component knowledge: Knowledge pertaining to
the design and operation ofa product's
components
Architectural knowledge: Knowledge about how
to combine .components to create a final product
Kogut and Zander (1992)
Information: Knowledge that can be readily
transferred (e.g., facts and symbols)
Know-how: Knowledge about how to do
something
Bohn (1994)
Data: .That which comes directly from sensors
Information: Organized data; data with meaning
Knowledge: Understanding that allows for
causal predictions and prescriptive decisions
Klein (1994)
Operational knowledge: Knowledge about how
best to perform a task (acquired with practice)
Analytical. knowledge: An understanding o/the
scientific principles underlying a task (acquired
with teaching)
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)
Tacit knowledge: Knowledge that is difficult to
codify or share with others
Explicit knowledge: Knowledge that is easily
codified and shared with others
Iansiti (1998)
Domain knowledge: Knowledge that is self-
contained and independent ofany particular
application
System knowledge: Context-specific knowledge
about how to integrate elements ofa system
Ahmed, et a) (1999)
Data: Information that comes from sensors
Information: Awareness ofthe context ofdata
Knowledge: Interpretation of information
3.1.2. Weaknesses in the Information Processing Model
While the information processing model has helped to improve communication
effectiveness in many organizations, it is not without its weaknesses. Its primary deficiency lies
in its assumption of stable, shared definitions of meaning between sources and destinations. As
early as 1956, Boulding (1956) noted that Shannon's information theory "is not adequate, of
course, to deal with problems involving the semantic level of communication" (p. 201).
Furthermore, Morton (1971) refuted the computer-based analogy often used for organizations,
noting that "though [they] are systems,·{organizations] are not machines!" (p. 93).
While ·a computer program has well-defined categories of meaning established from the
beginning, human communication is far more dynamic. Human-ta-human communication "is
not just a problem of processing, but of representing, creating, negotiating, and recreating
S5
knowledge" (Carlile, 1997, p. 11). The meaning ofa signal must be constructed actively, during
the course of the communication process. Therefore, the filtering of errors and the interpretation
of messages does not occur in human relations as cleanly as it does in machine communications
(see Figure 3.3), and the information processing model's assumption of shared meanings can not
be applied to·humans (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995).
!
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Figure 3.3: Flaws in the infonnation-processing model. The lack of shared categories of
meaning leads to failures in interpreting messages.
Given this lack of shared definitions of meaning, different subgroups within an
organization will seem to speak different "languages" (Allen, 1988; Bums and Stalker, 1961;
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; March and Simon, 1966; Morton, 1971;
Schein, 1992). Thus,as Allen (1988) notes, these different languages create "an inherent
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problem whenever communications must take place across an organizational boundary" (p. 139).
Furthennore, as groups become more specialized in their knowledge and skills, the "information
receptors" of the groups aIsobecomemore specialized. Consequently, a message that is clear to
one group wilLbe.unintelligible to another, a condition Bouldillg (1956) refers to as "specialized
deafness".
3.2. An Alternative Theory of Knowledge and Communication: The Process of
Abstraction
Overcoming the problems associated with the infonnation processing framework require
the development of an alternative model of communication that accounts for the initial lack of
shared meanings. The theories of General Semantics,pioneered by Alfred Korzybski, provide a
foundation for such an alternative theory. Originally· developed in the 1930s and explained in
great detail in Science and Sanity, Korzybski' s ideas gave rise to expressions such as "the map is
notthe territory" and the habit of waving fingers in the airto put "quotes" around words that are
used in specialized or questionable ways (Pula, 1994).
The following sections will develop·an alternative communications framework to the
information processing model based on General Semantics. First, several fundamental concepts
will be reviewed, providing a basis for an explanation of Korzybski's theory of abstracting.
Details of his theories will then be discussed, supplemented by more recent work in related
fields. At the c.onclusion of this chapter, an alternative model of communication will have been
developed, one that more fully captures the challenges of human relations than does the
information processing model.
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3.2.1. Foundations for General Semantics: Processes, Order, and Relations
..
In order to understand some of the basic concepts of human perception and communication
as formulated. in General Semantics, it is necessary to first describe some of the theory's
underlying premises about the nature of the world. First, and perhaps, most importantly, is the
notion of a "process" view of the world. Rather than considering the world as static, or
unchanging,. General Semantics starts from the premise that the world ~nd everything in ·it -
inorganic and organic objects - are "composed of some dynamic, fine-grained processes"
(Korzybski, 1994, p. 383). Thus, when referring to a substance such as "iron" one is actually
referring to a "persistence for a limited 'time' of certain gross characteristics, representing a
process" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 162).
The appearance of stability or constancy of an object, Korzybski argues, is actually a result
of humans' limited perceptive capabilities, and he uses the analogy of a spinning fan to illustrate
thepoint (see Figure3.4). A fan consists of a finite number of blades. However, when spinning
at high speed, the blades blur, and give the appearance of a solid disk. Similarly with other
objects encountered by humans - while objects may the appearance of permanence (like the
"solid" fan disk), they are in fact changing continuously. Therefore, no object, not even· a
person, is ever exactly the same at any given instant.
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Astopped fan... All of the Individual
blades are visible.
A spinning fan... The blades blur Into
a "solid" disk.
Figure 3.4: Korzybski's analogy between a spinning fan and human perception of processes
(adapted from KOfZybski, 1994, p. 383).
This ·dynamic,process-oriented view of the world then leads Korzybski to focus on
order. That is, if things change, they change from some initial state to a new state, and then
another, and another, etc. He notes that though it must remain as ancundefined term, "order"
conveys.a "sense of betweenness... If we say that a, b, and c are in the order a, b, C, we mean
thatb is between a and c, and we say, further, that"a, b, c, has a different order from c , b, a, or b,
a, c, [etc.]" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 152). Thus, the consequences of a given sequence of changes
are specific and different than an alternative sequence of changes.
Finally, General Semantics assumes that no object can ever be in complete isolation.
Therefore, an observation is always made between two objects, whether it be a human observing
a falling apple or a tree falling in an empty forest. Given that objects always occur at least in
pairs, it is always possible to conceive of some sort of relationship between them. So, Korzybski
argues, the phrase "to be" actually means, "to be related" (Korzybski, 1994,p. 161).
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3.2.2. The Process of Abstracting Part I: The Un-Speakable Level
Korzybski's .most significant contribution to our understanding of the human mind was his
development and formulation of the process of abstracting. Abstracting, he explains, can be
thought of as '''selecting', 'picking out', 'separating', 'summarizing', 'deducting', 'removing',
'omitting', 'disengaging', 'taking away', 'stripping'" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 379). The human
process of perception is a process of observing the environment, selecting some stimuli,
combining others, and neglecting or ignoring others - it is a process of summarizing and
integrating. Accordingly, "[w]hat we see is structurally only a specific statistical mass-effect of
happenings on a much finer grained level. We see what we see because we miss all the finer
details" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 376). Furthermore, a person abstracts from something,whether
that something is the.environment and events occurring around the person or one of the person's
own thoughts.
Like any other process, the process of abstracting occurs in a specific order. Abstraction
begins with a physical sensation, whether it be a touch, smell, sight, sound, taste, or an emotional
feeling, and then progresses to ideas, inferences, and conclusions. Therefore, the lowest order
abstractions occur at the "objective level," or the "un-speakable level", a tenn that expresses a
concept that is often .disregarded: "namely, that an objector a feeling ... is not verbal, is not
words ... Thus, we can sit on an object called 'a chair', but we cannot sit ·00 the noise we made or
the name we applied to the object" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 34).
The un-speakable, objective level,or first order abstractions, include all physical objects as
perceived by an individual (such as a chair) as well as emotional "feelings", and a person's
physical actions and interactions with the environment. The distinction between this lowest
order of abstraction and higher orders is significant. For example, one may "Jearn" how to drive
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a car·based on verbal instruction from an experienced driver. However, even if the student can
perfectly recite the instructor's directions, the student will not necessarily be a good driver - the
act ofdriving is not the same. as the words used to describe the act.
This distinction, between a verbal description of something and the act of doing it or the
object itself,has more recently been reformulated as concepts of "tacit knowledge." Polyani
(1966) first used this term, noti~g th~t ."w~ know more than we can tell". That is,a student might
"know" that he "knows" the material he has.just studied, but.he will find it difficult to express
with words. Similarly, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) stressed the importance of tacit knowledge
in the product development process. They described tacit knowledge as "knowledge of
experience" or "of the body", and noted that it tended to be context-specific and hard to
formalize or commu~icate. Carlile (1997), who also studied product development, described
tacit knowledge as "embedded inknow-how".and as "both difficult to access and transfer" (p.
18). Henderson (1991) also noted that tacit knowledge may not be verbalized because it cannot
be. Korzybski'snotion of the un-speakable level helps to clarify these observations: tacit
knowledge is hard to communicate because is it is not words.
Consider, for instance, Nonaka and Takeuchi's example ofthe development of an automatic
bread making machine (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The engineers developing the machine
first interviewed expert bakers to learn how to make bread. They then went back to their lab and
built a prototype machine. Though they had followed the exact instructions of the bakers, .the
bread produced by the machine was awful. After repeated efforts to fix the problems, the
engineers finally sent one of their own to apprentice under the bakers. During the course of her
apprenticeship, the apprentice baker/engineer learned that there was a particular twisting motion
that the bakers used on the dough that was essential and that had been missed in the design of the
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machine.. Nonaka and Takeuchi then call the knowledge of this twisting motion "tacit
knowledge". Korzybski's term "un-speakable", however, seems more specific: the bakers could
not convey this knowledge to the engineers during the'interview simply because the motion was
not words" and, therefore, could not be expressed verbally.
3.2.3. The Process of Abstracting Part II: Higher Order Abstractions
As noted ,above, the process of abstraction has a particular order, beginning with a person's
sensations. More generally, the process of abstraction, can be thought of as starting from a
"scientific event" (Korzybski, 1994). Korzybski uses ,the term "scientific event" to refer to the
infinite number of details, particulars, and aspects of any given event that occurs in nature. One
can explore this notion using a classic riddle: If a tree falls in a forest with no one around, does
the falling tree make a sound? Physically, the falling tree does disturb the air around it,
producing sound waves - this is the "'scientific event". The "sound" of a falling tree is a human
being's abstraction of the sound waves entering her ear. Furthermore, the falling tree itself is not
the only thing occurring in the forest - it just happens to be one aspect of the event. Hence the
second level of abstraction: an "object", in this case. the falling tree. The term, "falling tree"
corresponds to the next level of abstraction, the label. Once a label has been applied to an object,
higher order abstractions follow, such as descriptions ("the tree is brown", "it is falling fast",
etc.), as well as inferences, conclusions, ("the tree must have been old"), etc.
In order to help explain the process of and orders of abstraction, Korzybskideveloped what
he referred to as the "structural differential", illustrated in Figure 3.5. The structural differential
helps to demonstrate several important points about abstracting.. First, it highlights the basic
orders, or levels, of abstraction: the event (E), from which is abstracted an object (0), from
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which is abstracted a label (L) from which is abstracted a description (D), etc., on to higher order
abstractions. Each abstraction has associated with it some characteristics, or features, of that
abstraction (CE , Co, CL'- Cn, etc.). Note that the event is illustrated with arrows at the top: these
arrows indicate that there are an infinite number of characteristics associated with an event, not
~ll of which can ever be completely captured. Furthermore, the structural differential clearly
illustrates that each order of abstraction is separate from the others"":' the objective level, for
example, is not the same as the verbal (label) level. Thus, Korzybski warns against the dangers
of "confusing orders of abstraction".
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Figure 3.5: Korzybski's structural differential, used to highlight the major aspects of the process
of abstracting (adapted from Korzybski, 1994).
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Lines in the figure (AE-O' AO•L' AL•O) represent the process of abstracting from one level to
another. There are three important points about the abstracting process illustrated by these lines
and the characteristics that they connect. First, not all of the characteristics of a lower level
abstraction are· carried over to the higher level - i.e., during the process of abstraction some
details are left.out or omitted. Hence, in the falling tree example, one may simply say that the
tree is falling, without referring to the rate at which it is falling or the fact that that rate is
changing. Second, multiple characteristics from one level may be represented by one
characteristic at a higher level -abstraction is also a process of summary and integration. So,
insteaaof referring to all of the branches and leaves of the tree and manner in which those
branches and leaves ·are connected, one simply refers to a "tree". Finally, each level of
ab~traction has associat~d with it it's own, unique characteristics which do not exist on another
level. For example, when the label "falling t.ree" is applied to the object, one can make
statements about the label that do not apply to the tree itself, such as the label has two L's and
two £'s. The tree itself, however, does not have any letters associated with it.
This last point leads to the final features illustrated by the structural differential: the
abstraction process can continue indefinitely and ultimately leads to a more thorough
understanding of the event itself (Korzybski, 1994). That is, one. can always say something more
about an abstraction: the label "falling tree" has two L's; an "L" is drawn using one vertical line
and one horizontal line intersecting at a right angle at their ends; lines may be drawn using a pen
or pencil; etc. Furthennore, higher levels of abstractions allow humans to conceive of features of
an event that may not be directly observable. Thus, physicists were able to predict the existence
of black holes before a black hole was ever .actually observed. The concept "black hole"
represented an abstraction of physical processes that were suggested by other abstractions, or
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theories, about space-time and physics. More recently, Norman (1993) referred to abstractions
of abstractions as "metarepresentations", and noted their significance stating that,
[the] ability to represent the representation of thoughts and concepts is the essence of reflection and higher
order thought. It is throughmetarepresentations that we generate new knowledge, finding consistencies and
patterns in the representations that could not read~ly be noticed in the world. (p.-81)
Finally, Korzybski noted" that there is no need to establish an "absolute" order to
abstractions. Instead, it is important to simply recognize that there are multiple levels of
abstractions and to be able to distinguish lower order abstractions from higher "level ones. As
will be discussed below, confusing orders of abstraction is common cause of many problems in
organizations.
Since Korzybski introduced his theories about orders of abstractions, other authors have
developed similar concepts. For example, Boulding's(1956) conception of a mental "image" is
very similar to Korzybski's abstractions. Boulding observed that
... behavior is response not to a specific stimulus but to an 'image' or knowledge structure or view of the
environment as a whole. This image is of course determined by information received into the organism;
the relation between the receipt of information and the building up of an image however· is exceedingly
complex. It is not a simple piling up or accumulation of information received, although this frequently
happens, but a structuring of information into something different from the infonnation itself. (p. 204)
Likewise, Simon and March (1966) suggested.that people use simplified "models" to understand
the world around them:
The basic reason why [an]actor's definition of [a] situation differs greatly from the objective situation is
that· the Jatter is far 100 complex to be handled in all its detail. Rational behavior involves substituting for
the complex. reality a model of reality that is sufficiently simple 10 be handled by problem-solving
processes. (p. 15])
Also like Korzybski, Simon (1969) noted that people tended to think in "hierarchies".
Thus, if asked to draw a face, a person might start with the basic outline of a·face, then proceed
to add large features, such as a nose, eyes, and a mouth, and then continue on to add more
specific details. AndPolyani (1966) suggested that humans' perception of reality was "filled
with strata of realities, joined together meaningfully in pairs of higher and lower strata"(p. 35).
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For example, a person's understanding of a/written paragraph was based ona sequence of
understanding about letters, words, phrases, sentences, etc.
Eden (1994) models human decision making as a series of steps that mirrors the sequence
of the structural differential (see Figure 3.6). Furthennore, he notes that "[d]ecision making is a
consequen'ce of attaching meaning and significance to the events that occur around us -
perception filters in data,and construal interprets; thus perception and construalare.not the same
thing" (p. 263).· Though his terminology.is different, Eden is clearly pointing out that lower level
abstractions (perception) are not the same as higher level abstractions (construal). ,Thus, Eden's
model is highly consistent with Korzybski' s process of abstracting.
Events
Impact of Impact of
belief system value system
Selective Construal ~... Defining the ~... Problem
-...... Perception -........ "sense making" ...... situation P definition
Figure 3.6: Eden's model of human decision making (adapted from Eden, 1994, p.263).
Other researchers have also made similar observations about·people and their abstractions.
Senge (1990) observed "leaps of abstraction" (an expression derived directly from Korzybski's
theories) during disputes in organizations, when "[w]hat was once an assumption becomes
treated as fact," a problem that occurs when individuals "move from direct observations
(concrete 'data') to generalizations without testing" (p. 193}.Piore et al (1994) used the example
of re~ding a speech to observe·that when one reads a speech, one interprets the speech, by adding
inflection for example. Consequently, they argued, the read speech is not the same thing as the
66
speech delivered by the original speaker. Finally, Norman "(1993) stressed the importance of the
process of abstraction, and highlighted many of Korzybski's key points, when he observed:
The cognitive" age" of humans started when we used" sounds, gestures, and symbols to refer to objects, things,
and concepts. The sound, gesture, or symbol is not the thing itself; rather it stands for or refers to the thing: It
represents it. .. The powers of cognition come from abstraction and representation: the ability to represent
perceptions, experiences, "and thoughts in some medium other than that in which they have occurred,
abstracted away from irrelevant details. This is the essence of intelligence, for if the representations and the
processes are just right, then new experiences, insights, and creations" can emerge. (p. 47)
"3.2.4. TheOrganism-as-a-Whole and Semantic Reactions
Another essential element ·of Korzybski' s theories is the idea of the "organism-as-a-whole".
Korzybski stressed this notion in two respects: the concept of semantic reactions and the
importance of total body experiences. First, he rejected the traditional practice of splitting the
"mind" or "intellect" from "feelings" or "emotions". Instead, he noted that the human brain
operated in a cyclic fashion that started with an emotional reaction 'to a sensation'followed by an
intellectual component (see Figure 3.7). The intellectual component then fed back into the
emotional component, modifying the emotional reaction. Thus, the two reactions-emotional
and intellectual - can not be divided, not unlike the mistaken notion that space~time can be split
into "space"and "time".
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Figure 3.7: The interlocked cycles of "intellectual" and "emotional" responses. Aperson
observes.events, triggering (1) an emotional response, which is in tum followed by (2) an
intellectual response, which then modifies the emotional response, and so 00.
This indivisibility between emotions and intellect led Korzybski to develop a concept he
called the "semantic reaction", which he defined as "the· psycho-logical reaction of a given
individual to words and language and other symbols and· events in connection with their
meanings, and the psycho-logical reaction, which become meanings and relational
configurations the moment the given individual begins to analyze them or somebody else does
that for him" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 24). Thus, the process of abstracting is not simply a rational,
intellectual process·, but one that includes emotional responses. More specifically, it. includes
responses to meanings, hence the tenn "semantic". Furthennore, a person reacts emotionally not
only to the original stimulus (be it an action, object, word, or symbol), but to his ow~ further
abstractions based on that stimulus.
This notion helps to explain the emotional elements of inter-group disputes that was
previously discussed (see Section 2.2.2). Individuals from different groups attach different
meanings to events, words, etc. Such understandings of meaning, however, include both
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intellectual and emotional elements. Thus, when a person's interpretation of the world is
challenged, his or her reaction is likely to include an emotional element.
The conception of theorganism-as-a-whole also suggests that a person learns best when·· as
many of her sense are engaged· as possible.. Therefore, educational methods that engage a
'student's ·hearing, sense .. of touch, and -even her emotions, will yield better learning than simple
lectures alone~Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) noted the importance of bodily experience in
product development problem solving,.as did Carlile (1997). Honda, the automotive
manufacturer, institutionalized this concept for problem solving in the factory, requiring the
practice of the "3A's":· problem solvers must go to the actual spot, examine the actual part, in
the actual situation (Nelson et al (1998).
3.2.5. Abstractions and Language
Korzybski's process view of the world and his recognition of the human process of
abstraction has several consequences for understanding the use (and abuse) of language. First,
Korzybski rejected the object-subject division implied in the "is" ·identity. For example, one
might commonly state, "The grass is green." "Green," however, is a label conceived by humans
to describe the wayan object labeled as "grass" absorbs and reflects light. Thus, one speaks
more correctly by saying, "The grass appears green to me". This second version of the statement
explicitly recognizes the process of abstracting, and does not assume that "green" is a trait
intrinsic to the grass.
In place of a language based on the "is" identity, Korzybski advocated the development of a
functional language, one that describes behaviors and processes instead of asserting
characteristics. Korzybski argued that such a language was closer to the structure· of the ·world
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(based on the process view of world). This similarity is essential, because the only link between
a language and the empirical world is the relationship between a language's· structure and the
structure of the world it is intended to represent. The more accurate this relationship, the more
useful (and correct) the language.
These ideas have been supported by many other authors over the years. Dreyfus (1981) in
explaining Heideg-ger's theories, noted that "[t]he relationship between me and what I inhabit
[myenvironrpent] cannot be understood on the model of the relation between subject and object"
(p. 45). Instead, Heidegger stressed the importance of understanding the relationship between an
object and subject -by themselves, neither was complete. Both needed the other for sense to be
made of either. Similarly, system dynamics was created as a modeling language specifically to
provide a method of illustrating processes and dynamic relationships in place .of linear cause-
effect languages (Senge, 1990; Sterman, 2000; Weick, 1976).
Given this emphasis on recognizing processes, relationships,and. abstractions in place of
asserting intrinsic characteristics, Korzybski turned his attention to symbols, the building block
of any language. First, KOfzybski noted that a symbol is "a sign which stands fOf something" (p.
78). Understanding what a sign stands fOf, however, is not as simple a -task as it might initially
appear. Specifically, KOfzybski described symbols, and human words in particular, as
"multiordinal". That is, any symbol can take on a potentially infinite number of meanings, and
the only way· to be certain of a symbol's meaning is to extract that meaning based on the specific
context in which the term is used. Thus, Korzybski stated that
[t]he main characteristic of [multiordinal] terms consists of the fact that on different levels of orders of
abstractions· they may have different meanings, with the result that they have no general meaning; for their
meanings are determined solely by the given context. .. Accidentally, our vocabulary is enormously enriched
without becoming cumbersome, and is made very exact. (p. 14)
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The only way to comprehend a symbol's meaning is to. understand its relationsh~p to the world it
is signifying, hence the importance of a language's structure. matching the structure of the world
it describes.
Suchman (1990) made almost exactly the same argument, referring to the "indexality" of
words, rather than "multiordinality": " ... as a consequence of the indexality of language, mutual
intelligibility is achieved on each occasion. of interaction with reference to the situation
particulars [i.e., the "given context"], rather than being discharged once and for all by a stable
body of shared meanings" (p. 50). Furthennore, Suchman (1990) also noted that
[t]he efficiency of language is due to the fact that, on the one hand,' expressions have assigned to them
conventional meanings which hold on any occasion of their use. The significance of a linguistic expression on
some actual occasion,· on the other· hand, lies in its relationship to circumstances that are presupposed or
indicated by, but not actually captured in, the expression itself. (p. 50).
Similarly, Weick (1976) observed that "[i]t's certainlyobviolls.that saying is subject to numerous
interpretations" (p. 157), and Dreyfus (1981) stated,~'[a] sign's signifying must take place In a
context, and it signifies, i.e., it can be a sign, only for those who dwell in that context" (p. 100).
Therefore, like a map and the territory it represents, the meaning of a statement can only be
understood in terms of its relationship to the events it describes - the more similar the
relationship, the more useful the statement.
Furthermore, one's perception of the world is shaped by the structure of the language
used to describe the world: " ... every language having a structure, by the very nature of the
language, reflects in its own structure that of the world assumed by those who evolved the
language ... we readunconsciollsly into the world the structure of the language we use"
(Korzybski, 1994, p. 59). Thus, as Dreyfus (1981) stated "there are no interpretation free facts"
(p. 31). Similarly, Piore et al (1994) noted that "language pre-organizes the possible ways in
which a system of meaning can show up" (p. 418), and Simon and March (1966) stated that" ...
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the world tends to be perceived... in terms of the particular concepts that are reflected in [a
group's] vocabulary" (p. 165). In addition, Henderson (1991) and Carlile (1997) both found that
not only do words have strong effects on how an individual perceives the world, but the objects
commonly used by an individual (such as blueprints, faxes, tools, etc.) have a similar effect.
Therefore, .an individual's perception of the world will be strongly· influenced by the structure of
that person's system of symbols.
3.2.6. Knowledge as Structure
With. a conception of language based on relationships, one can now move to a more useful
understanding of "knowledge", an understanding that is DC?t dependent on the categorization of
different "types" of knowledge. To develop this understanding, one. must again turn to
Korzybski's concepts of process and order. Given that events (processes) occur ina specific
order, it is possible to fashion relationships between them- for example, one turns a key before a
car engine starts (order), and the act of turning the key starts the engine (relationship). Given a
series of relationships, one can construct a structure, "a complex of ordered and interrelated
parts" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 56) based on those relationships. Put another way, structure is a set
of relationships between relationships, and relationships are based on the order of a given set of
events. Therefore, structure is an abstraction from relationships, and relationships; in tum, are
abstractions from" order. Note, then, that any structure that a person sees in the world is an
abstraction that exists only in the person's mind, and it is not an actual attribute of the world
itself (which is always changing).
Korzybski then described "the content of knowledge" as "structure". The point is that a
single, isolated fact is not "knowledge",Dar is a simple list of facts. "Knowledge" consists of the
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construction of relationships and structure that link facts to one another. An analogy with a
house clarifies the concept (Korzybski, 1994): A house is not simply. a pile of bricks - it is a set
of bricks organized (structured) in a specific fashion. So too withJmowledge and facts.
These concepts, also, are supported by other researchers. Lave (1988) states that " ...
knowledge is notprirnarily a factual commodity or compendium of facts, nor is an expert knower
an encyclopedia" (p. 175). Instead, knowledge is an understanding between different concepts.
Simon (1969) espoused a similar theory, noting that memory is not based on "pictures~' but on
relationships: given one fact, a person can recall others based on the relationships between those
facts and the one given.. More recently, Norman (1993) observed a "similar ability and described
it as "navigation by description". Thus it seems that" the human mind operates on the basis of
relationships, not individual, isolated facts, lending support to Korzybski' s ideas.
A further consequence is suggested by Korzybski' s notion that the "content""of knowledge
is "structure": knowledge is context specific. As described above, order leads to relations, which
in tum lead to structure. Structure, then, leads to meaning (Korzybski, 1994) (see Figure 3.8).
That is, once a set of relationships are connected to one another creating a structure, meaning can
be abstracted from that structure. For example, words alone do not convey meaning. Words
mustbe organized using grammar to create a coherent structure. Once this structure is in place,
however, a message can be communicated which has meaning. Given the multiordinality of
symbols, the meaning, of a given message is context specific. Consequently, what one "knows"
is tied to the specific' context from which the relationships were originally abstracted.
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'Figure 3.8: The process of abstracting meaning from events.
Other researchers have developed very similar constructs. Giddens (1984) and Suchman
(1990) both described actions as "situated", i.e., actions take place ("are situated") in a particular
place at a particular time, making any action unique. Lave (1988) used the tenn"knowledge-in-
practice" to connote the specific relationship between what a person does and the context in
which it is done to what a person knows. The same type of relationship was implied in Schon's
(1992) concept of "knowing-in-action" and Morgan and Ramirez's (1983) "action learning".
Dreyfus (1981) also argued that what a person knows only makes sense in context - once a
concept is removed from its context, its source of meaning is destroyed.
Lave (1988) provided one of the best examples of this dynamic, context specific nature of
knowledge. He investigated the use of mathematics by adult students in everyday situations and
compared its use under those conditions to how they were taught math in schools. In school,
mathematical concepts tended to be taught divorced from any specific application: 1+1=2, for
example. Outside of the classroom, however, the students routinely applied mathematical
principles, but in different and dynamic fashions. When shopping for their families at the
supennarket, for example, students were forced to estimate the number of meals they were likely
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to make·before their next trip to the market,consumption rates for the various items they were
purchasing, and·a host of··other factors. The researchers found that the mathematical relations
used under these conditions bore little resemblance to the context-free math .taught in the
classroom. These observations then led to the concept of "knowledge-in-practice", e.g., how
knowledge of mathematical principles was used in a particular context or practice to solve a
problem.
Finally, given that knowledge is linked to meaning, knowledge is also linked to standards of
evaluation (Korzybski, 1994). Thus, one not only "knows" how to do something, one also
knows how to do that something correctly. Similarly, what one "knows," one "knows" is "the
truth". Recalling the notion of the semantic reaction, belief in "the truth" or what is "correct" is
'\
not simply an intellectual reaction, but an intellectual-em'otional reaction. Therefore, "[t]he
stronger the structural 'belief in the· 'truth' of the representatioD,or, in other words, the more we
identify the higher order·. abstractions with the lower, which, in fact, are different, the. more
dangerous becomes the 'emotional' tension in the factors" (Korzybski, 1994,p. 198).
This connection between knowledge of "the truth" or what is "correct" and emotional
reactions has become increasingly recognized in the management literature. Allen (1988), for
example, observed in his studies that "[a]n engineer's prestige among his· colleagues is founded
to a great degree. upon an almost mythical. characteristic called 'technical competence'" (p..193).
Similarly,Wenger (2000) noted that "[k]nowing ... is a matter of displaying competencies
defined in· social communities" (p.226). When an engineer appeared to lack knowledge of a
topic or to be uncertain ofa technical issue, his peers were likely to perceive his ignorance as a
lack of technical competence, and, consequently,. that engineer's prestige would be diminished.
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Thus, it became important for an engineer to be definitive in his knowledge, and to staunchly
defend his perspective in technical· disputes.
Similarly, Lave (1988) describes a problem as "a dilemma with which the problem solver is
emotionally engaged" (p. 175). That is, if the problem solver did not care about the dilemma or
its consequences, she would not·have a problem - the dilemma could simply·be ignored. For the
problem solver to devote time and energy to addressing the issue, she must have some emotional
stake in its outcome. Carlile (1997) observed thi.s same behavior in his study of product
development teams: designers would argue fiercely that a decision must be made in one
direction, while manufacturing engineers would argue just as fiercely that a different direction
had to be taken. Because their prestige (as it relates to their perceived technical competencies)
was at stake, as well as their "correctness" about the design decision (not to mention
opportunities for promotion and pay increases), the designers and manufacturing engineers were
emotionally engaged in the decision. Thus, Carlile (1997) observed that knowledge is not
neutral, but is instead "'charged' with power". Korzybski's notion. of the semantic reaction,
coupled with the process of abstracting, helps to account for these aspects of knowledge.
Finally, it should be noted· that such emotional disagreements in organizations are not
necessarily based on malicious intent, but on a desire to do what is best for the organization.
Each group is concerned with slightly different aspects of a problem, and, consequently,each
group will advocate· different recommendations (Dougherty, 1992). The resulting conflict, then,
does not originate from· people's small-mindedness perse, but from "honest people believing
they know what is best for the organization" (Eden, 1994, p. 260).
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3.2.7. The Individuality of·Abstractions, Mental Models, and· Confusing Orders of
Abstraction
Given all of the above discussions, one can state that most disputes between people are the
result of the different abstractions held by the people involved in the dispute. Returning again to
one of the foundational premises, all "objects", including humans, are dynamic, changing
processes. Thus, no two people are the same, nor is one person exactly the same at two different
times. Consequently, ·the. details and inferences one person abstracts from an event will always.
be different from those of· another person, or of that same person at a later time~ Therefore,
"[w]e can only agree on colours, shapes, distances, [etc.], by ignoring the fact that the effect of
the 'same' stimulus is different on different individuals" (Korzybski, 1994, p. 375). Whatone
person sees as "green" is not exactly the same as what another person sees. Since abstractions
occur inside people's heads, only· by pointing·to something that is "green" can two people agree
on what the word "green" represents- they have no other way ofcomparing their impressions or
abstractions (Korzybski, 1994). Korzybski referred to this process of "pointing to the thing" as
"silence on the objective level" - since words are not the thing, the only way to be sure that two
people are discussing the same .thing is to point to it.
Furthermore, a person's past experiences will influence what new perceptions are received,
and, consequently, what new· abstractions she will be capable of making (Korzybski,· 1994).
Thus, KOfzybski distinguishes between an "ideal" observer and an "imperfect" one. Consider
first the ideal observer (Figure 3.9). At some. initial time, Time 1, the person observes several
events, represented by the geometric shapes in the. figure. Based on these events, the person
abstracts descriptions (a, b, c,andd ), suggesting a conclusion or inference (A ), and causing the
person to take an action (A' ).Then, at a later time, Time 2,. the person witnesses another eve.fit,
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related to, but different than, the.initial events (represented by the shaded triangle in the figure).
The ideal observer ignores her previous inferences and conclusions, and generates a new one (B )
based on the new set of descriptions (a, b, C, d, and the new x'). This new conclusion then leads
the person. to carry out a new action (B' ).
TIME 1 TIME2
Seen events
(1st Order
Abstractions,
unspeakable)
Description
(2nd Order
Abstractions)
Inferences,
Conclusions
(3rd Order
Abstractions)
Actions
a b c d
... y ..
~
A
1
A'
a b c d x
'== v -"
~
8
1
8'
Figure 3.9: The abstraction processes of an ideal observer. When new information is received,
the ideal observer interprets all of her old infonnation again along with the new. (Adapted from
Korzybski, 1994).
The abstraction processes of an imperfect. observer, in contrast, are markedly different
(Figure 3.10).. As in the case of the ideal observer, the imperfect observer witnesses· an series of
events at Time 1, leading to descriptions, suggesting conclusions, and then resulting in an action.
The results at Time 2, however, reveal the differences. When the new, related event is observed
(again represented by the shaded triangle), the imperfect observer replaces the lower order
descriptions of the previous events with a higher order abstraction, his old conclusions, A. He
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then uses this conclusion to interpret the new event [A (x)], leading to anew description, y.
Consequently, another set of conclusions and inferences are drawn, C, resulting in a different set
of actions, C'.
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(3rd Order
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Figure 3.10: The abstraction processes of an imperfect observer. When new infonnation is
received, the imperfect observer interprets that information using the conclusions drawn from the
old information. (Adapted from Korzybski, 1994.)
The important distinction between the ideal and imperfect observers, then, lies in how they
use and compare the information they receive. The ideal observer always reevaluates all of the
old data along with the new, and then uses that enlarged dataset to draw her conclusions.. The
imperfect observer, on the other hand, simply interprets any new data using conclusions drawn
from the old data. The imperfect observer will do this even if the new data contradicts the
conclusions drawn from the old data.
As with the issues surrounding multiordinal terms, there are both benefits and drawbacks to
the abstraction processes of the imperfect observer. As noted above, the principle drawback is
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that the imperfect observer is unlikely to update his conclusions to better match his objective
reality, even if he receives information that would. allow him to do so. On the other hand, the
. imperfect observer's abstraction process allows for some efficiency: rather than having to review
every detail of a situation, place, object, or person every time he encounters it, the imperfect
observer can rapidly recognize the event as one he has encountered before.
Other researchers have referred to the processes represented by the imperfect observer
using a variety of terms. Lambert and Lambert (1964), in there review of social psychology
experiments, defined an attitude as "an organized and consistent manner of thinking, feeling, and
reacting with regard to ... any event in one's environment" (p. 50). Using the tenninology shown
in Figure 3.10 for the imperfect obs"erver, an attitude is represented byA(x).As illustrated in the
figure, Lambert and Lambert (1964) suggested that a 'person was more likely to accept
infonnation that was consistent with his existing attitudes - the person would take in information
and make it conform to his preexisting conceptions of the world. Weick's (1976) studies of
organizational behavior led him to a similar set of conclusions, noting that people tend to find
order in chaos where they expect to find it or tend to notice things that will help them achieve
what they want to achieve. A variety' of tenns are now used to describe such selective observing
and filtering, such as "mental models" (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Senge, 1990) "interpretative
schemes" and "thought worlds" (Dougherty, 1992), and "knowledge structures" (Walsh, 1995).
The most troublesome aspect of the imperfect observer's processes, however, relate to what
Korzybski refers to as "confusing orders of abstraction". Simply put, people tend to confuse
higher order abstractions with lower ones, such as, replacing the lower order abstraction that "his
face appears red" with the higher order abstraction that "he is mad", without taking the time to
discover that his face appears red because he had just been running.
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Simon and March (1966) noted this tendency in organizations, observing that "evidence is
replaced with conclusions drawn from that evidence, and these conclusions then become the
'facts' on which the rest of the organization acts" (p. 155). Simon and March coined the term
"uncertainty absorption" -to refer to this process: "when inferences are drawn from a body of
evidence .. and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then.communicated" (Simon and
March, 1966, p. 165). Similarly, Schein (1992), during his studies of organizational culture,
found that ·"[m]ost communication "breakdowns between ·people result from their lack of
awareness of that in the first place they are making basically different assumptions about
meaning categories" (p.72). That is, people tended to end up in arguments because they were
actually disagreeing on the meaning of the words they .were using, rather than the conclusions or
inferences they each held.
Schein's observation leads directly to another important element of Korzybski' s theories:
having a "consciousness of abstracting", or an "awareness that in our process of abstracting we
have left out characteristics" of the .objective world (Korzybski, 1994, p. 442). For people to
communicate effectively, they must first be aware that they may be defining words differently,
observing different aspects of the same event, or abstracting different meanings from the events
they see or words they use. Once this awareness has been achieved, a person is more likely to
ask for clarification of another person's statement before reacting to it, in order to be sure that
she and the other person are abstracting the same meaning from the words being used
(Korzybski, 1994). Such pauses for clarification then facilitate more effective and productive
communication.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) seemed to be advocating just such an approach when they
endorsed "confrontation" as a means of settling conflicts. During their studies oforganiz8tional
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dynamics, the researchers noticed that some organizations tended to ignore problems, others
simply allowed .their members to argue endlessly, while others forced the participants in the
dispute· to explain their point of view and the reasons behind that point of view. Lawrence and
Lorsch termed this approach "confrontational", because it forced the disputing parties to directly
confront the underlying reasons for the dispute, rather than simply debating preferred solutions.
Furthermore, the .study,revealed that organizations that used this style of problem solving tended
to be among the higher performing organizations than organizations using other methods (or
none· at all).
Similarly, Keeney (1994) noted that people tend to argue over preferred alternatives,
arguments that often end with high levels of dissatisfaction among all of the participating groups.
Keeney suggested that. this ~tyle of debate is reinforced by the manner in which most people
approach problem solving: developing alternatives first, and then creating evaluation criteria
second. Once alternatives are developed, however, individuals will almost instantly express a
preference for one over another. ConseCluently, when the debate begins over selection criteria,
people will argue in favor of criteria that will make their preferred alternative appear better and
the other options appear worse. Instead, Keeney argued, problem solving should begin with the
selection of evaluation criteria. Once the criteria are selected, alternative problem solutions can
be created and then evaluated. Since the participants agreed on the evaluation criteri~ in advance
of thecreationofaltematives, they are more like~y to accept the alternative suggested based on
the evaluation.
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3.2.8. Alternative Model of Communication
Earlier, it was argued that a critical assumption of the information processing framework
was its reliance on stable and shared meanings for the symbols used to communicate. As
discussed above, however, the reality ofhumari communication is that such shared definitions do
not necessarily exist in advance. Instead, because of the multiordinality of language and the
context specific nature of knowledge, the definitions are created over the course of any given
human interaction. Lave (1988) therefore describes cognition asa "distributed" process - a
person's understanding of a8ituation does not come solely from within that individual, but is
instead a product of that individual's own thoughts and her interactions with other members of
society (Eden, 1994; Henderson, 1991; Lave, 1988).
Furthermore, because of the emotional content of all knowledge, the "information flow" is
not neutral. Instead, all knowledge is laden with definitions of "value" and "preference" and
"correctness". Consequently,even in "intellectual" realms such as engineering, emotions come
into play and assumptions of rationality quickly fail. The information processing framework
offers no.mechanism for·handling such problems.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the problems discussed above and clarifies their origins. Two
imperfect observers, A andB, both witness an event that possesses an infinite number of
characteristics. Biased by their past experiences, each person abstracts a different set of objects
from the event, followed by descriptions. Because the objects and descriptions abstracted by
each person are different, each also abstracts different conclusions and inferences from the event
they witness. A then tells B his conclusions. Several problems are then confronted. First,
because the process of abstraction ·is a process of summarizing and omission, the message B
abstracts from A's signal is not exactly the same of the message A intended to send.
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Furthennore, when B compares A's conclusion to his own, he realizes that A is "wrong" - A's
conclusions in no way resemble his own. This discrepancy triggers an intellectual-emotional
(semantic) reaction, and an argument is likely to ensue.
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Influenced by Objects ~ " Influenced by
past ..0~ Illt.. abstracted It.. A 0 O· • \ past
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which 15
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Figure 3.. 11 : A depiction of why the infonnation processing framework does not apply to
humans.
Given these problems, a new model must account for the dynamic, multiordinal,
distributed, and value-laden nature of communication. That is, KOfZybski's concepts of
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abstracting need to be combined with an interactive model of human communication. To do this
requires the introduction of the "double interact".
The double interact is a framework .for human communication developed by Weick (1976).
Depicted in Figure 3.12, the double interact clearly illustrates the mutual dependence between
two people when they are communicating. Given a conversation between two individuals,
Person.Aand.Person B, A will first speak to B - the first action.B ·will then respond to A, the
first interaction. Based·.on··B's response" A will respond again,. resulting in the double .interact.
Thisback-and-forth element of communication is- important, because, .as Suchman (1990) noted,
a person cannot. know for certain what message she has sent until she sees how another person
responds.
Message
Person A
Signal
received bV
A, compared
with original
message
A's modified
signal
Person B
Message
received by
Person B
B's reply
~aIi)
Interaction ~
Figure 3.12: Weick's "double interact" model'of communication.
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Weick's double interact, however, can be enhanced when combined with Korzybski's
theories. The result is depicted Figure 3.13. As in Figure 3.11, the communication process
begins with two imperfect observers, A· and B. Each abstracts his own set of objects from the
event, followed by descriptions and then conclusions and inferences~ A then speaks to B - the
action. Babstracts from A's words what he thinks A's conclusions were. B then responds toA's
message, asking for clarification - the interaction. A can then attempt to understand what B
understood from his (A's) original signal. Based on this understanding, A speaks again (the
double interaction), adding further explanations to allow B to create an abstraction that is closer
to A's original conclusion.
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Figure 3.13: The double interact combined with the process of abstraction.
The, above model captures all of the elements of communication that can, make it so
difficult. First, it illustrates the process of abstraction, leading to semantic reactions (intellectual-
emotional responses) and indicates that the abstraction process is "biased" bya person's past
experiences. Furthermore, the abstractions created by each person are different and unique.
Consequently, the individuals do not share the same meaning and definitions for the symbols
they use. Therefore, communication between the individuals must be interactive - itmust be a
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continuous process of sending signals, receiving feedback and adjusting messages in order to
activel:y create· a shared understanding between them. This model, while more complicated than
the information processing framework, provides a more accurate picture of human
communications and interactions.
3.3. Review and Summary
Given the breadth of topics covered in the last two chapters, a summary is worthwhile:
1. This review began with the development of a definition for a system. Based on literature
sources, the following definition was put forward:
The process of combining a set of elements such that together they exhibit properties not exhibited by any
element independently.
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3.. Various ·studies related· to integration.were then reviewed, illustrating the importance of the
concept. Typically systems that are "better integrated" have higher performance than .less. well-
integrated systems. Furthermore, integration processes play important roles in innovation and
market creation, particularly in the development of architectural innovations.
4.. The concepts of differentiation and integration, as they apply to organizations, were then
discussed. For a variety of reasons, ranging from managing complexity to personal interests, the
individuals an'd subgroups ·within an organization tend to differentiate themselves, that is, tend to
specialize their skill· sets and: knowledge bases. The creation of successful products or delivery
of quality services, however, requires that these differentiated elements be integrated. The
integration process is complicated by the effects of differentiation, which tends to lead to
subgroups with different world-views and "languages."
5. Theories of communication and knowledge were discussed to provide a conceptual
framework to help understand the problems associated with differentiation and to indicate
potential methods to address integration. The information processing framework was
introduced but then rejected, because its assumption of stable and shared categories of meaning
. proved to be inaccurate.
6. In place of the information processing model, Korzybski' s theory of abstraction was
introduced. This theory argues that human beings abstract from their environment and that since
every human being is unique, each person's abstractions will be different. Consequently, the
meaning ·of symbols, as·· well as·· "knowledge", becomes context-specific. Furthermore, the
intellectual and emotional components of a person' sabstractions cannot be split, so that
"knowledge" includes value definitions, as well as judgements about "right" and "wrong"" The
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process of abstraction was then combined with the double interact to illustrate a new framework
for communication processes.
With these theoretical foundations in place, the next chapter explores the development of the
hypotheses for this study, as well· as the·experimental techniques that were used.
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4. HVPOTHESIS FOUNDATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Given the above discussions of differentiation, integration, and communication, the central
problem to be addressed by t.his research was to improve the ability of product development
organizations to integrate knowledge from multiple disciplines. This chapter will establish the
hypotheses and experimental. methods used in this study to achieve that goal. First, integration
tools and methods identified by .other researchers will be reviewed. Then, based on those
previous investigations and the communications model developed above, three hypotheses will
be postulated and explained. Finally, the experimental method used to test these hypotheses will
be described.
4. 1. Integration Too/sand Techniques
Integration methods identified in the literature can be grouped into two overarching
strategies. First, researchers have identified a variety of organizational designs that facilitate
integration in different ways. Second, other studies have identified specific practices that can
facilitate integration, regardless of an organization's structure. Both types are reviewed below.
4.1.1. Organization Design for Integration
At a top-level, the entire organization must shapeitself to best facilitate integration between
its parts. The literature cites two basic poles from which to choose: a functional or a product
organization. A functional organization is one in which engineers and other specialists are
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grouped together·within.their specific domains of knowledge, such as mechanical engineering,
manufacturing, or .sales.A product organization, on the other hand, groups employees not
according to their skills, but according to the project with which they are involved. In general, a
functional organization tends to retain and disseminate knowledge well over the long term, and
during times of stability (Allen, 1988; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 199~). A
product organizatioD,on the other hand, tends to perform better in dynamic environments and
when a high degree of integration is required (Allen, 1988; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995).
Between these poles, authors have recommended a variety of options.. One common
concept is the matrix organization, in which engineers are first organized into specialty groups,
and then assigned to product teams for specific projects (Alien, 1988; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
Nonanka's and Takeuchi's (1995) "hypertext organization" and Vande Yen's (1986)
"holographic organization" are similar concepts. The general idea is to allow the functional
structure to exist to maintain people's specialty skills. over the long ·tenn, while facilitating the
required flexibility and integration needed on specific projects with product teams.
4.1.2. Tools and Practices for Integration
Whatever the organizational structure for the entire company,a variety of mechanisms exist
for integrating people at a more individual level.
Co-Location
Several studies have shown that by co-locating engineers, the performance of the
development projects on which they work improves (Allen, 1988; March and Simon, 1966). By
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facilitating face-ta-face communication,· co-location he)ps engineers develop a shared ·language
and allows them to slowly reveal their tacit assumptions to one another. Engineers then develop
a shared frame of reference, improving their ability to communicate, which in turn improves
their ability to develop an integrated product design.
Human ·Bridges
Whether development groups are co-located or not, studies have shown that in general,
humans are'the best mechanisms for transferring knowledge. Studies by Roberts (1988)·and
Nishiguchi and Beaudet (1998) demonstrate that engineering groups can achieve high
perfonnance by moving engineers between functional groups or companies to exchange ideas
and knowledge in face-to-face meetings. Furthermore, such human bridges also best facilitate
the transfer of knowledge between projects over time, as studies by Cusumano and Nobeoka
(1998) and Aoshima (1996) have illustrated.
Teams
Several studies have indicated that project or product teams also tend .to perform better
than organizations that only have functional structures (see for example, Womack et aI, 1991).
Of particular benefit appear to be "heavy weight" teams (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). These are
teams that include nearly all of the skills and resources needed to complete a project from
beginning to end, usually led by an experienced manager. Because they are relatively self-
contained, these teams often achieve a high level of integration in their work. Moreover, due·to
their autonomy, such teams can often be self·organizing, configuring themselves specifically for
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the task at hand, further improving their level of integration (Imai et ai, 1985; Nonaka .and
Takeuchi, 1995).
Gatekeepers
The ·concept of the gatekeeper was first proposed by Allen (see Allen, 1988).
Gatekeepers are individuals who have contact with a number of subgroups within an
organizatio·n and outside of it. These individuals. are then in a· position to move information
between groups, translating between different functional languages as needed. Roberts (1988)
extended the idea of· the gatekeeper beyond the technical role originally noted by Allen,
identifying manufacturing and marketing gatekee.pers as well.
Integration Teams
In their study of project performance, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted that the
presence of an integration team tended to improve a project's. results. Such teams were tasked to
and rewarded for moving between the different specialty ~groups, ensuring that data needed by
one group from another was supplied, and that it was supplied at the right time and in the proper
fashion. Thompson (1967) and Roberts (1988) also found evidence supporting the benefits of
such teams.
Bums and Stalker (1961), however, found that the presence of such integration teams can
also hurt performance. While the teams may facilitate the transfer of information between
groups, they do so without putting, the two groups directly in contact. As a consequence, the two
groups never improve their understanding of each other, ·potentially allowing for. negative
stereotypes to persist and be reinforced. Thus, integration teams area technique that must be
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used with care. They may prove helpful in the short tenn,·but unless the proper actions are taken
to ensure good direct relations between groups, the indirect relationships established through the
integration team could lead to a deterioration in performance in the long term.
Management Leadership
Another factor that has been shown.to have a significant impact on project performance is
management leadership and skill. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that teams with the
highest performance were managed through "knowledge-based influence," in which a manager's
instructions were followed not·only because of the manager's hierarchical status but also because
the manager was respected for his or her.knowledge. The SAPPHO studies (Rothwell et ai,
1974) also demonstrated the importance of management in project success. Those investigations
revealed that key individuals in successful projects tended to be more experienced and have more
authority·than key individuals in failed projects. Furthermore, the SAPPHO studies concluded
that many project failures .could be attributed to avoidable management mistakes, adding more
weight to the importance of good management for project success. Similarly, Imai et at (1985)
found that management's role as a project "catalyst" was important. They also noted· that
management's ability to use "subtle control," the careful balancing of explicit instructions and
ambiguity, distinguished high perfonning companies from low ones.
Confrontational Problem Solving
Another element of managemen~leadership is the use of confrontation problem solving
I
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March and Simon, 1966)~ Rather than allowing problems to fester
I
unresolved, or, at the other end of spect~m, attempting to force compromise solutions on people,
I
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managers of highly successful teams tended to address problems in the open. People with
conflicting opinions were allowed to voice those opinions, and then, rather than seeking a
compromise, data was collected to support a specific solution to the problem. Once data was
available, even people who still did not necessarily favor the.·answer were found to support it.
Rules and Procedures
In a relatively stable environment, rules and procedures can be another useful technique
for integration (Galbraith, 1973; March and Simon, 1966; Roberts, 1988). By establishing
specific routines, people can know ,in advance what is expected of them, and how they are to
deliver information to other groups. Formalized processes can, therefore, reduce the need for
communication within the organization and foster better understandings between groups.
Common procedures can also be used to overcome cultural differences, whether they are
related to a field of specialization or national origin. Honda, for example, trains all of its
employees worldwide in the same basic problem solving approach (Nelson et aI, 1998). When
engineers from different divisions, orevendiffer~nt countries need to.work together, their shared
procedures ease the communication burden they face.
Overlapping Phases
Another technique that has been shown to improve performance· is overlapping of
development phases. Studies by Imai et al (1985) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991) have
demonstrated that projects that have some degree of overlap between their stages - such as
between development and design, design and manufacturing, etc. - tend to perform better than
projects that progress in purely sequential fashion. Furthermore, research by Cusumano and
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Nobeoka (I998) has sh'own that overlapping between projects can improve the performance of a
follow-on development project.
Considering Sets ofDesign Alternatives
Several studies have suggested that considering sets, or groups, of design alternatives can
facilitate problem solving on cross-functional design teams (Liker et aI, 1996; Sobek, 1997;
Sobek et aI, 1998; Ward et aI, 1995). Given that the members of a design team are likely to
focus on different aspects of a problem, they will each develop a solution that addresses their
own needs. Thus, by communicating about sets of potential solutions, engineers both illustrate
their goals and demonstrate the range of solutions that would facilitate meeting these goals.
Sharing this range of possibilities facilitates problem solving by allowing engineers from
different specialties to illustrate the constraints that they face. By gaining a better of these
constraints, .the specialists can more readily accommodate each other's needs, yielding a solution
that is acceptable to the entire team.
Prototypes and Boundary Objects
The final set of mechanisms that can be used to integrate knowledge across functional
groups are physical and virtual representations of design problems. Research by Noehren
(1999), Aoshima (1996), Carlile (1997), Henderson (1991), Leonard-Barton (1995), Robertson
and Allen (1993), and Wheelwright and Clark (1992) has shown that prototypes are excellent
mechanisms to· facilitate team discussion and focus efforts on problem solving. Prototypes help
specialists from different groups share their ideas by allowing for the creation of shared
languages, based specifically on the models themselves, rather than idiosyncratic references .
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particular to only to one group. More than simply allowing for the validation of design features,
therefore, prototypes are important for their role as communication .. tools . Given .their ability to
help move knowledge between organizational groups and boundaries, some researchers refer to
prototypes and similar artifacts as "boundary objects" (see, for example, Henderson, 1991 and
Carlile, 1997).
4.2. Topic Refinement, Context of Study, and Hypotheses
Given all of the above potential topics for further study, it was decided that the most
promising would be to study the use of prototypes and other design tools in facilitating
integration between disciplines. As noted above, a variety of studies have illustrated the
significance of such objects in improving communication. Furthermore, theoretically, the use of
objects during cross-discipline communication should be significant benefit. As ·discussed in
Section 3.2.7, since the abstractions a person creates from the environment exist only in that
person' shead, the only way for two people to ensure that they are both referring to same object
is to .point to the object.. Therefore, in engineering design, the use of models - either physical or
virtual - should reduce the uncertainty of communication between groups by facilitating the
creation ofshared symbols and definitions for those symbols.
4.2.1. Context of Study: Design Problem Solving
With the goal of investigating the use of models and prototypes during product
development, the next decision was one of scale. Forexample,one might investigate the overall
use of such models over the course of an entire product development process. On the other hand,
98
•
specific instances of model usage could be studied. For purposes of this investigation, the
specific instance path was chosen. Several factors contributed to this decision.
First, other investigators have detennined that problem solving behavior atsrnall scales can
.be a good indicator of behavior at larger, project-level scales. For example, Iansiti (1998)
studied 61 cases of problem solving efforts on design teams. The problems were relatively
narrow in their scope, e.g., fixing a problem with a particular component, not designing an entire
product. lansiti (1998) found that a design team's practices at this small-scale level "appeared to
have an enormous impact on product and project performance" "(p. 102). Therefore, a team's
effectiveness in solving small-scale design problems can provide an indication as to its success in
addressing the total design problem with which it is confronted.
Furthermore, studying specific cases of problem solving allows for use of the "critical
instant" technique (Allen et aI, 1978). This method forces study participants to recall a specific
event rather than describing "typical behavior". Because of this focus, critical instant methods
can be more reliable and accurate than "approaches that ask for general "behavior. Thus, from
both a theory and methods standpoint, studying specific cases of design problem solving
appeared to offer the greatest opportunity for meeting this project's goals.
4.2.2. Hypotheses
With a research context determined, a series of hypotheses were developed to explore the
use of models and prototypes during engineering problem solving. Using the theoretical
foundations ,discussed· in Chapter 3, three hypotheses were generated. These hypotheses are
presented in their general form below; they are operationalized (linked to specific, measured
variables) in following sections.
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Hypothesis One: Engineersfrom different specialties interpret a design problem differently.
Given the theory of abstraction, individuals interpret the world around them in individual
ways. Furthermore, as individuals in a specialized engineering group work together, the group
will develop its own biases in its interpretations of design problems. Consequently, engineers
from different groups will have different interpretations of a design problem.
Hypothesis Two: Engineers need to broaden their problem interpretations to solve cross-
disciplinary problems.
Given that engineers from different disciplines interpret (abstract) a design problem
differently, it is hypothesized that solving the problem to the satisfaction of all of the involved
engineers requires each engineer to incorporate aspects of other people's interpretations of the,
problem into her own. Once an engineer appreciates what aspects of a problem are important to
another engineer she can begin to address those issues. Consequently, one would expect that the
more similar two engineers' descriptions of a design problem were, the more effectively they
were able to solve the problem.
Hypothesis Three: Tools which illustrate constraints and requirements facilitate this
interpretation-broadening process better than tools that simply generate or illustrate answers.
Given that engineers interpret design problems differently, they are likely to reach
different conclusions about how to solve the problem. Since they are abstracting different
"problems" from a given set of events, the solutions to one abstracted problem are nat likely to
be the same as another. Therefore,' tools, such as prototypes or computer modeling programs,
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that help engineers from one specialty illustrate to another group what problem they are solving
are hypothesized to be more effective than tools that simply illustrate answers to a problem.
4.3. Data Collection Approach
A case interview approach was developed in order to collect data to test the above
hypotheses. The approach called for individually interviewing engineers and asking them to
each describe two cases of problem solving that involved a dispute between different specialty
groups. One case was to be what they considered to be an example of an "easy" problem, and
the other an example of a "difficult" problem. Interviewees were instructed that the·relative ease
of the problem need not refer only to the technical aspects of the problem, but could also relate to
the social or political factors that came into play. Therefore a "difficult" problem could have
been one in which the technical issue was relatively simple, but because of the people or political
issues involved, resolving the issue was difficult.
Whenever possible, efforts were made to collect paired interviews for each case. That is, if
a design engineer provide.d a case, he was asked to identify another individual from a different
specialty group (such as manufacturing) who also participated in the events. That second
individual was then interviewed, using the same set of questions asked of the first person.
Each case interview essentially consisted of two phases. During the first phase, the
interviewee was asked a series of open-ended questions intended to draw out a description of the
interviewee's interpretation of the problem and the process used to solve the problem. The
second phase of the interview used a series of 7-point Likert scale questions to collect outcome
measures and demographic information. The following sections· detail each question.
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4.3.1. Process-Focused Questions
A series of open-ended questions· were used to develop a basic description of each design
problem that was studied, along with a detailed understanding .of what the interviewee
considered to be important about the problem and the process that was used to resolve the
problem. Following are the questions asked during each interview, along with a brief discussion
of the logic behind the question.
Please briefly describe the initial situation - what was the problem?
The purpose of this question was to develop an understanding of the basic context of the
problem solving effort- what the technical issue was, what stakeholders were involved, etc.
Furthermore, this question often led the interviewee to provide an overall description of the
entire problem solving effort, providing useful guidance for tailoring later questions.
What designfactors or criteria were most important to you personally? What criteria or metries
did you use to evaluate the relative benefits or drawbacks ofpotential solutions?
In order to directly address the first hypothesis ("engineers from different specialties
interpret a design problem differently"), each interviewee was asked to provide a brieflist of the
criteria he/she used to evaluate potential solutions to the problem (such as "weight" or
"perfonnance" or "cost"). As will be discussed below,in cases for which paired interviews w.ere
obtained, a comparison of each interviewee's criteria clearly revealed the different priorities each
had regarding solving the problem. In addition, this comparison addressed the second hypothesis
(engineers need to broaden their problem interpretations to solve cross-disciplinary problems).
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How was the problem finally resolved? What was the solution to the problem?
Often tailored based on information generated by the initial question, this question
focused the interviewee's attention on describing the process the group used to resolve the issue.
Thus, interviewees would often outline a series of steps that the team went through to select a
solution to the problem, such as: holding a series of meetings, then conducting an experiment,
and then developing a solution.
What specific events do you believe were most important in reaching a solution?
Used as a follow-up to the previous question, this question fulfilled two functions. First,
it acted as·a check to ensure events or, steps that seemed to be emphasized earlier actually were
considered to important by the interviewee. Second, it prompted the interviewee's memory for
further important details. Answers to·this question helped to address the third hypothesis ("tools
which illustrate constraints and requirements facilitate this' interpretation-broadening process
better than tools that simply generate or illustrate answers") by prompting participants to
describe how different tools came into play while solving the 'problem.
Were any tools (such as drawings, CAD models, prototypes, etc.) useful in reaching a
consensus?
This question served as a check of the previous one and explicitly focused the
interviewee's attention toward the use of different design tools and their importance (or lack
thereof).
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Was anyone person most responsible for developing the solution or in helping to generate a
consensus?
This question was added to the interview after the first two interviews, during which
interviewees highlighted the contributions of specific individuals - an engineer who had a
particular insight, or a team member who helped to pull the group together.
How many design alternatives did you consider in attempting to resolve the problem, and how
were those alternatives considered: in series, in parallel, etc.?
Based on some of the trends indicated in the literature, the number of design alternatives
that a team considers seems to have some bearing on how well the needs of the different
specialty groups are satisfied. This question explicitly asked the interviewee to describe how.
many alternatives were considered and the manner in which they were developed and/or
compared.
What factors or events were the most critical to resolving the issue?
This question was used as a final check to ensure that the notes already taken accurately
reflected what the interviewee felt was important.
4.3.2. Outcome·and Demographic Questions
Outcome data was collected using a series of subjective measures based on seven-point
Likert scales. SimilarscaJes were also used to collect demographic information for each case.
When asking these questions, written copies of the scales were shown to the interviewees to
clarify thescales'meanings (see Figure 4.1 for an example and Appendix Afar all of the scales).
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Solution's Impact on Product
Performance
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Performance
Figure 4.1 : An example of the subjective rating scale used during interviews.
Subjective outcome measures were chosen for several reasons. First,because of the range
of cases that would be studied (from product design to factory floor improvements), few specific
quantitativemetrics could be identified that would apply across all cases. Second, companies
were often unwilling to release specific numerical data.about product or project performance or
cost due to competitive concerns. Finally,and perhaps more importantly, since paired interview
data was to be collected, it was anticipated that outcome "performance" would be measured
differently by individuals from different groups (e.g., "drag" for an aerodynamicist and "part
count" for a manufacturing engineer). Consequently, subjective measures were selected to allow
each interviewee to mentally tailor the specific measure to the metrics he or she considered most
important.
For each question described below, the range of the Likert scale is given in parentheses after
each question.
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How satisfied were you with the final resolution to the problem? (1 =not at all satisfied; 7 =
very satisfied)
This question allowed the interviewee .to rate his or her overall level of satisfaction with
the outcome to the problem.
Please rate the solution's impact on the product's performance compared to original goals. (1
= strong negative impact, decreased performance; 4 = no impact; 7 = strong positive impact,
improved performance)
This question allowed the interviewee to mentally select those performance metrics most
important to him or her, and then rate the ·solution's performance relative to those measures,
Furthermore, this subjective approach avoided the arbitrary selection of a metric.that mayor may
not have been significant to the individual.
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Please rate the solution's impact on the product's cost compared to original goals. (1 = strong
negative impact, increased cost; 4 =no impact; 7 =strong positive impact, lowered cost)
Since cost is such an important factor in the defense industry today, this qu.estion was
used to investigate any .factors that may have a direct impact on cost.
Please rate the solution's impact on the project's schedule compared to original plans. (1 =
strong negative .impact, missed deadlines; 4 = no impact; 7 = strong positive impact,.finished
ahead ofschedule)
Similar to the previous two questions, this one was intended to study factors that may
have contributed to effects on a project's schedule.
Did the solution result in any downstream engineering changes to the product or to changes to
associated systems or components? (1= yes, many engineering changes, or a few large
changes; 7 =no changes)
Engineering changes are often u~ed as a measure of design team performance, so this
question was intended to measure such changes. However, interviewees often had trouble
judging these impacts, and in a significant number of cases were not certain enough to provide
any answer. Consequently, this question was omitted from any analyses.
Please rate your previous experience with similar problems. (1 = have never seen a problem
like this before; 7 = have solved similar problems many times in the past)
This question was intended to help control for any "familiarity" effect in the cases ·that
were studied.
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Please estimate the complexity of the problem, accounting/or both technical and socialfactors.
(1· = simple; 7 = complex)
This question was intended to investigate what effect, if any,. the relative complexity of a
problem had on the factors that were judged to be important in solving it.
Please rate your degree ofprior experience working with the other members of the team. (1 =
have never·workedwith the other members before; 7 = have worked with the other members
many times in the past)
This question was intended 'to investigate what effect, if any, a person's familiarity with
the other members of the team had on the factors that were cited as important to resolving the
problem.
Please rate the accuracy ofyour memory of the situation. (1 = do not remember the case well; 7
= remember the case very well)
Used asa final check, this question helped to ensure that interviewee data could be
treated as reliable. (Several cases were thrown out due to very low memory ratings by the
interviewees.)
4.3.3. Quantifying Differences in. Problem Interpretation
Two measures were developed in order to quantify differences in problem interpretation.
The first was the "Ratio of Unique Criteria to Total Criteria Cited", or "unique criteria ratio".
This measure was used only for paired cases, and was the ratio of unique criteria cited by each
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interviewee of a pair to the total number of criteria cited across both interviewees. For example,
suppose the first interviewee.cited weight, cost, number ofnew manufacturing processes, number
of assembly steps, and manufacturability as her criteria, while the second interviewee cited
performance, cost, weight, and payload capacity. The total number of criteria cited across the
pair would then be nine. Since both cited cost and weight, those two criteria are not unique. The
criteria number of new manufacturing processes, number of assembly steps, manufacturability,
performance, and payload capacity, on the other hand, were each·only cited by one of the two
interviewees. Therefore, those criteria are considered "unique" and the ratio would be 0.56 (five
unique criteria divided by nine total criteria).
The second measure used to quantify· differences in problem interpretation was the "Ratio of
Unique Problems to Total Number of Problems", or "unique problem ratio". Again used only
for paired interview cases, this measure compared the problems that each member of a pair were
solving. As will be discussed, engineers tended not only to describe problems using different
criteria, in several cases they also described different problems. Consider again the lists of
criteria given above. These lists essentially describe two problems. The first problem, described
by both hypothetical interviewees, relates to product performance. This problem is characterized
by the criteria weight, cost, number ofparts, perfonnance, and payload capacity - all of these.
criteria describe aspects of the product itself. The second problem, however, relates to the
manufacturing process that will be used to produce the product This problem is described by
the criteria number of new manufacturing processes and number of assembly steps. While
interrelated, these two problems a physically different. Therefore, the unique problem ratio
would be 1/2 or 0.5 - there are two total problems, the manufacturing-related one and the product-
related one, and the manufacturing-related problem was considered by only one interviewee.
109
4.4. Operationalized Hypotheses
The measures .defined. above can now be used to operationalize the generalized hypotheses
presented earlier. These refined hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: Engineersfrom different.specialties will describe the same design problem using
different criteria.
Hypothesis 2: Engineers whose criteria lists are more similar -- whose lists have unique criteria
ratios and unique problem ratios closer to zero -- will ~olve problems more effectively, as
measured in terms of satisfaction and product performance, product cost, and project schedule
impact.
Hypothesis 3,: Cases in which design problems are solved using tools that illustrate constraints
and requirements will result in higher satisfaction and product performance, product cost, and
project schedule. impact scores than cases in which tools that illustrate solutions are used.
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5. RESULTS
This chapter will present the key findings of this investigation. An overview of the scope of
the. data collection effort will .first be presented, followed· by a description of the data analysis
process and examples of key factors. Finally, key results related to each hypothesis will be
presented.
5.1. Data Collection Scope and Analysis Process
Data was collected during visits lCJ corporate. members of the Lean· Aerospace Initiative
(LAI) consortium. These companies provide financial· support for LAI, .along with guidance and
data collection o:pportunities. Interviews were conducted at each site during one to fOUf day
visits. Interviews· lasted from thirty minutes to just over an hour. Depending on their time and
willingness to participate,· each interviewee provided one to two cases. When possible, each
interviewee w,as asked to provide an example of an "easy" case and a "difficult" case, as
previously described. Due to individual experiences, however, study participants did not
necessarily have one example of each. Consequently, the final data set does not include an even
number of easy and difficult cases.
Overall, ninety-six intervie,ws were conducted for this research. Of this total,seventy
interviews were "first" interviews - the initial interview used to identify a paired case. These
interviews resulted in a total of 98 cases (using just·· one individual's perspective). Thirty-three
cases were classified as "easy" by the interviewees, thirty-eight as "difficult" and twenty-seven
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were unclassified in terms of degree of difficulty. For analysis purposes, unclassified cases were
grouped with the difficult· cases. Twenty-six interviews were '·'follow-up" interviews, yielding
twenty-six cases for which two perspectives were obtained. Cases were further divided in two
primary ways: first, based on the major parties involved in the problem and, second, based on the
development phase during which the problem occurred. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 summarize
these statistics.
Table 5.1: Number of individual-interview cases by "Dispute between" and "Phase".
Dispute between ...
Across Groups Across Firms
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Conceptual Design 2 4 a 0 7 0 13
-a Preliminary Design 2 1 1 0 0 0 4
I~ Detail. Design 2 4 1 0 4 0 11I·rl! Product Improvementt EMD,or Prototype Testing 9 7 8 2 5 0 31.a:~I~Q Mass Production 1 2 1 0 13 1 2 29... -a.Q 0
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Note: Dispute between or Phase not indicated for 10 cases.
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Table 5.2: Number of paired-interview cases by "Dispute between" and "Phase".
Dispute between ...
Across Groups Across Firms
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Conceptual Design 2 1 0 0 1 0 4
-a Preliminary Design 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
,- Detail Design 0 1 0 '0 1 0 2.~ Ii1;:1 " Product· Improvement, EMD.or Prototype Testing 2 4 0 0 1 a 7.c:~I-" Mass ProductionIL-a CO a 1 6 a 0 0 7
Total (by Group) ·5 7 6 0 3 0
Note: Dispute between or Phase not indicated for 5 cases.
5.2. Analysis Process: Identification of Facilitating and Hindering Factors
In order to provide a framework to analyze the interview .. data, a list of factors that
interviewees cited as facilitating or hindering problem solving processes was generated. This list
was revised several times over the course of the study, both to better capture the intent of the
interviewees' descriptions and in an attempt to generate a statistically significant and stable
dataset. For each case, a factor was "scored" as a "1" if the interviewee cited it as important and
"0" if it was not cited" It should be noted that score of "0"· did not necessarily mean that a factor
was totally absent from case - it simply indicates that the interviewee did not specifically signify
that the factor was important. For example, "co-location" is one of the factors cited in several
cases. However, in several instances, team members were co-located, but interviewees did not
indicate that co-location played an important role in solving the problems. In such instances, co-
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location· was scored as a "0". Furthennore, multiple factors may have been scored "1" for any
one case. Thus, if an interviewee noted the importance of both co-location and the use of a trade
study, both factors were scored as "1".
The factors were divided into two broad categories: factors that facilitated resolution of a
problem and factors that inhibited resolution. The following two sections detail each factor,
along with examples from interview data. Appendix B shows all of the factor data.
5.2.1. Factors Facilitating Problem Resolution
Mainagemef)t Intervention
Definition: In order to solve the problem, management was asked to step in and make a final
decision for the team, Of, because the team was unable to do so on its own, management
intervened without the team's request to settle a dispute.
The design of a weapon system's power subsystem provides an example of management
intervention. Early in the subsystem's development, a relatively new architecture was chosen for
the design. As the program evolved, however, a change toa related subsystem caused the power
subsystem engineering group to re-evaluate its initial decision. The group conducted a series of
computer simulations of alternative architectures and ultimately decided to change the system to
a more "traditional" configuration. These results were then presented to other specialty groups
working ·to develop the weapon system, several of whom were opposed to making the change
(due to its impacts to their elements of the system). As a result of the developing impasse, the
issue was raised to the level of the program's chief technologist (a senior manager). The
manager· reviewed the power group's simulations and requested an additional series of tests and
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evaluations. After these requests had been satisfied, the manager mandated that the power
subsystem group's change be implemented, forcing the other groups to accept the modification.
Critical Team Member
Definition: A single member· of the team was crucial to settling a dispute, either by "doing the
leg work", serving as a negotiator or mediator between groups, or developing a key technical
insight.
An example of a critical team member is demonstrated by the design of a tool to repair
fatigue cracks· found in an aircraft's fuel tank. The engineering .group at the ·company
responsible· for fixing the cracks had determined that a portion of the tank would "have to be cut
out and a metal "patch" installed. The challenge to the tooling group, therefore, was to desigo.a
cutting tool that would fit ioto the narrow space of the fuel tank. Initially, the tooling
engineering lead did not believe it would be feasible to develop a tool with the ·needed
capabilities. After some initial design work, he was directed to contact another tool designer at
one of the company's other sites. Communicating via phone and fax, the other designer was able
to conceiveofa tool that met the group's needs. Thus, the tool designer served as a "critical
team member" - without his input, the tool itself might not have been developed.
Reliance on Engineering Expertise
Definition: The problem's solution was a result of "good engineering", careful thought and
reflection, or creativity.
An engineering team at a automotive manufacturer was confronted with a problem when
styling changes displaced a taillight on a new· version of a car design. In particular, the challenge
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was how to.package the light and its electronics given the new constraints imposed by the styling
choices that had been made. As one of the engineers involved in designing the installation for
the light described, the solution was the result of "lots of thinking in the car." In this case, no
specific design tools (such as computer aided design packages or rapid prototypes) were used-
the engineers simply spent time considering the problem in their minds. Such a process was
therefore characterized as· "reliance on engineering expertise".
Use o/Trade Studies
Definition: The team conducted a trade study (formal consideration of multiple options which
are compared against an explicit set of metrics), and the development and execution of the study
was critical to solving the problem.
The process .usedby an aircraft design team.to select the configuration for .an aircraft's
control surfaces provides a classic example of a trade study. The team consisted of engineers
from multiple sites within the company, and the engineers from each site had different
"philosophies" regarding the benefits of various configurations. In order to create a consensus
on which approach to follow, the team developed an extensive trade study to select a
configuration. The first step in the study was to agree to a set of engineeringmetrics that would
be used tojudge the benefits and drawbacks of each design alternative (for example, weight and
perfonnance). In addition, the engineers agreed to a series of qualitative methods of comparison,
to add to their understanding of the merits of each design (for example, marketing
considerations). The team then developed a range of configuration alternatives. These
alternatives were compared using the previously agreed to metrics.Based on a combination of
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the qualitative and quantitative metrics, the team was able to reach a consensus on which
configuration to pursue.
Show and tell
Definition: Showing a boundary object (such as a model of the product, a drawing, etc.) was
critical in helping the group solve the problem.
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, a boundary object is a physical object that helps to,
communicate a design problem or show relationships in ,a problem. In this instance, "show and
tell" has a specific meaning that must be clarified. An example helps to demonstrate this factor's
meaning.
An aircraft subsystem design te,am faced a problem with, the airflow from a cockpit
windshield defog, nozzle. The nozzle was not providing the proper defogging performance, and
this problem was traced to a stagnation point in the nozzle's airflow. Uncertain of the specific
cause of the problem, the manager responsible, for the nozzle needed to bring, together his entire
multidisciplinary team to address the issue. The team included individuals that would be critical
to solving the problem who had little to no knowledge of nozzle aerodynamics, such as the
manufacturing engineers.
In order to illustrate the stagnation point, the manager and some of'his aerodynamicists
built several models they could use to illustrate theproblem~ First, the actual nozzle was
mounted to the end of leaf...blower - it turned out the leaf blower's mass flow rate was similar to
the flow rate of the installed nozzle. Tufts of thread were then· taped to ·the nozzle. When the
leaf-blower was turned on, the tufts of thread in the stagnation area would stay limp while the
others would blow straight. This phenomenon was video taped, and the tape was then shown to
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the other team members to explain the problem during a meeting. To further help the other
engineers appreciate the issues, the nozzle was also attached to a hair dryer that was brought to
the meeting and passed around, allowing everyone to experiment with the nozzle on his or her
own.
Use of Tests
Definition: The use of tests and test data (whether real or "virtual"/computer simulated .testing)
was critical in helping the -group solve the problem.
The· use of tests is distinguished from showing boundary objects· and trade studies" on the
basis of process .and intent. -A trade study is characterized by its comparison of multiple design
options, and show and.tell is distinguished by one group creating an object that is then shown to
another. A test, in contrast, is typically done "to prove" a hypothesis, i.e., a test is part of an
experiment that includes a hypothesis to be proven or refuted.
For example, the area around several'rivets on an aircraft skin suddenly began to develop
"dimples" during production. A multidisciplinary team, including engineers and factory line
operators, was formed to resolve the problem.. Initially, many of the team members believed
they. "knew" the source of the problem. Such assertions, however, simply led to heated debates.
One of the engineers on the team then grew suspicious of the operating settings that had
been programmed into the riveting tool. The engineer went to a similar tool on another aircraft's
assembly line. "Bringing the factory machine operators with him, he first checked the machine's
operation" using the nominal operating parameters for the problematic machine. These settings
produced the correct"results. He then entered the actual parameter values that were being used
on the problematic machine.· These settings recreated the dimpling problem, thus demon~trating
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that the dimpling problem lay specifically in the settings being used on the machine. Thus, the
important elements of "use of tests" were clearly illustrated:' the hypothesis, followed by a test to
prove or disprove the hypothesis.
It is important to note that two key features distinguished "use of tests"from "show and
tell": participation and context. As described above, "show and tell" was typified by instances in
which one member (or subgroup) of team brought an artifact (such as a boundary object) to a
team meeting and then pointed to that object during a discussion. "Use of tests," on the other
hand, required that the team as a whole .either agree to conduct the. test or that the team as a
whole in some way witnessed the test itself. That is, "use of tests" was a more inclusive event.
Furthermore, "use of tests"· maintained a greater amount of a problem's context than· did
"show and tell." For instance, in the nozzle example ,described above, a leaf-blower substituted
for the actual nozzle arrangement. While this demonstration illustrated the stagnation points on
the nozzle, it could not be used to show the interaction between. the nozzle .and cockpit or the rest
of defog system. In contrast, in the testing example just discussed, the engineer demonstrated the
problem on the factory floor using actual factory machines, thereby retaining more of the
problem' soriginal context.
Time Pressure
Definition: The team was under significant time pressure, and this pressure helped the team to
reach a consensus.
An example of time pressure was provided by a product improvement initiative for an
aircraft. Several structural beams on the airframe tended to be damaged during assembly,
resulting in expensive rework. A multidisciplinary design team was assembled to solve the
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Lproblem. The team began to flounder from a variety of social and technical challenges. Finally,
upper level management established a finn deadline by which the project had to be completed.
The establishment of this specific date provided the pressure the team needed to focus on the
problem and make the necessary compromises'to create a consensus regarding a solution.
Co-located Team
Definition: All team members were physically located in close proximity, and' this, proximity
was helpful in solving the problem.
During early tests of a new aircraft, problems were uncovered with a fuel sensor.
Different elements of the total fuel system, however, were controlled by different groups within
the company, and these groups were geographically dispersed. In order to solve the problem, the,
engineers with the needed expertise were all temporarily relocated to a common work area. ' The
ease of communication facilitated by this' common area was an' essential, element to helping the
group quickly solve the problem.
FrequentFace-to-Face Meetings
Definition: Although not co-located, the team met regularly to review their progress and discuss
the problem.
For example, a new car design team was having trouble designing 'an interior console
unit. Specifically, the problem centered on how an access door on the console should operate.
The design favored by engineering was disliked by styling. The engineers, stylists, and their
managers held meetings ona regular basis, at which engineering and styling would present their
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latest design concepts and critique each other's ideas. Over the course of these meetings the
team developed a mutually suitable design that was ultimately selected for production.
Shared· Objectives or Well Understood Requirements
Definition: All members of the .team evaluated the design or were themselves evaluated on the
basis of a shared understanding of the team's purpose or on shared, performance measures.
A good illustration of the power of shared objectives or well understood requirements is
shown by a.design team's decision to move a production break' in .the manufacture of a new
aircraft. The plane was to be built by several companies, each company responsible for a
different section of the vehicle. An initial series of decisions· were made during conceptual
design about the location ofthese production. breaks and the workshare the breaks represented.
As the design's detail increased, however, the engineers came to. realize that using the. original
break in one locatioowould make the aircraft difficult and costly to produce. The team began to
debate how the break should be moved, a debate with significant consequences: Moving a
'productioo'break could change the amount of money the companies would earn. However, two
factors were particularly important to the team because of their importance to their customer:
weight (which affected the product's performance) and schedule (when the customer would
receive' the aircraft). A comparison of the different options for moving the production break
showed that a shift in the break would have significant benefits for these two measureS.
Consequently, even though one of the companies would lose some its workshare, the engineers
from that company agreed to the shift.
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Development ofa Win-Win Solution
Definition: The problem was resolved because the team developed a solution that improved the
design's performance along multiple dimensions~
For example, during the .development of a technology demonstration version of a new
weapon system, one of the subsystem engineering groups developed a novel approach for using a
back-up power generator to provide supplementary power-during the weapon system's normal
operation. This idea was developed to solve several problems the group was facing~ The
concept, though unconventional, also had benefits for other subsystem groups, such as reducing
the weapon system's weight, leading to improvedperfonnance, and allowing for the elimination
of some other components, reducing the cost of the demonstrator. While· the subsystem group
originally proposed the change because of the advantages it offered relative to their own
measures of performance, these additional benefits meant that _other groups had reasons to
support the change as well.
Delineation ofTechnical Issues/"Reasons Why JJ
Definition: Special efforts were made to explain the technical aspects of a problem to
individuals from other groups. rather allowing team members to argue over opinions.
The debate over the approach used to install a structural upgrade to an airframe illustrates
this factor. Initially, the manufacturing representatives on the team developing the upgrade
proposed an installation scheme. The design engineers did not support the proposed approach,
and in the ensuing debate, the group appealed to their manager to resolve the problem. The
manager refused to -force a decision, however, and sent the team back to. settle the issue on its
own. Ultimately,.thedesign engineers used what one of them referred to as a "logic argument":
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the designers slowly and meticulously explained to the manufacturing engineers why their
proposed approach would not· work and why ·an alternative approach would. Eventually, based
on this reasoned argument, the manufacturing engineers agreed to thealtemative method.
5.2.2. Factors Inhibiting the Resolution of a Problem
Social Problems
Definition: The presence of negative social factors, such as lack of experience working together,
."cultural" differences, or historic~strust,inhibited the team's ability to resolve the problem.
A "classic" example of this problem was illustrated by a manufacturing engineer
describing a case about producibilityproblems with an aircraft part. The part in question, a
complex composite component of an aircraft bodypanel~ could not· be reliably produced· based
on its original design~ The manufacturing engineers responsible for the part then approached the
design engineers to request a change to the design. Historically, however, the company's
different groups had interacted using an "over-the-wall" model: design would develop a part
concept and then pass it on to manufacturing, who would then produce the part, without
providing any feedback to design. In this case, however, extensive changes were required to the
part ifit was to be produced reliably. The lack of past interactions, however, initially hindered
the ability of the manufacturing and design groups to work together to develop a solution.
Misuse ofBoundary Objects or Test Data
Definition: Boundary objects or test data were used by one side of a dispute in a fashion that
misconstrued the.truth or the important relationships of a problem.
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Again, a case .of manufacturing-to-engineering interaction provides an example of this
factor. Similar to the case described above, a new aircraft component made of composite
materials could not be reliably produced. Manufacturing engineers brought this problem to the
attention of the design engineers in order to address the problem. When first presented with the
issue, the design engineers noted that a pilot program had been run demonstrating the
manufacturing techniques used to produce the composite component. The results from that pilot
program, the designers noted, suggested that the manufacturing process was adequate, and,
therefore, no change to the part's design was necessary. This conclusion, however, was faulty.
While the pilot program had been considered a success, the tests had been conducted on parts
with relatively simple shapes. The production part, in contrast, had a complex shape, and the
manufacturing problems were directly related to the production of these complicated features.
The results of the pilot program, consequently, were not a reliable representation of the problems
that were being confronted in the production of the final part. Therefore, the designers were
misusing the results of the pilot program.
Poorly Defined or Understood Requirements or Lack ofShared Metrics or Objectives
Definition: Different members of the team interpreted the team's requirements or performance
metricsdifferently, making problem solving difficult. Or, the lack of shared rnetrics inhibited
the team from reaching a consensus.
A debate over the installation of a tow hook in a new car design demonstrates this factor.
During the developmentof an export version of a new car, a debate arose over where a tow hook
should be built into the vehicle. The engineers were basing their arguments on a company
guideline for export market tow hook design. Using this guideline, however~ resulted in a design
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of which styling did not approve. The debate continued in circles for several weeks. One of the
engineers assigned to the issue then began to study the guideline itself. He discovered that the
company guideline was based on an amalgam of requirements from several different segments of
the export market. Consequently, there was no Cone specific tow hook installation requirement -
the guideline essentially represented an "average". The engineers pushing for the design to
conform exactly to the guideline did not know this, however, and this lack of understanding
fueled the debate. Once the requirement was clarified, a final design decision was made, though
several of the design engineers remained displeased with the final result (because of their
interpretation of the design guideline).
Unclear or Split Lines of Communication and/or Authority
Definition: Team members did not know for certain who was in charge, or the team debated
who was in charge. Or, communication channels between team members were indirect,
requiring multiple handoffs or intennediaries.
A case related to manufacturing quality illustrated both aspects of this factor. An aircraft
component supplier's engineering group was not satisfied with the quality of a weld. on a
component during production. In an attempt to correct the problem, the engineering group began
investigating an alternative welding method. The engineers asked for and initially received
support from the tooling group to help develop the new welding method and the requisite tools.
Once some initial work had been completed on the new approach, the engineering. group wanted
to test it on the production line. The line, however, was located overseas and- was in the midst of
full rate production. Consequently, the plant manager was unwilling to shut down the line to
allow engineering to experiment with the new tool. At that point, it was unclear who had more
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authority - the engineers or the plant manager. Development of the. tool (and, therefore, .the
elimination of the welding problems) slowed until the groups could detennine who had decision
making. authority for running the tests.
5.2.3. Consideration of Alternatives
The final factor that was recorded was the manner in which the team .considered design
alternatives. Three possible approaches were identified: (1) serial or iterative development of
one idea at atime; (2) parallel consideration of two design options; and (3) parallel consideration
of three or more design options. Interviewees were specifically asked to indicate what approach
was used for each case they described. Note, however,- that a response of "2" or "3" (parallel
consideration of two or three or more alternatives) did not necessarily mean that an interviewee
cited trade' studies as important. In several cases, for instance, interviewees said that they did
consider two options in parallel, but that no formal trade study was done to select between them
- the decision was based on less formal processes and judgements.
5.3. Hypothesis One: Implications from the Data
It will be recalled that hypothesis one stated that engineers from different specialties
interpret design problems differently and that these differences could be measured using the
unique criteria ratio and unique problem ratio. Table 5.3 shows the mean, high, and low scores
for these two measures. Several important points can be taken from this simple table. First, on
average, each member of a pair listed a different set of criteria than did his or her counterpart
(i.e.. , the mean value of the unique criteria ratio was not zero). This result suggests that engineers
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from different specialties .do interpret the same problem differently. Returning to· Korzybski' s
model of abstraction, one could say that one engineer abstracts a different set of criteria from a
design problem than does another. Perhaps more importantly, this result demonstrates that
engineers evaluate design problems differently, a topic to be addressed in greater detail below.
Table 5.3: Mean, high, and low results for the unique criteria and problem ratios.
Mean Low High
Unique Criteria Ratio 0.56 0.2 1
Unique Problem Ratio 0.32 0 1
Notes:
Total number of cases for which data was
available =18.
For both ratios,a 1 Indicated completely
different responses by each Interviewee In a
p.alr, while a zero indicates exactly the same
response.
Table 5.3 also indicates that, on average, the two members of each interviewed pair actually
were considering different problems (i.e., the mean value of the unique problem ratio was
nonzero). Thatis, a given design problem does not consist ofa single issue, but consists of a set
of interrelated problems, the nature of which can vary to a great degree. Examples help to
illustrate both differences in problem definition and differences in criteria~
5.3.1. Case Examples
Consider first· a case in which both interviewees in a pair were addressing the same problem
(unique problem ratio was zero) but they each considered a somewhat different set of criteria.
An example of such case ·revolved around the design and development of ·a· customized
manufacturing tool for a large aerospace component (case 82 in Appendix· C). The tool was
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designed to move along a part and to drill holes perpendicular to the surface along the part's
length. The criteria lists for the two engineers interviewed from the project are shown in Figure
5.1 (note that in this case, both interviewees were design engineers). Arrows between criteria in
the figure indicate shared criteria, and since there are seven total criteria, three of which are
unique, the unique criteria ratio was 0.43 (three divided by seven). All of the criteria address the
same problem, the design of the tool. Therefore the total number of problems was one, and since
there are no unique problems, the unique problem ratio was O.
Design Engineer 1
1. Ability to build part
2. Part 'quality
3. Cycle time
4. Ergonomics
Design Engineer 2
1. Tool must be lightweight
2. Ease of use
3. Conform to surface
Figure 5.1: Comparison of problem definitions: shared problem, but different criteria (arrows
indicate shared criteria)2.
Therefore, although both designers were concerned about the design of the tool and its
performance, they were evaluating its performance slightly differently. Both wanted, to ensure
that the tool be easy to use and that it conform to the contoured surfaces on which it was
intended to operate. However, design engineer 1 seemed to be more concerned about the
manufacturing performance of the tool, as indicated by the criteria part quality and cycle time.
Note that both of these criteria are still related to the design of the tool -- they are a measure of
tool performance - so engineer 1 is not addressing a different problem than engineer 2. The
2 Throughout this work, criteria are listed in the order in which they were stated by interviewees - no
particular significance should be attributed to their ordering. In most cases, criteria are listed as ,direct quotes from
interviewees. However, .in order to ensure confidentiality and protect proprietary data, terminology has been altered
in some instances.
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differences in criteria,however, do indicate that the engineers are evaluating the design
somewhat-differently.
Other cases, in contrast, demonstrate that-engineers are often solving different problems.
For example, .the case of a manufacturing problem with a large, machined aircraft component
(case 68 in Appendix C) illustrates how the range of issues considered by engineers can vary.
The problem itself centered on the inability of a manufacturing process to meet the tolerance
requirements for holes that were reamed into the part. One interview was conducted with a
manufacturing process engineer and the other with a design engineer. The criteria given by each
interviewee are reproduced in Figure 5.2.
Process Engineer Design Engineer
1. Meet part acceptance criteria 1.00 not invalidate data from
~ fatigue test article
. 2. Ensure that worst case
manufactured part still meets
acceptance criteria
3. Do not impact aircraft
aerodynamics
4. Do not affect part
interchangeability
Figure 5.2: Illustration of different criteria and different problems (arrow indicates shared
criteria).
The most obvious contrast between the lists in Figure 5.2 is the difference in the number of
criteria: the process engineer listed only one while the design engineer listed four. For the
process engineer, the problem revolved around the manufacture of the part itself. Therefore, the
criterion that most· mattered. to him was that the part meet its acceptance criteria. Once the part
met these criteria, the problem would be solved. The design engineer, in contrast, was concerned
about several additional factors. First, a fatigue test aircraft had already completed several
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rounds aftesting to certify the airframe's fatigue life. The design engineer wanted to ensure that
any changes made to correct the holes, would not .invalidate the previously collected fatigue
'testing data and consequently require a new round of testing (which was e'xpensive and· time
consuming). In addition, the design engineer desired that any changes made to the part not
impact the aircraft's aerodynamics which could potentially decrease the aircraft's performance.
Finally, he also wanted to ensure that the part re'main interchangeable, i.e., that a part from one
plane would be able to fit without diffi~ulty ooto another plane.
These differences in criteria translate into different problems. The first problem, shared by
both engineers, was to solve the part quality dilemma (represented by the criteria meeting
acceptance criteria and ensure that worst case manufactured part still meets acceptance
criteria). The design engineer, however, was also concerned about three other problems:
maintaining the validity of the fatigue test data, avoiding degradation to the aircraft's
aerodynamic performance, and ensuring that the parts remained interchangeable. Thus, while
they were both solving one problem, the design engineer was also worrying about several others.
Another example illustrates that differences in problem definitions may be the result of a
solution to one problem creating a new problem. Figure 5.3 illustrates the criteria lists from a
tool designer and an engineer involved in a fatigue crack repair for an in-service aircraft (case
103 in Appendix C).
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Tool Designer
1. Tool design/feasibility
2. Control tolerances
3. Accessibility
4. Could the cut be made as
drawn?
Engineer
1. Reinforce or remove the
material around the crack?
2. Avoid·damaging surrounding
material
3. Avoid removing parts
4. Feasibility
Figure 5.3: Criteria lists. illustrating how solutions created by one engineer generate problems for
another (arrows indicate shared criteria).
As can be seen, ·the two engineers shared several concerns and also had some worries
unique to their realms of expertise. From the engineer's·perspective, the first issue was deciding
how to repair the crack-whether the· cracked material should be reinforced or removed from the
structure. The details of this decision were outside of ·the tool designer's expertise, and,
consequently, were not issues about which he worried. Once ·the engineer made the decision to
remove the material,.the engineer and the tool. designer confronted a shared problem: could it be
done? Thus, both interviewees citedconcems regarding the feasibility of removing the material
and both were concerned about the potential of damaging nearby structure. The tool designer,
however, also· had to address problems about which the engineer was not concerned: specifically,
issues related directly to the human reality of making the repair. For example,while the engineer
could readily illustrate on drawings what region of material needed to be removed, the. ability of
a human being to access the area, insert alool, and then make the cut was less clear. Issues such
as this one were of primary concern for the tool designer, while the engineer hardly even
mentioned them during the interview. For the engineer, the problem was framed in terms of the
crack's impact on the.aircraft's structure; for the·tool designer, the problem was framed in tenns
of a human reaching the crack. Therefore, in this case, one engineer's solution created a set of
new, physically different problems for another engineer.
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5.3.2. Discussion
The above examples help to highlight several important issues. First, the criteria lists
formally illustrate that engineers from different specialties do interpret design problems .
differently~ In fact, in many· instances, engineers from within the same specialty had slightly
different interpretations of the same design problems. Thus, the first hypothesis has been
confinned.
The collection of the criteria lists also helps to illustrate a further point: engineers may
evaluate a solution to a design problem differently. This result reinforces some of the theoretical
arguments put forward in section 3.2.6, namely, that what. one knows includes both how to do
something and how do it correctly. As this study has shown, in the case of engineering design
problems, engineers from different groups are likely to use different evaluation systems (as
evidenced by different criteria) to judge the suitability and desirability ofa given solution to a
problem.
That the differences between specialists lies in their evaluation systems is significant and
has important practical consequences. Design disputes can often take on a character of "right"
versus "wrong", one group arguing that the solution put forward by another group is wrong while,
theirs is right. Differences in evaluation systems, however, mean that the issue is more
complicated. According toone side's evaluation method, one alternative may appear better than
another, while the reverse conclusion may be reached by the other side using a different
evaluation method. But, in "reality", one alternative is not intrinsically better than another.
Rather, the criteria used to evaluate the alternatives define and limit the ways in which the
alternatives can be interpreted as having benefits or drawbacks - "goodness" and "badness" are
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abstractions of the :altetnatives, notcharacteristics of the alternatives themselves. Consequently,
an important step in the design problem solving process would appear to be thehannonizationof
evaluation systems, or. the development of a shared means of judging the suitability of a design.
This issue will be addressed in greater detail below.
The criteria lists also help to demonstrate that multidisciplinary problem solving is
complicated along another dimension: specialists may in fact be solving different problems. As
the examples above illustrated, engineering design problems often consist of multiple "layers" of
problems: Marples (1961), during his studies of the design of nuclear reactors, made a similar
observation. He suggested thatthe engineering design process progressed through a hierarchy of
problem identification and problem solution. Engineers would be confronted with an initial
problem, and the solution to that problem would in tum create a new set of subproblems. Thus,
in the fatigue crack repair example discussed .above, the initial problem was deciding how to
repair the crack (reinforce or remove), and the subsequent subproblem was the design of the tool
that would remove the damaged material. Similarly, in the manufacturing problem (case 68), the
initial issue was the inability to meet part tolerance requirements, and its subproblems were the
potential impacts to the fatigue test data, aerodynamic perfonnance, and part interchangeability.
Furthermore, this research suggests that not only do solutions to problems create their own
set of new subproblems,but that the responsibility for solving the problems shifts. Thus, the
engineer was responsible. for determining how to repair the fatigue cracks, while the tool
designer was responsible for determining how to implement the repair. As with the criteria lists,
this phenomenon has important consequences. Specifically, a design dispute may not only be the
result of different evaluation systems, it may be the result of different evaluation systems being
applied to different problems - the solution to one engineering group's problem is likely to
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become, the next problem for another group. Thus, resolving cross-functional disputes requires a
process that captures not only differences in evaluation methods, but also that demonstrates how
solutions and their attendant subprobleins are linked. Such processes' will be addressed in the
coming sections.
5.4. Hypothesis Two: Implications from the Data
The second hypothesis for this research suggested that cases with,unique criteria and unique
problem ratios closer to zero would result in higher satisfaction and performance, cost, and
schedule impact scores than cases with ratios closer to one. In other words, it was expected that
when engineers had more similar definitions of a proble~, they would be able to solve that
problem more effectively.
Unfortunately, the data do not provide any conclusive relationships between these measures.
No correlations could be identified between the "input" measures, the unique problem ratio or
the unique criteria ratio, and the "output" measures, satisfaction or performance, cost, or
schedule impact. Therefore, the hypothesis cannot be ,accepted, nor can it be rejected - the data
provide no clear indication in either direction.
There are several possible explanations for this ambiguous result. First, the sample size is
relatively small -criteria lists could be collected for only nineteen paired cases. With additional
cases, more definitive relationships may have been revealed. Moreover, the outcome measures
may not be sufficiently sensitive to distinguish any differences. This possibility is supported by
other research. Wanous et aI, 1994, for example, specifically investigated the relationships
between problem solving process performance indicators and outcome indicators and noted that
few strong correlations could be identified. Perhaps if less subjective, more quantitative
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measures had been used in this study, differences ·between cases with low and high .unique
criteria and problem ratios could have been identified.
Furthermore, the nature of the design problems studied for this investigation complicated
performance measurement. All of the problems that were studied had to be solved. If the teams
did not solve the problems in some way or another, their development .projects would have
ground to a halt. Therefore, ultimately all of the problems were resolved. Again, the result of
this trend is that the outcome measures appear to not be sensitive enough to indicate many
differences between cases.
Another possible explanation for the ambiguous outcome is that the question used to study
the relationship between problem definition and problem solving perfonnance was incorrect. To
address this hypothesis,each ·interviewee was asked to provide a list of criteria that were
important to him or her in judging a potential solution. The nature of the question, therefore, was
personal - it asked the interviewee to only cite factors that were important to him- or herself.
Problem solving performance, however, may not depend solely on such a personalized
definition. Instead, an individual may consider two sets of criteria during problem solving -
those important to· himself and those that he believes are important to the other members of his
team. Based on the criteria he believes to be important to the other individuals, the individual
may "temper" his threshold for a given criterion.
For example, in the fatigue crack repair example described above, the tool designer
commented that human access to the repair site, though possible, was still difficult Therefore,
he was not completely happy with the final outcome, buthe understood that given the constraints
faced by the group and the need to make the repair, the decisions that were made were the best
ones possible. In a sense, then, he lowered his standards for accessibility in order to facilitate
solving the problem.
Clearly, additional work is required ·to better understand these issues. Specifically, future
investigations should consider collecting data on what criteria an individual believes are
important to other members of the team, in addition to the criteria the individual considers to be
important to himself. Furthermore, interviewees should also be asked how the criteria that are
important ·to other members of the team affect the extent to which they will argue in· favor or.
against an alternative based on one of their own criteria.
Despite the lack of clarity offered by these measures, another avenue of investigating .this
hypothesis exists. As described previously, one of the factors cited that helped to facilitate
problem resolution was shared objectives or well understood requirements. The implications of
this factor, relative to hypothesis two, will be addressed in the following section.
5.5. Hypothesis· Three -Implications from the Data
The final hypothesis guiding this research argued that cases in which design problems were
solved using tools that illustrated constraints and requirements would result in higher satisfaction
and product performance, product cost, and project schedule impact scores than cases in which
tools that illustrate solutions were used. This hypothesis will be addressed first through several
statistical comparisons and then through case examples.
5.5.1. Statistical Analysis of the Data for Hypothesis Three
Four different numerical analyses were used to ascertain the importance and effects of the
various factors that interviewees identified as facilitating problem solving. First, the frequen~y
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withwhich·interviewees. cited ·different factors was .assessed, providing an ·indicationof·what
factors the interviewees considered to be important. Then, a combination of correlatio~s,
regressions, and Mann-Whitney tests were used to judge the actual effects of these factors. Each
test is discussed in tum.
Citation Frequencies
In order to determine what factors the interviewees considered most important in
facilitating problem resolution, the frequencies with which they cited the various factors were
compared. First, consider the citation frequencies in paired interview cases. These· frequencies
are shown in Table 5.4. Three valueswe~e compared: the frequency with. which one member of
the pair cited a factor as impo~ant, the frequency with which both members cited a factor as
important, and· the ratio between the number of times a factor was cited by both members of a
pair to the total number of times the factor was cited.
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Table 5..4: Paired interview cases: Citation frequencies offactofs facilitating problem resolution.
Factor N Cited by N Cited by When Cited,One (%) Both (%) % by Both
Use of Tests 2 (8%) 16 (62%) 16/18(89%)
Show and Tell 7(27%) 11 (42%) 11/18(61%)
Frequent Face-to-Face Mtgs 11 (42%) 5(19%) 5/16 (31%)
Shared Objectives/Requirements 5 (19%) 5 (19%) 5/10 (50%)
Use ofTrade Studies 1 (4%) 4 (15%) 4/5 (80%)
Time Pressure 2(8%) 3 (12%) 3/5(60%)
Critical Team Member 4 (15%) 3(12%) 3n (43%)
Co-location 4 (15%) 0 0/4 (0%)
Engineering Expertise 2(8%) 0 0/2(0%)
Management Intervention 6(23%) 0 0/6(0%)
Delineation ofTech Iss/Reas Why 2(8%) 0 0/2 (0%)
Development of Win-Win Sol'ns 0 0 0
Notes
NCited by One: Number of times a factor was cited by one member of the pair.
Percentage Is relative to total number of cases (26).
NCited by Both: Number of times a factor was cited by both members of the pair.
Percentage Is relative to total number of cases (26). .
When Cited, % by Both: Percentage of times a factor was cited by both members of.pair,
relative to total number of times It was cited by one or both members.
The table lists the factors in rank order based on the nUInber of times a factor was cited
by both members of a pair. As ·can be seen, the use of tests was cited most often, followed by
show and tell. Subsequent factors had relatively small N's, for example, ·only in five of the
twenty-six cases did both members of a pair cite frequent face-to-face meetings as important.
The significance of the ·factors to interviewees was further ·tested by taking the ratio
between the number of. times both members of a pair ·cited a factor as important and the total
number of times the factor was cited (by one or both members of a pair). Using this comparison,
the use of tests continues to be important: in sixteen of the eighteen cases in which it was cited,
or eighty-nine percent of the time, the use of tests was cited by both members ofa pair. This
result suggests that when tests are used, their impact is considered important by both members of
the pair, further indicating that tests are a useful tool in resolving design disputes.
The paired citation ratio for trade studies was also high, eighty-percent, but this is based
on only five cases. ·Thus, while trade studies would appear to be a useful method for resolving
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design problems, the" relatively small number of cases in which they were used prevents the
development of a strong conclusion.
Show and tell, shared objectives, and time pressure all had paired citation ratios afabaut
sixty-percent. Thus, these factors, when present, were important to both members" of interview
pairs, suggesting that they also play important roles in facilitating problem solving.
Citation frequencies for individual interview cases, both easy and difficult, are shown in
Table 5.5. Again, these frequencies provide an indication of what factors interviewees tended. to
believe were important in resolving design problems. As was the case for the paired interview
data, the use of tests and show and tell were the most frequently cited factors. Other factors cited
in the individual ~nterview cases that were also cited in paired interview cases included shared
objectives and frequent face-to-face meetings. Furthermore, management intervention was cited
in almost a third of the difficult cases, indicating its importance under those conditions. While
co-location, time" pressure, and trade" studies were also cited relatively often, the N for these
factors becomes very small (less than ten), so drawing firm conclusions as to their significance is
difficult.
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Table 5.5: Individual cases: Citation frequencies of factors facilitating problem resolution.
Factor Difficult Cases, Easy Cases,NCited (%) NCited (%)
Use atTests 38.(59%) 19 (58%)
Show and Tell 34 (52%) 14 (42%)
Frequent Face-to-Face Mtgs 16 (25%) 8(24%)
Shared Objectives/Requirements 9 (14%) 10 (30%)
Use ofTrade Studies 8 (12%) 0(0%)
Time Pressure 8 (12%) 4 (12%)
Critical Team Member 7 (11%) 6 (18%)
Co-location 8 (12%) 7 (21%)
Engineering Expertise 6(9%) 5 (15%)
Management Intervention 19 (29%) 2(6%)
Delineation otTech Iss/Reas Why 3(5%) 4 (12%)
Development of Win-Win 501'ns 0(0%) 3(9%)
Notes
Percentages Indicate number of times a factor was cited relative to the
total number of cases of each type. There were 65 DIfficult cases and 33
Easy cases.
Combining Easy and Difficult Cases
For the regressions,correlations, and Mann-Whitney analyses that follow, easy and
difficult individual-interview cases were analyzed as a group. This was done to increase the
number of cases available for each analysis and seemed appropriate given that few significant
differences "existed between the factors that facilitated problem solving for easy and difficult
cases (see section 5.6.2 below and Appendix E). Any cases for which a difficulty level was not
indicated were omitted. In addition, only when an interviewee provided both an easy and a
difficult.case were his or her responses included (so, cases from interviewees that provided only
one case were not included).
Correlations
With an understanding of what factors the interviewees considered important based on
citation frequencies, the next step in the analysis process wasta ascertain if these factors had any
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effects on the outcome measures. The first method used to assess these impacts was to identify
correlations between. the factors and the outcome measures. Before that was done, however, an
analysis was conducted to test for correlations between the outcome measures themselves. These
results are shown in Table 5.6. As can be seen, the measures are correlated. In paired interview
cases, satisfaction was positively correlated with cost and schedule impacts. Thus, as might be
expected, interviewees were more satisfied with cases that also resulted in positive effects on the
product's cost and the program's schedule.
Table 5.6: Correlations between outcome measures.
Measure In case type Correlates with ...
Correlation
Coefficient Si nificance
Satisfaction Paired
Paired
0.513**
0.472**
0.002
0.003
Paired Cost Impact 0.412* 0.015
Performance Impact Paired Schedule Impact 0.350* 0.032
Individual Schedule Impact 0.262** 0.007
Paired Satisfaction 0.513*· 0.002
Paired Performance Impact 0.412* 0.015
Cost Impact Paired Schedule Impact 0.768** 0.000
Individual Schedule Impact 0.624** 0.000
Paired Satisfaction 0.472** 0.003
Paired Pertormance Impact 0.350* 0.032
Schedule Impact Individual Performance Impact 0.262*w 0.007
Paired Cost· Impact 0.768** 0.000
Individual Cost .Impact 0.624** 0.000
~
.. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The other three measures, performance, cost, and schedule impacts, were also all
correlated with each other. Thus, when problems were solved to thebettennent of one measure,
the other two also tended to be improved. This also suggests that when a factor that facilitated
problem resolution had an impact on one of these measures, it was also likely to have an impact
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on the other two. To ascertain such effects, as well as their potential benefits to problem solving,
Table 5.7, lists the significant correlations that were found between factors and outcome
measures.
Table 5.7: Significant correlations between factors facilitating problem resolution and outcome
measures.
Factor In case type Correlates with ...
Correlation
Coeffecient Si nificance
Paired Satisfaction -0.534 .... 0.002
Management Intervention Paired Schedule Impact -0.377* 0.039
Individual Satisfaction -0.194 0.074
Use of Tests Individual
Individual
0.315 ....
0.265"
0.004
0.013
Paired Cost Impact 0.405" 0.026
Shared Objectives Individual Cost Impact 0.283'A''' 0.009
Individual Schedule Impact 0.277"" 0.01
Co-location
Freguent Meetings
Individual
Individual
Performance· Impact
Cost Impact
0.328**
-0.221"
0.002
0.041
~
,. Gorrelationis significant at the 0.05 level (2;.tailed)
... Correlation Is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Of the factors that had significant correlations with the outcome measures, management
intervention is perhaps the most notable: it tended to lower both satisfaction and schedule impact
scores. Given the correlations between the outcome measures themselves, this combined effect
is not unexpected. Furthermore, this result is consistent with management intervention's
described usage: as discussed previously, this factor was typically used when a team could not
resolve a design problem on its own. Management, then, would step in and mandate a solution.
What is perhaps most significant is that management intervention tended to correspond
with lower schedule impact ratings, i.e., the project's schedule slipped for cases in which
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management intervened. ' However, causality is not indicated by the correlation: management
intervention most likely did not cause these results. Instead, the results indicate that managers
simply did not intervene until teams had already spent considerable time attempting to resolve
their problems on their own.· At that point, programs were already behind schedule, and
managers could do little to accelerate the development processes to make up for lost time.
Use. of tests was positively correlated with .both cost and schedule impact, though not
performance. ·Thus, teams that. used tests were more likely to either improve or at least not
degrade their products'cost and their projects' schedules. This finding suggests two·important
conclusions. First, testing isa useful way to help teams solve problems..Second, although the
tests themselves may take time and require money, the overall effect of testing is positive - it
does· not increase the total time required to solve the problem nor does it increase the product's
cost. These results, therefore, indicate that testing is an important and effective mechanism. for
resolving mUltidisciplinary· design problems.
Shared objectives also demonstrated similar trends, being positively correlated with
schedule and cost impacts, but again, not with performance. Thus, shared objectives helped
teams stay on schedule and avoid cost overruns, but did not necessarily help them solve
problems in ways that enhanced product perfonnance.
Co-location, on the other hand, was positively correlated only with perfonnance impact.
This indicates that teams that shared office areas were more likely to solve problems in such a
way as to enhance, or, least not degrade,.a product's perfonnance. Co-location, therefore, ·has. an
important effect on a team's ability to solve problems in terms of the product itself, rather than
simplyextemal constraints (such·as budgets or schedules).
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Finally, frequent face-to·face meetings was found to be negatively correlated with cost
impact. Given that interviewees were asked to rate the cost impact to the product, it must first be
noted that the "cost of meeting" is not what was being measured. Instead, this result suggests
that in cases in which frequent meetings wer~ cited as important, the product's cost tended to be
negatively affected. Again, note that this correlation· does not indicate causality. As suggested
by the citation frequency results discussed above, frequent meetings likely took place because of
the problems teams were having, and. these problems were the likely cause of the increased
product costs. It does suggest, however, that-meetings were unlikely to help teams avoid these
increases in cost, though such increases may have' been·· unavoidable given the problems the
teams were confronting.
Another test used to judge the significance of the factors that facilitated problem
resolution was to look for correlations between the factors and the unique problem ·and criteria
ratios from· the paired cases. The logic behind this decision was that even if the factors could not
be correlated with the outcome measures, perhaps there would .be a relationship between the
factors and how interviewees defined problems. Specifically, the goal was to determine if the
presence of any of the factors tended to decrease the unique problem or criteria ratios, Of, put
another way, if the presence of any of the factors lead to convergence on problem definition.
However, no significant relationships could be found.
Regressions
The second method of factor/outcome analysis was to run regressions with the factors
facilitating problem resolution and the outcome measures. The details of these analyses are
presented in Appendix F. Stepwise models were built for each of the outcome measures
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(satisfaction, performance impact,' cost impact, and schedule impact) and the factors that
facilitated problem solving. The models identified key factors that affected each measure, and
the most significant results are shown in Table 5.8.
Table ·S.8:Predictorsfor outcome measures identified by stepwise regression models.
.Outcome Measure I Predicted by
Satisfaction
I Performance Impact
Cost Impact
Schedule· Impact
Colocation
The results from this regression, no~ surprisingly, reinforce several of the trends identified
by the correlations. Specifically, the relationships between satisfaction and management
intervention, performance impact and co-location,· cost impact and use of tests and shared
objectives, and schedule impact of use of tests were again revealed. The regressions also
identified several additional relationships not-found in the correlations: satisfaction and shared
objectives and schedule impact and co-location.
Given the results of the citation frequencies, correlations, and stepwise regressions, six
factors seemed to emerge as the most important: shared objectives, useo! tests, co-location,
frequentface-to--face meetings, management intervention, and sh,ow and tell. These six factqrs
were then compared to each other to see further investigate their differences.
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Mann-Whitney Tests
Asa final statistical test of effects, a multi-step process was used to determine if the
presence of one factor led to better performance than another. First, the mean satisfaction and
mean performance, mean cost, and mean schedule impact scores were calculated for cases in
which a given factor was cited as important. This calculation was made for use of tests, show
and tell, frequent face-to-face meetings, co-location, shared objectives, and management
intervention, based on their presumed importance (as suggested above). The results are shown in
Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Mean outcome measures for selected factors.
Mean Mean
For Cases that Cited: Satisfaction Performance Mean Cost Mean Schedule
Use of· Tests 5.8 5.5 5.0 4.6
Shared Objectives '''''' .":?,:".:;,,.,:::, 5.3 :,,;,5,.:~,::<·,?:,;y .iF·,:' .'0".'•• ·:'5~·3<:','.:, ,;.;:/
Show and Tell 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.3
Frequent Meetings 5.8 4.9 4.2 4.0
Management Intervention 4.8 4.7 4.3 3.6
Co-location ','C' ;'~:,it)6'31L:\",:'i:;::. ) 0, ••• "::6~'3 5.0 4.9
~:
Shaded values indicate highest scores for a given measure.
Next,the factors were rank-ordered based on their mean satisfaction, mean perfonnance
impact, mean cost impact, and mean schedule impact, as shown in Table 5.10. To determine if
the differences between these scores were significant, Mann-Whitney tests were used to make
comparisons between each pair of factors. So, for example, all cases in which use of tests was
cited as important but show and tell was not were compared to all cases in which show and tell
was cited as important and use of tests was not. The details of these calculations are shown in
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Appendix D. In Table 5.10, significant differences are indicated by the brackets that link factors
in each list.
Table 5.10: Rank order by meanoiltcome measures of selected factors.
For Cases that Cited:
Co-location
Shared Objectives
Use of Tests
Frequent Meetings
Show and Tell
Management Intervention
For Cases that Cited:
Co-location
Use of Tests
Shared Objectives
Show and Tell
Frequent Meetings
Management Intervention
Mean
Satisfaction
6.1 ...----.
6.1
5.8
5.8
5.6
4.8 ",--......-.....--.1
Mean
Perf'ormance"
6.3
~:~~.4.9 ",,-_...........1
4.7 .....----.
For Cases that Cited:
Shared Objectives
Use of Tests
Co-location
Show and Tell
Management Intervention
FrequentMeetin98
For Cases that Cited:
Shared Objectives
Co-location
Use of Tests
Show and Tell
Frequent Meetings
Management Intervention
Mean Cost
5.3
5.0 {J'.• '.'5.0 _'
4.6
4.3
4.2
Mean Schedule
5.3
4.9
4.6
4'0'4.0
3. ............1---1
~
Brackets indicate factors with significant differences in results. based on
Mann-Whitney Tests (asymptotic 2-tailed significance .s 0.05)
As indicated in both sets of tables, cases in which teams had shared objectives had the
highest mean' satisfaction scores and the', highest cost and schedule impact scores. Thus, shared
objectives are clearly an important factor in facilitating team problem solving.
Further, note that co-location, shared objectives, and useo! tests always ranked first,
second, or third. This general trend indicates that these three factors are among the most
important mechanisms for facilitating problem solving on productdeveJopment teams.
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Moreover, management intervention always ranked last or second-to-Iast. This result is
consistent with the correlations reported earlier and adds support to the argument that teams that
resorted -to management intervention were confronting .serious difficulties~
Another imp.ortant trend in.the data is thatuseof.tests resulted in significantly.higher
mean performance a~d cost impact scores than did show and tell. Thus, use oftests tended to be
a more effective mechanism for improving product performance. As is .discussed in greater
detail below, these two factors differed in two important ways: use of tests tended to be more
inclusive than did show and tell, and use of tests tended to keep a problem in its context while
show and tell tended to remove a problem from its context. These differences appear to have an
important effect on the utility of these factors for solving problems.
Also consistent with the correlations presented earlier, co-location had a significantly
better impact on performance than didfrequentface-to-face meetings. This result indicates that
team· members are better able to solve problems when they are physically close to one another
than when they must relocate themselves in order to meet.
Given these results, teams that are co-located, have well-defined, shared objectives, and
make extensive use of tests are more likely to effectively solve problems than teams lacking
these factors. Similarly, teams that must rely management intervention, hold meetings rather
than being co-location, or use show and tell instead of tests will be less able to effectively solve
the problems they confront.
Notes on the Outcome Meas·ures
Although multiple .factors were identified that facilitated problem resolution, few ·of these
were strongly correlated with the outcome measures. As was discussed earlier, the lack of
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correlation may be due to an inadequate degree of sensitivity in the outcome measures. Again
this lack of sensitivity may be a reflection of the nature of the. designs problems that were studied
(i.e., all of the problems had be solved) or may be the result of too few cases (only twenty-six
paired cases were available, along ninety-eight individual interview cases). Additionally, the
analysis is complicated by the fact that multiple factors were often. cited by interviewees as
important in resolving the problem. Thus, resolving the effects of one particular factor was
difficult.
5.5.2. Further Discussion of the Data for Hypothesis Three with Case Examples
Several important conclusions were drawn from the ~omparisonsdiscussed above. These
conclusions can also be reinforced using. case examples' from the interview data. The following
sections review in greater detail each of the six factors analyzed above.
Management Intervention
First, as suggested by the correlations previously discussed, cases in which management
intervention was cited as important yielded the lowest outcome scores. Again, these results do
not suggest that management intervention is .the cause of the low scores. Rather, these cases
represent the instances in which teams had the most trouble finding solutions on their own.
To test this inference, the rate at which management intervention was cited in easy cases
was compared to the rate at which the factor was cited in difficult cases. A chi-squared test was
used to judge significance. As shown in Figure 5.4, management intervention was cited
significantly more often in difficult cases than in easy cases. This result supports the notion that
design teams tended to resort to managers under difficult circumstances. Therefore, while
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management intervention may tend to result in relatively poor outcomes, it seems as though such
results are more reflective of the difficulty of the problems; rather than any lack of skill in
managers.
Factor: Management Intervention
Number of Times Cited
Easy 12
Difficult 119
Factor
Absent Present Residuals
Difficulty Eas 31 2 33
Difficult 46 19 65
Remdua~ 77 21 98 =N
Frequencies l--~-~-:~--1~1~"""1-;-:~----l~I
Figure 5.4: Comparison of management intervention citation frequencies between easy and
difficult cases.
Despite these trends; the interview, data do suggest ways in which managers can intervene
more effectively. Two cases in particular provide some clues. In the first case, a team was
tasked to develop a structural modification for a fighter·plane that was already in service. The
aircraft had been extensively modified over time and had been flown under more strenuous
conditions than anticipated during its development, resulting in fatigue cracks in several of its
structural components.
An interdisciplinary, co-located team was assembled to develop both replacement parts
and a process for removing the worn out compone.nts and installing the new ones. An initial
solution was proposed by the .. manufacturing engineers working on the project, but the design
engineers rejected the solution. Th~ manufacturing engineers tried, however, to implement their
solution despite· the objections from the other engineers. The design engineers, therefore,
appealed to the team' smanager to, resolve the dispute. Rather than simply choosing between the
alternatives presented by the design engineers and the manufacturing engineers, the manager
150
1_
established a deadline by which the engineers had .to reach a consensus on their own. In this
case, the two groups of engineers were able to resolve their differences through a series of
technical discussions and meetings with the mechanics who would do the repairs.
A second· case provides a further example of how managers can successfully intervene to
resolve a problem. In this case, a structural engineering design team was developing the
preliminary structural design for a new spacecraft. The vehicle had to be designed to endure a
wide range of environments, and this requirement substantially complicated the structural design.
At several points .. during the development process, the engineers .. tumed to their manager to
resolve technical disputes. In many of these instances, however, the manager did not provide an
answer. Instead, he asked the engineers additional questions and forced them to explain. the
reasoning behind their design decisions to one another. This technique of facilitating. discussion
allowed the engineers to then resolve· their disputes on their oWD,without the manager having to
mandate a solution that would be unsatisfactory to one group or another. The one caveat to this
manager's approach, ·however, was that he was described as a highly skilled engineer. His
approach relied on his own thorough understanding of the technical.issues that. were confronting
the team, and only because·of this understanding was he able to. guide the engineers.
To reinforce the benefits of the approaches described in these tw.o cases, Table 5.11
shows .theoutcome measures given by the individuals interviewed for .these cases. Note that
most of the scores are higher for these two cases than for all the other cases that cited
management intervention. This result suggests that the techniques used in these cases do in fact
yield better results than the typical management intervention technique of decision by decree.
151
!
~
."',-------~--~~-----------------------------~---
Table 5.11: Outcome measures for alternative management intervention strategies.
Mean
Mean Performance Mean Cost Mean Schedule
Case Satisfaction Impact Impact Impact
Manager created time pressure 5.5 6.0 4.0 5.0
Manoer asked probinQ Questions 6.0 6.0 N/A N/A
All other cases that cited 4.2 4.5 3.8 2.9Manaaement Intervention
Shared ,Objectives
Shared objectives also was an important factor in· resolving. This result allows for a
further.interpretation of hypothesis two, that solving problems requires engineers develop a
shared understanding of a problem. As was discussed above, no clear relationship .cQuldbe
identified between the extent to which two engineers' interpretations of a problem differed and
the performance of their problem solving effort. Based on" this result, it was suggested that the
reason for this lackof.relationship could have .been due to the personal nature· of the criteria
question, namely, that the question specifically asked interviewees to cite .criteria important to
them. This result led to the additional hypothesis that engineers may have been tempering their
emphasis of somecriteria.based on the needs of other members of the team.
The importance of the shared objectives factor may provide support for this hypothesis.
As shown in Table 5.10, the presence of shared objectives' typically resulted in the highest mean
cost and schedule impact scores. During interviews, engineers who cited this factor often noted
that the problem solving process was made easier by the fact that "everyone understood.what the
goals were". Because of this understanding, team members were often more willing to make
compromises in order to facilitate resolving the problem.
For example, during the development of an aircraft, a problem was identified with a
unique aspect of its control system. Specifically, the control system was not providing adequate
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control· margins in the .event of a partial failure of the system. As a result, a significant redesign
effort was required to correct the deficiency. The development of a solution, however, was
complicated by several technical and logistical factors. The critical piece·of the control unit was
located near the tip of the·wing, in an area that was very thin. Consequently, there was not
enough space to install a truly redundant control system. Furthermore, neither the prime
contractor, nor the second-tier supplier providing the system, had a great deal of experience with
the components being used in the new system. Finally, complicating the technical aspects of the
problem was the fact that the second-tier supplier was headquartered· in another country.
Because of the lack of proper technical exchange agreements, the prime contractor could not
interface directly. with the supplier. Instead engineers from· the prime .had to work through an
upper level supplier that did have .the required agreements in place with the second-tier supplier~
Despite all of these obstacles, the engineer described the·problem.solving process as.relatively
smooth. ·Henoted that· because of a "good shared understanding of the goals" of the problem
solving effort, "no ·one [on the team] had any strong differences". Consequently, once the
logistical hurdles· were overcome, the engineers were able to work relatively efficiently to create
a fix created for the control system.
Similarly, as described in 5.2.1 under the discussion of shared objectives and'trade
studies, well understood goals or perfonnance metries tended to facilitate the· problem solving
process by establishing a shared method of evaluation for potential solutions. Thus, although the
criteria considered personally important to engineers varied, it appears that engineers also
considered a second list, one that included the criteria prioritized by other members of the team.
When these criteria were made explicit - such as on decision matrices used in trade studies or
when projects operated knowing that cost was paramount - engineers seemed to better
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understand each other's needs, and, consequently, appeared to be more willing· to compromise
their·own needs in order·to resolve the problem.
Use o/Tests and Show and Tell
In general,use of tests and show and. tell facilitated problem resolution by allowing
engineers to develop a shared interpretation of the problems they were addressing. Byproviding
a physical object (or a representation of a physical object such as on a CAD display), tests and
models helped to facilitate "silence on the objective level" - they allowed individuals to point to
something rather than to try to use words to describe something. This decreased the number of
abstractions used duringcommunicatioD, eliminating several stages of interpretation, summary,
and inference (see Figure 5.5). As a result, the individuals sharing models or conducting tests
together.started their abstractions from the same, objective level. Consequently, their ability to
solve a problem improved, since they were able to develop a more closely shared understanding
ofwhat the problem itself was. Furthermore, since their lower order abstractions were now more
similar, their higher order abstractions, such as judgements about the suitability of a solution,
were also more similar.
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Figure 5.5: Comparing the'abstraction process when an object is and is not shared between two
people. Sharing an .oi>ject reduces the chain of abstractions, facilitating more similar
interpretations.
A design team developing. concepts. for a new car's exterior provides a good example of
the concepts shown in Figure 5.5. During early discussions about the car, the stylists stated their
preference for a design that featured many "sharp" angles and "crisp corners". The
manufacturing engineers' on the team immediately objected, 'noting that such features would be
difficult to produce. They argued in favor of much smoother surfaces, with more "open"
corners. This disagreement rapidly brought the team's progress to a halt, as the two groups
argued back and forth. To help end the debate, one of the more senior and experienced
manufacturing engineers on the team ordered a full-scale clay model be built of one the
components on· which the debate focused. As an engineer who worked on the team .described,
once the model was in front of people, the team had much more effective discussions.
Specifically, he noted that the shiftfrom words and numbers toa physical object clarified the
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points both sides were trying to make, and allowed the groups to begin to move toward a
consensus about the design.
While both show and tell and use of tests have clear benefits, as previously noted, use of
tests resulted in significantly. higher mean performance and cost impact scores than did show and
tell. Understanding.these differences requires understanding how models or other objects were
used in the. case of use of tests compared to show and tell.
Recalling the discussion in section. 5.2.1, there are two primary distinctions between use
of tests and show and tell. The first important difference between these two factors centered on
the·extentto which the team participated in their creation. Typically, tests were either witnessed
by the entire team or the team as a whole agreed in advance to conduct the test. Show and tell, in
contrast, referred to instances in which prototypes, models, or even·test results were created by
one member or subgroup of a team and then presented to· the other members of the team. Thus,
use oftests typically indicated a more inclusive, participatory event while show and tell was
more passive. The second difference between these two factors related to context. Use of tests
required that some representation of the design (a prototype, for example) be subjected to an
environment that would mimic the environment experienced by the final design (such as a wind
tunnel or computer simulated environment). Show and tell, in contrast, was usually divorced
from such contexts - a prototype part was simply brought to a meeting and pointed to by
members of the team.
These differences in degree of participation and context are the likely causes of the
signific.ant outcome measure differences between use of tests and show andtell. When agreeing
to conduct a test, a team was effectively agreeing to a shared standard of evaluation, whether
they explicitly stated that standard or not. The process of conducting a test required that a team
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first· agree··on what the problem was that required testing and then required that the team'agree to
a data collectio·n approach. That data collection approach, in turn, established an evaluation
system. By choosing to gather information on some variables and not others, the team declared
those variables to ... be most important, and, by using that information to guide later design
decisions, those variables framed an evaluation system for the team.
In contrast, show.and tell did not require the development of such an evaluation system.
In fact, show and tell placed control of the evaluation system in the· hands of the individuals who
brought theobjectto the other members· of the team. Rather than allowing other members of the
team to help shape an evaluation system, the model could be used by one person or group to
limit and restrict the number of possible interpretations of the problem. The importance of
participation can be illustrated by comparing two cases that -attempted to make use of tests.
Consider first a case in which use. of tests was .used to facilitate the development of a
shared evaluation system. In this case, manufacturing engineers were .attempting to implement
lean manufacturing techniques on a composite component 'manufacturing area. The line
operators,however, were relatively resistant to these efforts. They considered themselves
craftsmen, and the new methods would make their work much more mechanistic. Under the old
approach, each ··operator was responsible for the complete lay-up of· a· component. The· new
approach, in contrast, required that multiple operators work together to build a part.
Consequently, the· operators felt as though they.would have less control over the quality of their
work and believed their talents as skilled workers would be compromised.
Rather than attempting to force a new manufacturing method on the operators, the
engineers set up a prototype ·operation -referred to as the "lab" - next to the old one. The
engineers then asked the line operators to come experiment with the new set-up and express their
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opinions about its performance. Gradually, the engineers refined the design of the new
manufacturing operation based on the input of the line operators, and ultimately the new design
was implemented on the production· line. One of the manufacturing engineers involved with the
project credited the lab with being a key factor in facilitating the line worker' sacceptance of the
new operation. Allowing the workers to actively participate in the development of the new
manufacturing method enabled them to feel that their opinions and skills were valued and gave
them a sense of having designed the new method to suit their own needs.
In contrast, use of tests in another manufacturing-related case did little to facilitate
solving a dispute. In this instance, a group of research and development manufacturing
engineers wanted to install a new riveting tool on an aircraft component production line. The
new tool allowed for more control over the forces applied' to a rivet than did the old machine.
This additional level of control would allow the riveting operation's speed to be increased,
shortening the cycle time needed to assemble several components. A multidisciplinary team was
fonned to investigate the feasibility of installing the new machine on the production line.
Several members of the team, most notably the materials and processes (M andP)
engineer, expressed serious reservations about the machine .and its riveting method. The
particular point of contention related to how the machine applied force to a rivet over time,
referred to as the force profile. The new machine changed this profile, shortening the duration of
the force that was applied to a rivet These changes, in tum, facilitated the higher cycle times for
the machine. The M and P engineer, howeve~, believed that the old force profile and its duration
was .critical to the fatigue life of the assembled components. He argued that the proposed
changes to the force profile would reduce the component's strength,leading to potentially
catastrophic failures during the product's. operation.
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In all effort to alleviate these concerns, several of the manufacturing engineers
independently conducted coupon tests3 with the new machine and assessed a variety of variables
"through the use of design of experiments (DoE)4. They then analyzed the riveted test coupons to
compare the results of the new riveting process to· the old, and these results were then presented
to the team.
By this point, the debate had become very heated. As one manufacturing engineer who
worked on the project· recalled, one of the engineers who conducted the testing slammed a
coupon' onto atable in front of the group and declared, "See, it works!" To this day, a s·malldent
remains 'in the table. Thus, rather than being" a process in which the whole team participated, the
test results were presented in a show and tell-like "fashion. And, despite this show of emotion,
the M and P engineer remained unconvinced.He did .not believe that the tests adequately
represented the. issues about which he' was concerned, namely, the rivet's fatigue strength over
time. In other words, in his mind, the tests did not represent his evaluation system. His distrust
ofthe results was exacerbated by the fact that he was not trained in DoE. Consequently,he did
not understand how it could be used to demonstrate interactions between variables, .interactions
that addressed his concerns. No matter how accurate the tests may have been, his lack of
confidence and understanding of their results meant that the tests held little significance for him.
Because of his objections, the effort to install the new machine ultimately failed.
From the perspective of this research, the important point is that the testing that was done
failed to fully accommodate the evaluation systems of all of the members of the. team in way
they· all could understand. Rather than allowing the team to agree to "a standard of evaluation, the
3 Coupon tests are experiments that use representative pieces of material, rather than complete parts, to
demonstrate the operation of a manufacturing process.
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manufacturing engineers tried to control that standard, in effect declaring that the coupon tests
adequately illustrated all of the 'important issues surrounding the dispute. But theM and P
engineer did not agree and felt that the tests failed to properly address his concerns about the
fatigue life of the rivets. Consequently, tests that could have been definitive were not, and their
results proved unhelpful in resolving the dispute.
A study by von" Meier' (1999) 'revealed very similar trends'. Von Meier -investigated
communication patterns between engineers ,and operators at electric power distribution
companies. She found that the two groups had different cultures and that they evaluated
technical problems using different criteria. Furthermore, as in the example discussed above, von
Meier noted that the two groups were swayed by different types of evidence during arguments:
"the engineer is convinced by abstract analysis, whereas the operator trusts only direct
experience" (p. 109). The differences between' the M and P engineer -and the manufacturing
engineers at the aircraft company are a close parallel those of the operators and engineers
discussed ,by von Meier: the M and P engineer only trusted his own experience, while the
manufacturing engineers were accustomed to the more abstract test results.
In other cases use of tests proved helpful in resolving problems because it focused teams
on analyzing some aspect ,of a design in, its operational context·(or a simulation thereof). As was
previollslydiscllssed, much of what a person knows is context specific. Thus, a person can
better express what he or she knows when that knowledge is applied to a specific situation. Tests
facilitated such opportunities for members of design teams. Rather than having to guess how a
design solution might perform under a given set of conditions, tests allowed teams to actively
witness how their designs performed in operation. By placing a problem in an operational
4 Design of experiments is an experimental approach that uses mathematical relationships to reduce the
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context, a layer of interpretation and supposition was removed from a debate, and·the chain of
abstractions was reduced (see Figure 5.6). Examples help to demonstrate these concepts.
Object
~,~. . u-cJ-~ Object 0 C> Assumed relationship
./ Perceived by 0 = between object and
. Person A ~ context.
Chain ofabstractions when object 15 divorced from context.
.. ' ..... "(@.k.@'k,.. ,... " . \, ...... ... ;. c . .. L A4L.t .. ..J ... . IIA'!
----..~o~.,o 0 ".• j)..
as perceived by 11 '
PersonA
Chain ofabstractions.when an ObJect 15 shown In context.
Figure 5.6: Comparing the abstraction process when an object is and is not represented in its real
context. When an object is represented in context, fewer abstractions are required to understand
its relationship with its surroundings,reducing the likelihood of error.
During the assembly of several aircraft components, line operators discovered that they
could not install shim plates that were called for on, the assembly drawings. The problem was
that .theoperators did not have enough 'space to physically reach the location where the shims
were to be placed. Engineering ,was alerted to the problem. They were initially surprised by the
difficulties the operators were having ~ according to their drawings, the shim should fit without
problem.
number of experiments that are required to test for the effects of a large number of variables.
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The reason the engineers failed to realize that their design would cause such trouble on
the factory floor was· that their design process had not accounted for the dynamics of the
assembly process. The engineering drawings showed that once assembled, all of the parts fit
together. Nevertheless, the drawings failed to demonstrate how those parts would come together
during the assembly process - the drawings failed to capture the context in which the shim would
be installed. In real life, several other components blocked the operators' access to the shim's
location. .This problem was verified by the engineers during visits. the factory floor to observe
the assembly process and by using three dimensional computer models to simulate the assembly
sequence. With the dynamics of the problem clearly demonstrated, the engineers were able to
quickly develop a modification to a nearby part to facilitate access to the shim.
This example clearly demonstrates the importance of capturing the complete context of a
design during problem solving. Represented as a fully assembled part, the drawings did not even
reveal that a problem existed..Onlyonce the dynamics of the assembly process were included
did the engineers realize their oversight. Hence, the test in this case was when the line operators
actually assembled the parts for the first time, revealing the problem. Subsequently, the
computer models of the parts were also used for additional testing, allowing the engineers· to
experiment with methods for correcting the problem. Thus, the inclusion of the proper details of
the context in which the shim was to be installed was essential to recognizing and resolving the
design problem.
So, the primary differences between use of tests and show and tell lie in the extent to
which an entire team participated in the creation of an object and the extent to which the object
was represented in its. operational context. These differences, then, are the source of the higher
outcome measure scores for cases that cited use of tests compared to cases that cited show and
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tell. By more fully ca.pturing. the details ofa problem and by ensuring that the team reached a
consensus on· how· to evaluate potential solutions to a problem in advance, use of tests provided a
clear and definitive mechanism for teams to resolve their differences.
Co~locationandFrequent Face-to·Pace Meetings
Co-Iocatin.g the members a product development team is a technique that has been
advocated by· many researchers over the years ·as a means of facilitating improved cross-
functional communication and integration (see, for example, Allen, 1988). The results~ofthis
study join those previousinvestigations in advocating its use. Importantly, this study was also
able to demonstrate that frequent meetings are not an adequate substitute for co-location. As
discussed above, co·location had a significantly better effect on performance impact scores than
did frequent face-ro-face meetings. Thus; meeting regularly does not serve as·a replacement· for
sharing an office space.
The benefits of co·location and frequent face-to-face meetings, however, appear to
originate from the same foundation. Both of these factors allowed team members to get to know
each other and one another's concerns. By meeting regularly, the engineers got to know each
other as people, and this social familiarity helped to. facilitate their technical communication and
problem solving. Typically, additional factors such as show and tell or use of tests
supplemented discussions during this socialization process. Over·the course of their meetings or
co-location, the different groups also learned to trust each other's technical· skills, and this
gradual development of trust improved their abilities to work together.
A good example of frequent meetings coupled with show and teZI is provided by the
design and development of a new overhead crane for use an aircraft manufacturing factory. In
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addition to a variety .of technical requirements, management had mandated that the crane's
controls be designed to reflect the input of the crane operators. To meet this mandate, the
electrical engineers developing the control system held a series of meetings with the crane
operators. At each .meeting, the engineers brought with them a laptop computer on which they
showed computer-generated illustrations of the· crane's controls and displays. The operators then
critiqued the· design, and the. engineers· subsequently updated the controls to reflect the additional
input. This back 'and forth process of design, meet, and critique continued until the end of the
crane's development project.
Meetings were also used in another fashion: as design reviews. During suchrevie,ws,
experienced engineers who were respected for their technical skills were invited to witness
presentations made by design teams. These experts were. then asked to note if the team had made
any mistakes or if there were issues that the team had failed to address. The experts also tended
to share· lessons they had learned on past projects that might be applicable to the challenges being
faced by the team. In this manner, such meetings served as checkpoints during the development
process to ensure the quality of a design team's efforts.
5.5.3. Conclusions Regarding Hypothesis Three
So, does the data presented in the preceding sections refute or support hypothesis three and
its suggestions as to the benefits of some tools over others in facilitating problem solying? Based
on the results and cases reviewed above, it would appear that the hypothesis itself misses the
important issue. What affects the success or difficulty of design problem solving is not what tool
is used, but how the tool is used. Thus, a leaf blower helped to facilitate one design team's
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efforts by illustrating the problem faced by the team, while a· clay model helped to clarify a
potential solution for another team. Similarly, tests run with the full involvement of line
operators helped facilitate the development of new manufacturing methods, while the lack of
involvement of some members of a team prevented the installation of a new riveting tool, despite
tests demonstrating its potential benefits. Three common themes emerge from the cases in which
tools facilitated problem solving: (l)they were used in a highly inclusive, participatory fashion,
(2) all of the important elements of a problem's context were captured in the tool's use, ,and (3)
through the use of such tools, the team was able to agree to a shared evaluation system used to
judge potential solutions.
In summary, then, design tools such as prototypes, test results, or CAD models appear to
offer their greatest benefits when they are used ina particip'atoryfashion and when they capture
the full context of the design problem. In contrast, when the same tools are used by one side of a
design· dispute to unilaterally "prove" that they are correct,or when important elements of the a
problem's context areomitted,lheir potential benefits appear to be significantly lessened.
5.5.4. Further Discussion of Participation and Shared Evaluation Systems
As noted above, the results of this study indicate that what tool is used to help solve a
dispute is, less important than how the tool is used. Specifically, it was argued that using a
problem solving tool effectively required that the team use the tool together to create a shared
understanding of the problem and a mutually agreed to evaluation system for judging potential
solutions' benefits or drawbacks. Support for these conclusions can be found in a variety of
other studies.
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Many other researchers have investig~ted the benefits of different problem solving
approaches, and, in general, support the use of participatory, or cooperative, strategies.
Typically, the literature distinguishes between three types of problem solving methods: (1)
cooperative (also often called collaborative or constructive, and in this study termed
"participatory"), (2) passive (or avoidance), and (3) aggressive (or competitive or forceful). As
Griffin and Hauser (1996) concluded in their review of the problem solving literature, "[t]he
evidence [in support of cooperative problem solving methods] is strong, consistent, common
across a variety of methodologies, and seemingly applicable in both services and products and in
both consumer and industrial markets" (p. 193).
For example, in Cooke and Szumal's (1994) study using a simulated survival exercise,
teams that used constructive methods to resolve conflicts were more effective problem solvers
than those who used passive or aggressive styles. Similarly, Gobeli et al (1998), in a survey of
115 software development professionals, found that confrontational problem solving strategies
(e.g., strategies that encouraged team members to openly and constructively explain their
reasoning) had beneficial effects on team performance while forcing strategies (in which one
side of dispute demanded the other side accept its solution) had negative effects. Such trends
appear to be fairly consistent across cultures as well. Xie et al (1998), for example, surveyed ·968
marketing managers in Japan, Hong Kong, the United States and Great Britain, and concluded
that of three possible strategies - collaboration, avoidance, or conflict - collaborative methods
produced the best results.
In addition, several studies have specifically cited the need for team members to actively
.participate in the problem solving process. For example, in a study by Berardi-Coletta et al
(1995), researchers found that simply providing hints, explanations, or demonstrations of
166
-
solutions did not help problem solvers find the answer to an experimentally-controlled problem.
Instead, they discovered that "information regarding the problem solution must be acquired or
discovered by the participant" -only by actually participating in the problem solving process
could the 'subjects solve the problem.
Such trends seem to also apply to product development teams. For instance, based on a
review· ofthe management literature, Cohen and Bailey (1997) concluded'that the. "substantive
participation" of technical specialists on teams led to better performance than when specialists
participated on teams ina "consultative" role. Similarly, in their study of automotive and
aerospace product development teams, Lucas et al (2000) found that "active .participation" of
team members' was a significant factor·in preventing.teams from making mistakes and avoiding
costly delays.
A variety of researchers have also advocated the shared use of tools, as suggested by this
study. Wenger (2000), for example, recommended an approach which he refers to as
"engagement". He.noted that the process of producing artifacts together served as a way for
team members to learn what they each could do and how their actions would influence others'
reactions. Similarly, Henderson (1991:) and Carlile (1997) found that the actof jointly creating
and sharing objects such as sketches or prototypes facilitated conflict resolution on product
development teams. As Henderson (1991) noted, such objects "enlist group participation and are
receptacles for the knowledge created and adjusted through group interaction" (p.456). And, in
their study of 40·new product development projects at 15 firms, Adamset al.(1998) found that
data from test results were more believable to team members when ·they participated in its
acquisition. Thus, they argued, "[b]road and active participation throughout the [product
development] process will enable the development ofa shared mental model and the
167
dissemination· of information based on a co~mon understanding of its contribution to the
objectives and priorities of the project" (p. 418).
The importance of such shared mental models and objectives has also been demonstrated
by other· researchers. In addition to the work by Adams et al cited above, studies by Bailey
(1999), Gobelo et al (1998), Lynn et al (1999), McDonough (2000), Pelled and Adler (1994), and
Rusinko (1999) have ·al1 found that the'presence of well-known, shared team objectives was·an
indicator of high performing produ~t development teams. Importantly, as a group these studies
indicate ~hat shared goals were important across technical specialties, including product
designers, product development managers, manufacturing engineering managers, and software
developers. That shared goals have been indicated to be important across specialties reaffinns
their importance during multidisciplinary problem solving. Shared goals allowed teams to
develop a shared representation of the problems which they faced, and such common
understandings then facilitated their efforts to find a solution to the problem.
Along this line of reasoning, Tindale et al (1996) suggested that. the development shared
representations among team members was at the root of the members' ability to solve problems
together. They proposed that there were four elements required for a group to solve a problem
together:
(1) A shared verbal or mathematical system for solving the problem.
(2) Sufficient information to demonstrate that one answer correctly solves the problem.
(3) Group members not directly involved in solving the problem must have sufficient
knowledge of the system to recognize a correct answer when one is proposed.
(4) Members who solve the problem correctly must be able to demonstrate that answer to
those who solved the problem incorrectly. (Tindale et ai, 1996)
When members of a group all shared these elements, the researchers argued, the .group was more
likely to agree to a solution. Furthermore, the representation to which they agreed influenced
an,d·limited how easy or difficult it was for a team member to argue for or against anyone
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potential solutioll. Thus, if an incorrect answer was more·easily demonstrated using the team's
shared representation, it was more likely to be chosen over correct answers.
Tindale etal (1996) used this model of problem solving to explain a wide range of
previous psychology study findings. For example, previous studies using mock juries had found
that manipulating a judge's instructions to the jury affected the jury's verdict, even if the same
evidence was presented. Such an outcome is predictable according. to the shared· representation
model· presented above. In these cases, the judge's instructions formed the basis of the jury's
shared representation. Altering those instructions altered the jury's shared representation,and
affected what arguments (in favor of· a guilty or innocent verdict) seemed more plausible.
Similarly, Tindale et.al (1996) suggested that the "risky shift" phenomenon in groups was
explainable using shared representations~, as· were group decision errors.
The importance of such a shared representation has also been argued· as· facilitating the
formation of a strong sense of team identity. Walsh (1995), for.example argued that "a shared
cognitive map emerges from a social process marked by negotiation and argument" among team
members (p. 293). Although the team members initially join the group with very different
opinions about the problem, through their interactions their models of the problem grow to
include issues raised by other individuals· on the team. Furthennore, Scott (1992) studied 42
product and process development teams across three divisions of a Fortune 500 company and
concluded that team members' ·social identification with their team had a "critical influence on
team performance" (p. 120). Specifically, the basis of group identification in high performing
teams "did not appear to be personalized bonds of attachment among team members but
impersonal bonds derived from the common identity of 'project team member'" (Scott, 1992, p.
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122). This identity was likely derived in part from the shared representations held by the team
members of the problems that they faced.
Therefore, Tindale et·al's model, along with the results of the studies discussed above, all
lend support to the conclusions reached during this investigation. As was argued, the process of
running a test or creating a prototype together allowed· team· members to agree to a shared
evaluation system that they could then apply to solving the problem. Thus, through a
cooperative process, the team agreed to a shared set of goals, in turn creating a shared
representation of the problem. Once this shared representation was in place, the team members
had a common system of meaning and evaluation that they could use to develop a mutually
acceptable solution. On the·other hand, teams that failed to develop such a shared·system proved
less effective in solving the problems they faced.
5.6. Additional Observations
Several additional issues from this study are worthy of note: how alternatives were
considered during problem solving, other differences between easy and difficult cases, and some
observed differences between how engineers solved problems and how manufacturing personnel
solved problems.
5.6.1. Consideration of Alternatives
As discussed in section 4.1.2, several studies have suggested that considering more than one
design alternative at a time can help facilitate problem solving. While this study did ask
interviewees to indicate the number of alternatives .they considered and the manner in which
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those alternatives .were evaluated, no significant relationship could be found between those
approaches and the outcome measures. Table 5.12 lists citation frequencies for these
approaches. Note that in both easy and difficult cases, the most often cited approach w'as the
serial or iterative evolution of one alternative. Parallel consideration of three or more options in
parallel was" cited next most frequently , followed by. parallel consideration of two alternatives.
The tendency suggested by this data is that when engineers do consider multiple options, they
usually consider more than three at a"time. B'ut, 'as stated above; no indication of any potential
problem solving performance benefits of the different strategies were identified by this study.
Table 5.12: Citation frequencies of various design strategies.
Number of PercentageCase Type Interviewee Times Cited
Iterative/serial development of one option 17 S2
Easy Parallel consideration of 2 alternatives S 15
Parallel consideration of3 or more alternatives 9 27
Iterative/serial development of one option 28 43
DIfficult Parallel consideration of 2 alternatives 12 19
Parallel consideration of 3 or more alternatives 22 34
Notes:
There were 33 Easy cases and 6S Dlmcult cases. Percentages are relative to these total
values.
One potential explanation for the tendency towards considering only one design at a time
is that in a team environment, people can better focus on solving a problem when they consider
one solution rathermany~ For example, a study by Laughlin "and Bonner (1999), found, that
while an individual's problem solving performance increased when he or she considered more
hypotheses, a group's. performance was improved with more evidence and fewer hypotheses.
That is, in a group environment, teams that considered fewer hypotheses at a time, but that
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collected more· evidence on each, perfonned better than groups that attempted to consider a large
number of hypotheses in less detail.
Such trends may explain the results of this study. In a team environment, product
developers were better able to convince each other of how to solve a problem by considering
only· a few potential solutions in great detail, rather than trying to analyze many. possibilities.
Thus, while developing sets ofaltematives may work well at a high level,detailed problem
solving might be better. facilitated by considering fewer options. Clearly, however, the results of
this study on this topic are far from definitive, but they do suggest avenues for future
investigations..
5.6.2. Other Differences between Easy and Difficult Cases
Several comparisons have already been made between easy and difficult cases. It is
worthwhile, however, to consider some of the other differences between the two types of cases
as well. These differences suggest that the source of difficulty in solving problems on teams
may lie more with social, rather than technical, factors.
Table 5. I 3 lists the mean outcome and demographic measures for easy and difficult
cases. While satisfaction scores tended to be higher for easy cases, the other .performance
measures are similar for both types of cases. Several issues are raised by the demographic
measures, however. First, the average previous experience with similar problems scores are not
very different between the two types of cases. Thus, an individual engineer's past experience
solving similar problems is not necessarily an indicator of whether or not a problem will be
viewed as difficult.
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TableS .13: Comparison of mean outcome and demographic measures for easy and difficult
cases. (Shaded values are the higher of the two scores.)
Measure
Mean Satisfaction
Mean Performance 1m
Mean Cost 1m act
Mean Schedule 1m act
Previous Experience with Similar
Problems 4.5 4.4
Comlexit social and technical
Previous Experience with Other
Members of the Team
Looking. at the mean complexity and previous experience with the team scores, however,
is more revealing. On -average, difficult cases were rated as more complex, and interviewees had
had less experience working with the other members of the team, than compared to easy cases.
Recall that the complexity question asked interviewees to estimate complexity accounting for
both social and technical factors. Thus, when combined ,with the lower mean previous
experience with the team score, these two measures suggest that difficult problems were rated as
such less for their technical challenges than for their _social· challenges. That is, difficult
problems tended to be difficult because of the social interactions within the team, rather than
because of the technical problems faced by the team.
This notion is reinforced when looking at the citation frequencies for factors that
hindered problem resolution (see Table 5.14). While all of the negative factors occurred more
frequently in difficult cases than in easy ones,- both social problems and Lacko! shared metrics or
objectives occurred significantly more often, based on chi-squared tests (see Appendix E). Note
that both of these factors' are directly related to the social interactions' on the team and not
technical issues. The frequency with which they occur, therefore, supports the notion that
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difficult cases were difficult because of the social challenges faced by the team, rather than the
.technical ones.
Table 5.14: Comparison between easy and difficult cases of citation frequencies for factors that
hindered problem resolution. (Shaded factors indicate statistically significant differences.)
. One potential limitation to this conclusion, however, stems from the instructions given to
interviewees. As previously described, participants were told that difficult cases could be
characterized less by technical challenges than by social ones. Thus, interviewees may have
been biased to describing cases that were socially challenging, instead of describing cases that
were technically challenging. In that sense, the data do conclusively show that the interviewees
tended to understand the instructions..Asserting that, in general, difficult problems are difficult
more for social than for technical factors, however, may be less firm a position. On the other
hand, given that product developers were able to provide so many cases in which social
challenges dominated technical ones does suggest that such tendencies are less than rare.
Table 5.15 lists the citation frequencies for factors that facilitated problem resolution for
easy and difficult cases. As previously discussed, management intervention occurred
significantly more often in difficult cases than in easy ones. Note also that trade studies were
conducted significantly more frequently in difficult cases as well. Again, such a result is not
necessarily unexpected. Difficult cases, by their nature, forced engineers to make compromises,
and trade studies are a common tool to help engineers make such decisions. The fact that trade
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studies were never used in easy cases reinforces· the idea that such cases involved few, if any,
difficult tradeoffs. Finally, win-win solutions were only developed for easy cases. Because such
cases tended to be simpler, engineers were more often able to develop solutions that
simultaneously addressed multiple needs. Such achievements were less possible in difficult
cases because such cases were often characterized by either-or types of choices.
Table 5.15:·Comparison between easy and difficult cases of citation frequencies for factors that
facilitated problem resolution. (Shaded factors indicate .statistically significant differences.)
5.6.3. Differences between Engineering and Manufacturing Problem Solving
While no quantitative data were collected on this topic, several significant differences were
observed between theproblem·solving approaches typically used by engineers >and those used by
manufacturing personnel. These differences centered on the degree of fonnality in the problem
solving processes of the two groups. In general, when discussing their efforts to improve their
production processes· Of to correct problems on the factory floof, manufacturing personnel· would
refer toa standardized problem solving approach used by the .company_ Such. approaches
typically required a fannal contract be written and then signed by the team that stated what the
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problem was and how the team members were expected to behave during meetings (for example,
to refrain from.criticizing an idea during brainstorming sessions). In addition, these formalized
processes also.tended to specify how many alternatives should be considered, the rate at which
alternatives should be eliminated, and the degree to which they should be developed. For
example, at one factory site, the problem solving process mandated that a problem solving team
initially generate at least seven ideas. Furthennore, all ideas had to be illustrated,no matter how
bad people's drawing skills were, rather than described using words. Once the seven ideas were
developed, these were then slowly -narrowed, to two,based on discussion or rough analyses.
Prototypes of the remaining two options were then built in order to further develop the ideas.
Finally, one option w.as selected, and its prototype refined prior to building production-quality
equipment.
This concept development process also highlights. another important difference between
typical engineering problem solving and manufacturing problem solving: manufacturing
personnel seem to place more emphasis on visual or physical representations ... of their ideas.
Whereas many engineers informally complained about "spending too much time in meetings"
during their interviews, none of the manufacturing personnel expressed similar problems. Rather
than meeting to discuss problems, manufacturing personnel seemed to place more emphasis on
experimenting with new ideas. Clearly one reason for this increased emphasis on
experimentation was the result of the relatively low availability and use of manufacturing-related
computer simulation or analysis tools. In addition, many of the manufacturing problems were
hard to s~mulate on a computer. Thus, the only way for manufacturing personnel to address their
problems was via direct experimentation.
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Finally, although manufacturing problem solving processes appeared more formalized than
engineering processes, the results produced by such approaches seemed no less creative. Instead,
the formalization of the process prevented time being wasted on establishing how a team will go
about its task and allowed the team to focus its energies on the problem itself. Furthermore,
because. the process was explicit, people better understood what was expected of them, and this
understanding allowed -the teams to work more effectively.
In contrast, engineers rarely referred to any_ standardized approaches to addressing the.
problems they confronted. One argument that could be used to explain this lackoffonnalization
is that the wide variety of problems confronted -by engineers do not lend itself -to standardized
approaches. The few cases that cited trade studies as-an important factor, however, demonstrate
that such an argumentis not valido While the interviewees who described trade studies did not
describe processes that were defined to the same level of ·detailas in many manufacturing cases,
they did describe a common process -of first developing a list of evaluation criteria, then creating
a set of design concepts, and, finally, running tests or analyses to compare those concepts against
the criteria. Thus, engineering- design problem solving processes clearly can be standardized.
Future investigations might examine this possibility, and its effects on problem solving
perfonnance in greater detail.
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6.·RECOMMENDATIONSAND SUMMARY
6. 1. Recommendations for Practitioners
The ultimate aim of this research was to improve the ability of design teams to solve
problems,and thereby improve the ability of product developrnentfinns to compete successfully
in the marketplace. Given the results of this research, several practical recommendations· can be
made to practitioners in the product development business.
6.1.1. Agree on the Problem, then the Standards for Evaluation,then the
Solution
The most fundamental result of this investigation was to demonstrate that two engineers are
likely to interpret the same·problem.differently. Furthennore, their differences in·interpretation
likely will include differences inexactly what·they believe the problem to be and how. potential
solutionsto.the problem(s) should be evaluated. Given this finding, engineers. working on design
teams should work from the assumption that what they consider a problem may not, in fact, seem
like a problem to other members ofthe team. Conversely, engineers need to be ready to accept
that something that does not ·seem ·likea problem to them may be a significant issue to another
engineer on the team.
Therefore, when team members are confronting serious difficulties in resolving a design
problem, they should ask two questions: (1) Does everyone agree on what the problem is that
they .are trying .tosolve, and (2) How do they differ in the manner in which they are evaluating
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potential solutions to the problem? Explicitly addressing such differences could reveal that the
actual source of the disagreement is not based so much on irreconcilable opinions as -it is ana
difference in how the problem itself is being framed.
Finally, the more explicitly a team's goals and.requirements are defined at the start of a
problem solving effort, the·.more effective the team will be. By clearly establishing the team's
objectives from the ,outset, all members of the team begin the problem solving process from the
same reference point. More importantly, such shared objectives create a shared evaluation
system among the team members, meaning that they are more likely to evaluate a potential
solution in the same way. Thus, some of the more divisive effects of each individual's
interpretations are avoided, facilitating communication during the problem solving process.
6.1.2. Successful Management Intervention
This study found that it is not always possible for design teams to resolve design disputes
on their own - at times, management intervention may be required to help a team end a
disagreement. However, some methods of intervention yielded better results than others.
Whenever possible, managers should seek to .facilitate additional problem solving by the team
itself, rather than mandating the use of a particular solution. For example, such facilitation can
take the form of a series of technical questions that are put before the team for its members to
investigate (perhaps through additional testing) or by giving· the team a new, closer deadline by
which they must come to an agreement on their own. In general, the guiding principle for
managers under such circumstances should be to seek additional ways of getting the team
members to work together, rather than taking the decision process out of their hands.
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Note that such approaches require that managers have a good technical understanding of the
problems being addressed by their team. Consequently, another recommendation from this
research is that design teams should be managed by individuals who are respected for their
technical, as well as b'usiness, abilities. Managers who lack such skills will be forced to rely
solely on the .arguments of the different sides of·a dispQte, .and .will be unable to objectively and
knowledgeably chose between them.
6.1.3. How to Use Design Tools
Given how differently engineers ffi.ay frame a problem, it is important that design tools be
used in'a fashion that reflects and allows fOfsuch differences. Several methods are available to
facilitate this goal.!
'First, the closer the representation of a problem is to its real form, both in terms of the
appearance and functionality of the design, the better. Thus, a physical prototype part is likely to
be preferred to a drawing when attempting to demonstrate what a part will look like. On the
other hand, a computer simulation may better demonstrate .the process needed to assemble the
parts than a prototype part could. Consequently, engineers must be aware of the tradeoff they
may make in· terms of accurately representing what a design might look or feel like compared to
accurately representing how a design might behave.
Furthermore, the choice of representation must also be influenced by ·the degree of
familiarity other members of the team may have with a given tool. As several cases
demonstrated, when team members can readily interpret the meaning of a representation, they
are more likely to accept conclusions drawn from it. Thus, a leaf blower proved to be an
effective method of demonstrating aerodynamic principles to engineers without backgrounds in
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aerodynamics, whereas a computation fluid dynamics simulation would have been far more
difficult for them to comprehend.
Finally, in order to ensure that all of the various criteria used by different team members are
considered, the creation of representations of design problems should be as .interactive as
possible. Therefore, when possible, tests should be agreed to jointly by the team before they are
carried out. Furthermore, when design tools are used in a show and tell manner, they should be
used to help explain a group's concerns, rather than to "prove" that thegroup'.s opinion is
correct.
6.1.4. Getting the Most Benefit from Design Meetings
The utility of tests and other design representations in facilitating problem resolution
suggests a means for improving how meetings are used by design teams. Rather. than simply
reporting to one another about their.progress, engineers on design teams might make better use
of meetings by building them around the creation of a model or test related to the problem they
are addressing. As this·investigation showed, a ke.y factor in attaining. the benefits of conducting
tests or building models is having as much of the team participate in their development as
possible. So, in place of simply reporting to one another about the problems they face, engineers
might instead use a meeting to jointly create a model· or develop a testing procedure that
illustrates their problems. If need be, the details of the testing could be left to another time, and a
follow-up meeting held to discuss the results. Shifting the foeusof meetings from a passive,
infonnationdissemination process to an active,knowledge creating one might yield better
engineering results and a greater sense of satisfaction in team members.
182
- -
6.1.5. Use Design-Build-Test Cycles
The results of this study suggest that teams should use design-build-test cycle strategies to
guide their overall development efforts. The design-build-test framework wasfonnalized by
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) based on their studies of product development practices across
several industries. A single cycle is illustrated in
Figure 6.1: Wheelwright and Clark's design-build-test cycle. (Adapted from Wheelwright and
Clark, .1992, p. 224.)
. As shown, the cycle begins with the recognition of a gap between a product's existing
capabilities and the targets established for anew design. The design problem is framed based on
this performance gap. A variety of potential solutions are then developed that may correct this
shortfall, and prototypes or models (real or virtual) ,of each. concept are built These models are
then tested, and the results used to refine 'both the problem statement and the solution to the
problem.
Design Build Test Decide
Establish Generate Build models Run simulations Select an alternative
goals alternatives or prototypes or experiments or refine the cycle
....,.j Alternative 1 I.....·0
8 -+fAlternative 1 I.....'(!)
..........~8-+l!ternatlve11-+ (!)
........----
Meets
---' goals. e
Falls
hortaf
{loa's
Repeat Cycle
Figure 6.1: Wheelwright and Clark's design-build-test cycle. (Adapted from Wheelwright and
Clark, 1992, p. 224.)
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The typical argument in favor of this approach to product development is that the
sequential series of tests helps to reduce the technical risk associated with the creation of the new
. product. This research, however, also suggests that some of the ·benefits associated .with the
design-build-test strategy may lie in its social effects. As this study has shown, tests· are an
effective way for design teams to .resolve cross-functional problems. The design-build-test
approach to development institutionalizes those benefits. Based on the results of this
investigation, one would expect that teams using design-build-test approaches would be both
more satisfied with the development process and produce better performing products than· teams
that did not use such methods.
6.1.6. Standardizing Problem Solving Methods
As discussed above, no quantitative data was collected on the benefits of standardized
approaches to problem solving. However, an informal comparison between the discussions held
with manufacturing personnel and those held with design engineering personnel suggests there
maybe benefits to having a formalized approachto solving problems. Other research studies, as
described previously (see section 4. 1.2), have also pointed to the benefits of such
systematization.
Based on the observations made during the .. course of this project, several guidelines can be
proposed. First, teams must.be assured that the purpose of standardizing the problem solving
process is not to restrict their creativity but rather to enhance it. Rather than having to "start
from scratch" each time a new problem arises, the team members can arrive pre-equipped with
an· approach to address the problem. In order to facilitate such acceptance and "portability",
however, care must be taken regarding what elements of the process are standardized. In
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general, the focus should be on standa.rdizing questions, not tasks. Typically, the reverse is done:
detailed methods are established, but because each problem is unique, teams are forced to modify
the "standard" approach so much that they have essentially created a new process.
In this regard, a comparison can be made to the scientific method. Typically, the scientific
method is described using four steps:
1..Statement of problem (What is to be studied)
2. Hypothesis· about the source(s)or cause(s)·of the problem
3. Design of an experiment to test the hypothesis
4. Data collection and analysis to prove or disprove the hypothesis.
Although seemingly general, this simple framework is very powerful. It can, be applied nearly
universally to al).y problem, and, in many cases, failures in·experiments can be linked to failures
in properly addressing one of the four steps. Honda, for example, teaches all of its employees
worldwide the same problem solving approach (Nelson et ai, 1998), and their approach is
remarkably similar to the scientific method. Seven steps form the backbone of the method:
1. What is the plan compared to the actual situation?
2. What is the gap?
3. Conduct a gap analysis.
4.·Define gap countermeasures.
5. Identify the means - money, resources, and/or people.
6. Who is responsible for implementing the plan?
7. When will it be completed? What is the schedule?
(Nelsonet ai, 1998, p. 58).
In addition to the fact that the steps all seem logical and well-planned, what is more important is
that all of its employees know the method, and, consequently, when they work together,
understand the mental processes they are each using (Nelson etal, 1998).
Research also suggests that Toyota follows a similar strategy. Work by Sobek (1997),
Nishiguchi and Beaudet (1998), and Spear (1999) indicates that Toyota trains all of its
employees, both on the factory floor and in the design studios, within Toyota proper and at
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supplier sites, .similar approaches to solving problems and designing. systems. Again, the power
of this approach may not lie so much in its details, as much in the fact that it facilitates
communication. Furthermore, since everyone is trained in the same process, the process itself is
reinforced every time engineers work together.
Clearly there are potential drawbacks to standardization. Perhaps the most notable is the
potential to stifle creativity and free thinking. Based on the comments of manufacturing
personnel who have used such approaches, the most effective countermeasure to such drawbacks
appear to be focusing. on standardizing questions, rather detailed activities, as. demonstrated in
Honda's approach. The goal of such formalization is not t~ dictate specifics, but to provide
overall guidance and a common starting point that can be shared by the diverse members of a
team.
6.2. Implications for Theory
The results of this research also have important implications for theories related to design
team communication and knowledge sharing. Three important and interwoven concepts have
been developed: individuals from different backgrounds interpret problems differently, what an
individual "knows" includes standards of evaluation and methods of judgement, and the extent to
which individuals participate in creating a shared evaluation system can affect their ability to
effectively solve problems together.
Data from the paired interview cases collected by this study clearly illustrate that two
engineers do interpret the same problem differently based on their backgrounds and previous
experiences. The criteria lists also demonstrate that a key element of these different
interpretations lies in the manner in which the individuals judge the benefits or drawbacks of
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potential solutions. Furthermore, these differences are often the result of engineers addressing
related,. but unique problems. Thus, the concerns of a tool designer are not the same as those ofa
structural· engineer, .and the problems about which a process engineer worries are different from
those about which a design engineer worries.
The classic model of human communication based on the information processing
framework, however, fails to account .for such differences in meaning and evaluation. The
results. of this research suggest that human communication processes first consist of a search for
shared meaning.. This search is greatly facilitated by sharing in the creation of models, tests, or
similar activities. Such practices facilitate· the development of a shared understanding of a given
problem by allowing individuals to point to an objector a data point rather than having to use
higher level abstractions, such as words, to describe a con·cept or concern. Reference to such
artifacts reduces the chain of abstractions required to communicate an idea, curtailing the
potential for misinterpretation. Furthermore, ·since words include connotations. of good .or bad,
direct reference to prototypes or models can help to remove an emotional element from problem
solving processes. This reduction of emotional involvement helps individuals to focus their
attention on the complexities and challenges of the problem itself, rather than on protecting.their
credibility or technical competence.
This research does not suggest, however, that the information processing model be thrown
out. Instead, the information processing model and the abstraction-based model put forward in
this study can and should exist together. The information processing· model works well to
explain communication processes at a relatively high level or when there are few differences
between the individuals or groups that are communicating. Under these circumstances, details of
meaning systems may be· unimportant or the groups·may already have.a.shared understanding of
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meaning. However, because of its assumption of shared meaning, the information processing
model fails at the detailed, person-to-person level of human communication. At that point, a
communications model that includes the need to create shared meanings is required to explain
and improve people's relationships. The greater the differences between the individuals ·being
studied, the more important this altemativemodel becomes.
6.3. Recommendations for further Research
The results of this investigation has led to as many new questions as it has answered.
Several specific recommendations for additional study have been identified.
6.3.1. Improving Academia-ta-Industry Research Relationships
A challenge faced by any .academic study is how to collect data to support or refute the
hypotheses to be studied. In investigations such as this one, the challenge is made· even more
difficult because the research is dependent on the cooperation and participation of companies
from which to acquire data. Based on this researcher's experience, several observations and
recommendations can be made to improve the effectiveness of academic-industry research
consortiums, such as LAI.
At the time of this writing, LAI's data acquisition approach depended on points of
contact (POCs) at each member company. When a student was ready to acquire·data,he called
the POCsat the companies at which he wished to work. poes were typically· associated with
improvement programs at member companies and .were not necessarily affiliated with product
development projects themselves. Furthermore, POCs were typically mid-level managers, with
188
_ ..... " I I ~---__... ...... ~ .......- __~--------
no formal authority over product development projects. Therefore, when a poe received a call
from a student researcher, he would simply use his own personal network to request that product
development projects support the student.
Because the poe did not have any formal authority over the development projects,
however, project managers could simply decline any requests to participate ina study. More
than financialconcems, managers often refused to participate because ·of time concerns. This
researcher was told. by several poes that project managers. simply did not feel they .could .spare
their engineers for even one hour to participate in a research study.
Thus, the limitations of this relationship were clearly revealed during this project. While
POCs were contacted at twenty-eight sites, only nine sites actually agreed ·toprovide data.
Furthermore, while each site included numerous product development projects, typically only
one to three teams would agree to participate. ,Although the potential existed to acquire data
from·a very large number of projects, such goals.werenever realized.
These goals were not met for lack of effort on the part of the poes,. however. In this
researcher's experience, the POCs worked hard to try to provide data collection opportunities.
But, because they lacked any authority over product development projects, they could not exert
any pressure on teams ·to participate. Furthermore, the POCs'efforts were complicated by the
fashion in which LAI itself operated. Since each student was responsible for establishing contact
with companies,·POCswould regularly receive multiple calls on the same day from students and
researchers at LA!. The need to balance these multiple requests clearly complicated the task of
the POCs.
Given these experiences, LAl might consider implementing several changes to improve
its ability to work with member companies:
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• Establish regular contact with product development executives at member companies. As
noted above, most POCs affiliated with LAI are not associated with a particular product
development project, and, because of this, can not exert any formal authority over such
projects. LAI might consider enhancing the poe network by establishing regular ties to
product development executives who would be in a position to mandate that their teams
participate in. a study. If such executive-level connections were established, they might be
maintained either at the focus team leader- or research council-level, rather than with
individual studentss.
• Have focus team leaders to make contact with POCs for all students on a focus team. This
approach would continue to keep the company-to-researcher contact at a low level, while still
reducing the number of calls ·a POC is likely to receive.· In addition, consolidating such calls
would enhance a focus team leader's ability to coordinate the research efforts within her or
his team. This enhanced coordination could facilitate several students. gathering data on a
single visit, reducing the burden to member companies.
• Consolidate all communication with companies with the LA! research council. Rather than
having students or focus team leaders contact companies, researchers could instead place
requests with the research council. Members of the council could then consolidate and
coordinate attempts to gather data at LAlcompanies. Research council members could be
"assigned" to a small group of companies, allowing them to build relationships with
company representatives and improving their ability to locate specific projects that would
make a good match with a given study.
S At the time of this writing, LAI researchers were grouped into focus teams. These .teams oversaw and
implemented tbe day-lo-day research tasks of theconsortiuffi. Academic oversight was then provided by the LAI
research council, which was composed of the MIT faculty members associated with LA!.
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LAI represents a 'unique partnership between industry, academia, andgovemment and has
already made significant contributions to the aerospace industry. Furthermore, the ·personal
networks that it has created between these threecornmunities are invaluable". Improvements in
the researcher-to-company relationship ;would only enhance the ability of researchers to collect
meaningful data, which 'in turn would increase the benefits industry receives through its
affiliation with LAI.
6.3.2. Establishing Connections between Problem Interpretations and
Periormance
The criteria list data collected for-this study proved useful in demonstrating that engineers
do interpret problems .differently. These lists, ·however, did "not provide an ,indication of how
such differences affected problem solving performance. Two recommendations for improving
this method are:
1) Replace the subjective outcome measures used in this investigation with quantitative ones
(such as number of engineering changes to a design or .comparisons of product performance
between two teams developing the same product).
2) Ask interviewees to provide what they believe to be the criteria list of the other individual
interviewed for the case. The accuracy of these lists might show a stronger correlation with
outcome performance.
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6.3.3. Collect Data on Changes in Criteria o'ver Time
Another potential improvement to the criteria-list method developed during this study
would be to sample product developers' lists over time while they were actively .engaged in
solving a problem. Rather than asking engineers to recall a problem they had solved in the past,
a researcher might instead first ask an engineer to describe a problem he is currently solving.
'Then, ·the ·engineer could be asked to provide his criteria list for the problem. Using a web-,
phone-,or mail-based survey, the researcher could then ask the engineer to provide the list on
later occasions. When changes·are observed, the engineer could be interviewed in detail again,
in an attempt to ascertain what happened that changed his criteria list (such as a test, for
example).
Furthermore, the criteria lists·could also form a method for tracking and evaluating learning
over time. A researcher might attempt a long term study, for example, in which she tracked
engineers over multiple projects. By comparing criteria lists from one project to another when
similar problems arise, the researcher mig,ht be able to demonstrate whether or not an engineer
had learned from his past experiences. Such learning might be captured when an engineer adds a
criterion to his list that had not been present during a prior, similar problem solving effort. If the
engineer added the criterion because of his previous experience, it might help to quantify his
learning. Further comparisons between engineers and projects might then be able to highlight
practices that facilitate learning.
6.3.4. Effects.ofDesign-Build-Test Strategies
The results of this study indicate that the effectiveness of design-build-test product
development strategies may arise in part from the social benefits of emphasizing testing. Future
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studies might· ·investigate this hypothesis· directly by comparing teams developing similar
products but emphasizing testing to different degrees. Study participants should be asked to rate
their personal satisfaction with the development process used by their team. Such data, when
analyzed in.combination with product perfonnanceoutcomes,could.yield a variety·of interesting
insights.
6.3.5. Benefits of Standardizing Problem Solving Processes
Several issues related to the standardization of problem solving processes were raised
during.the course of this investigation. The first question worthy of further study suggested by
this project is to assess whether or not teams that use standardized problem solving processes are
more effective than teams without· formalized· methods. A, second issue to be addressed is the
effect on perfonnance of varying levels or standardization: do teams that use a standardized list
of questions perfonn better than teams that use a standardized list of tasks? Finally, engineers
could be asked to rate the amount of creativity they.felt their problem solving processes allowed,
and the responses of individuals who used standardized methods compared to those who did not.
6.4. Limitations of this Study
While this study has provided useful insights into problem solving on product development
teams, it does have several limitations. Perhaps the most important is that it used an approach
requiring·engineers to describe their past experiences. Participants, .however, may have already
spent considerable time rationalizing. these experiences, biasing their recollections of the events.
In addition, the participants may not have recalled the events which they described with total
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accuracy, not because deliberate intent, but simply from forgetfulness. While participants were
asked to rate the quality of their. memory, there are no complete assurances that they did not
remember the events incorrectly, even if they thought they remembered them well.
Another limitation of this study is that it relied on a single informant for the.majority of the
cases studied. Thus, -significant details about a case may have 'been omitted or skewed by
obtaining just one person's description. Although this study attempted to achieve a fairly large
dataset to compensate for this weakness, in addition to several cases for which paired ·data was
acquired, there was still the potential for biases. Future studies may endeavor to overcome such
shortcomings, perhaps. using some of the suggestions made above, in an effort to either lend
additional support for the conclusions of this study or to refute them.
6.5. Final Thoughts: A Social Perspective on Integration
Earlier, it was argued· that integration was, at least in part, a social process. Because of
the complexity of their environments' and the tasks that they must accomplish, product
development organizations tended to evolve into collections of highly specialized, and highly
skilled, subgroups. Delivering a successful product, however, required that the knowledge
possessed by these different groups be combined - that their knowledge be integrated.
T·hisstudy has demonstrated that a consequence of differentiation within organizations
was that individuals from different groups tended to interpret design problems differently.
Furthennore, successfully resolving these problems required that the individuals create a shared
evaluation system with which to judge the benefits or drawbacks of potential solutions. The
creation of such an evaluation system, then,can be· considered a first step in the integration
process. Without such a system, disputes on design teams tended to fester unresolved. Once
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such a shared method of judging solutions was in place, on the other hand, teams were able .to
solve their problems and continue their development efforts.
As was argued, the creation of this shared evaluation system was primarily a social
process. It required that product developers with different backgrounds interact and exchange
ideas so that they could explain toone another what they each considered to be important. The
way in which design tools were used played a critical role during such social interactions,
facilitating or inhibiting teams' abilities to develop shared understandings of the problems which
they faced. Thus, ·the. integration process was seen to be as much a social phenomenon as a
technological one, and by.facilitating the human processes of communication, successful design
teams facilitated the technological. integration of the products which· they· developed.
195
i196
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND WORKS CITED
Author'sNote: The following list includes both the works cited in this dissertation along with additional references
that were not cited but that the author found useful in developing this study. It is hoped that this expanded listing is
ofuse to other researchers pursuing similar studies.
Abemathy, William J. and Kim B. Clark (1985). "Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative
Destruction." Research Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 3-22.
Abernathy, William J. and JamesM. Utterback (1978). "Patterns of Industrial Innovation."
InnovationIFechnology Review, pp. 59-64.
Ackoff, RussellL. (1974). Redesigning the Future.' A Systems Approach to Societal Problems.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Adams, Marjorie E., George S. Day, and Deborah"Dougherty(1998). "Enhancing·New Product
Development Performance: An Organization Learning Perspective." loumalof Product
Innovation Management, Vol. 15, pp.403-422.
Adler, Paul S. (1995). "Interdepartmental Interdependence and Coordination: The Case of the
DesignIManufacturing Interface." Organizational Science, Vol. 6, No.2, March-April, pp. 147-
167.
Adler, PaulS. and RobertE. Cole (1993). "Designed for Learning: A Tale of Two Auto Plants."
Sloan Management Review, Spring,.pp. 85-94.
Adler, Paul S.,Avi Mandelbaum,VienNguyen, and Elizabeth Schwerer (1996). "Getting the
Most Out of Your Product Development Process." Harvard Business Review, 74(2), March-
April, pp.134-152.
Ahmed, Saeema, Lucienne Blessing, and Ken Wallace (1999). "The Relationship between Data,
Information, and Knowledge Based on a Preliminary Study of Engineering Designers."
DETC99:·ASME Design Theory and Methodology, Las Vegas, Sept. 12-15.
Allen, Thomas J. (1966). "Studies of the Problem-Solving Process in Engineering Design."
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. EM-13,No. 2, June, pp. 72-83.
Allen, Thomas J. (1988). Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the
Dissemination ofTechnologicallnfonnation within the R&D Organization. Cambridge: MA.
197
Allen, ·Thomas J., James M. Utterback, Mavin A. Sirba, Nicholas A. Ashford, and J.Herbert
Hollomon (1978). "Government Influence oli the Process of Innovation in Europe and Japan."
Research Policy, Vol. 7, No.2, April, pp. 124-149.
Anderson, David M. (1997). Agile Product Development for MassCustomization. Chicago:
Irwin Professional Publishing.
Andrews, Katherine Zoe (1995). "Cross-Functional Teams." Harvard Business Review, 73(6),
November-December, pp. 12-13.
Aoshima Yaichi (1996). "Knowledge Transfer across Generations: The Impact on Product
Development Performance in the Automobile Industry." Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, June
Bailey, Diane E. (1999). "Challenges of Integration in Semiconductor Manufacturing Firms."
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 46, No.4, November, pp. 417-428.
Becker, Harold s. (1983). "Scenarios: A Tool of Growing Importance to Policy Analysts in
Government and Industry." Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 23, pp. 95-120.
Beckerman, Linda P. (1999). "Application of Complex Systems Science to Systems
Engineering." Orlando, FL: Science Applications International Corporation.
Ben-Arich, Asaf, Mariolf Grupp, and Shlomo Maital (1997). "Optimal Incremental Innovation:
A Mathematical Programming Approach for Integrated~&D and Marketing." Managing R&D
into the 21 st Century: Theory and Practice: Tools of the Trade. The R&D Management
Conference,··14-16 July, Manchester, UK
Bensaou, M. and N. Venketrarnan(1995). "Configuration of Interorganizational Relationships:
A Comparison between U.S. and Japanese Automakers." Management Science, Vol. 41, No.9,
September, pp. 1471-1492.
Berardi~Coletta,Bernadette, Linda S. Buyer, Roger L. Dorninowski, and Elizabeth R. Rellinger
(1995). "Metacognition and Problem Solving: A Process-Oriented Approach." Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Vol. 21, No.1, pp. 205-223.
Black, J. T. (1991). The Design o/the Factory with a Future. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Blanchard, Benjamin S. and Wolter J. Fabrycky (1981). Systems Engineering and Analysis.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Bohn, Roger E. (1994) "Measuring and Managing Technical Knowledge." Sloan Management
Review, Fall, Vol. 36, No.1, pp. 61-73.
198
Boland, Richard J., Jr. and Ramkrishnan V. 'Tenkasi (1995). "Perspective Making and
Perspective Taking in Communities of Knowing." Organization Science, Vol. 6, No.4, July-
August, pp. 350-372.
Boothroyd, G. and P. Dewhurst (1994). Product Design, Manufacturing, and Assembly.
Wakefield, RI: Boothroyd and Dewhurst,. Inc.
Boulding, Kenneth E. (1956). "General Systems Theory - The Skeleton of Science."
Management Science, Vol. 2,No. 3, April, pp. 197-208.
Bower, Joseph L. and Clayton M. Christensen (1995). "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave." Harvard Business Review, January-February, pp.43-53.
Brecka~ Jon (1995). "The Voice of the ,Customer is Loud and Clear." Quality Progress, Vol. 28,
No.5, May. p.14.
Brill, James H. (1999). "Systems Engineering - A Retrospective View." Systems Engineering,
Vol. 1, No.4, pp. 258-266.
Brown, ShonaL. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (1995). "Product Development: Past Research,
Present Findings, and Future Directions." Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No.2, pp.
343-378.
Browning, Tyson R. (1997). ".ExploringIntegrativeMechanismswith a View towards Design
for Integration." Advances in Concurrent Engineering -- CE97, Aug. ·20-22. Fourth ISPE
International Conference on Concurrent Engin~ering: Research and Applications, pp. 83-90.
Browning, Tyson R. (1996). "Systematic IPT Integration in Lean Development Programs."
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Unpublished Master of Science Thesis.
Burgelman, Robert A. (1994). "Fading Memories: A Process Theory of Strategic Business· Exit
in Dynamic Environments." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, March, pp. 24-56.
Burns, Tom and G.M.Stalker (1961). The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock
Publications.
Carbone, James (1995). "At Toyota, Supplier Targets and Specs Go Together." Purchasing,
November 23,. pp. 15-21.
Carlile, Paul Reuben (1997). Understanding Knowledge Transformation in Product
,·Development: Making Knowledge Manifest through Boundary Objects. University of Michigan,
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation.
Chang, Tzyy-Shuh~Allen C. Ward, and Jinkoo Lee (1994). "Conceptual Robustness in
SimultaneollsEngineering: An Extension of Taguchi's Parameter Design." Research in
Engineering Design, Vol. 6, pp. 211-222.
199
Chatman, Jennifer A., Jeffrey T. Polzer, Sigal G. Barsade, and Margaret A. Neale (1998).
"Being Different Yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic Composition and
Organizational Culture on Work Processes and Outcomes." Administrative Science Quarterly,
VoL 43, pp.749-780.
Christensen, Clayton M. (1997). The Innovator's Dilemma: Why New Technology Causes Great
Firms to Fail. Cambridge: Harvard Business School·Press.
Christensen, Clayton M. (1992a). "E"xploring the Limits .of the Technology S-Curve: Part I:
Component Technologies." Production and Operations Management, Vol. 1, No.4, Fall, pp.
334-357.
Christensen, Clayton M. (1992b). "Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-Curve: Part II:
Architectural Technologies." Production and Operations Management, Vol. 1, No.4, Fall, pp.
358-366.
Clark, Kim B. and Takahiro Fujimoto (1991). Product Development Performance: Strategy,
Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry. Boston: Harvard Business School
Press.
Clark, Kim B. and Steven C.Wheelwright (1992). "Organizing and Leading 'Heavyweight'
Development Teams."Califomia Management Review, Vol. 34, No.3, Spring, pp.9-28.
Cochran, David (1998). Lecture notes for 2.812, The Design and Control of Manufacturing
Systems. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Cohen, Susan G. and Diane E.Bailey (1997). "What Makes Teams Work: Group Effectiveness
Research from the ShopFloor to the Executive Suite." Journal ofManagement, VoL 23, No.3,
pp. 239-290.
Cohen, Wesley M. and Daniel A. Levinthal (1990). "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective
on Learning and Innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, pp..128-152.
Cooke, Robert A. and Janet Szumal (1994). "The Impact of Group Interaction Styles on
Problem-Solving Effectiveness." Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, VoL 30, No.4,
December, pp.415~437.
Cunningham, Timothy W. (1998). "Chains of Function Delivery: A Role for Product
Architecture.in Concept Design." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation.
Cusumano, Michael A. (1994). "The Limits of Lean." Sloan Management Review, 35(4),
Summer, pp. 27-32.
Cusumano, Michael A. (1992). "Shifting Economies: From Craft Production to Flexible
Systems and Software Factories." Research Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 453-480.
200
Cusumano, Michael A. and Kentaro Nobeoka (1998). Thinking Beyond Lean: How Multi-
Project Management is Transforming Product Development at Toyota and Other Companies.
New York: The Free Press.
Cusumano, Michael A. and Richard W. Selby (1998). Microsoft Secrets. New York:
Touchstone.
Day, George (1975). "A Strategic Perspective on Product Planning." Journalo/Contemporary
Business, Spring. Reprinted in Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L.Tushman
and William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982..
Dewar, James A., earl H. Builder, William M. Hix, and Morlic Levin (1993). Assumption-
Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times. Santa Monica: RAN.D
Corporation.
Dixit, Avinask·K. and Robert Pindyck (1995). "The Options Approach to Capital Investment."
Harvard Business Review, May-June, pp. 105-115.
Dougherty, Deborah (1992). "Interpretive Barriers to Successful Product Innovation in Large
Firms." Organization Science, Vol. 3, No.2, May, pp. 179-202.
Dreyfus, HubertL. (1991). Being-in-the-World. Cambridge", MA: The MIT Press.
Droar,Paul (1997). "Dynamic Decision Analysis: R&D Portfolio Management Methodology for
the .21 st Century." Managing R&D into the 21 S1 Century: Theory and·Practice: Tools of the
Trade. The R&D·Management Conference, 14-16 July.
Eden, Colin (1994). "Cognitive Mapping and Problem Structuring for System Dynamics Model
Building." System Dynamics Review, Vol. 10, Nos. 2-3, Summer-Fall, pp. 257-276.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.and Shana L. Brown" (1998). "Time Pacing: Competing in Markets
That Won't Stand Still." Harvard Business Review, 76(2), March-April, pp. 59-69.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. and Behnam N. Tabrizi (1995). "Accelerating Adaptive Processes:
Product Innovation in the Global Computer Industry." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.
40, pp. 84-110.
Faulkner,Terrence, w. (1996). '''Applying 'Options Thinkin'g' to R&D Valuation." Research-
Technology Management, Vol. 39, No.3, May/June, pp. 50-56.
Finch, William, and Allen C. Ward (1997). "A Set-Based System for Eliminating Infeasible
Designs in EngineeriIlg Problems Dominated by Uncertainty." Proceedings of the 1997 ASME
Design Engineering TechnicalConjerences. Paper #DETC97/DTM-3886. Sept. 14-17.
Sacramento, California.
201
Fine, CharlesH. (1998). Clock Speed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary
Advantage. Reading, MA: Perseus Books.
Fiol, C.Marlene (1994). "Consensus, Diversity, and Learning In Organizations."
Organizational Science, Vol. 5, No.3, August, pp. 403-420.
Ford, David N. and John D. Sterman (1998). "Dynamic Modeling of Product Development
Processes." System Dynamics Review, Vol. 14, No. I,Spring,pp. 31-68.
Foster, Richard N. (1986). "Timing Technological Transitions." In Technology in the Modem
Corporation: A Strategic Perspective,Mel Horwitcl1 (ed.). New York: Pergamon Press.
Frischmuth, Daniel S.and Thomas J. ,Allen (1969). "A Model for the Description and
Evaluation of Technical Problem Solving." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,
Vol. EM-16, No. 2,May, pp. 58-64.
Funk, Jeffrey (1993). "Japanese Product-Development Strategies: A Summary and Propositions
about Their Implementation." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 40, No.3,
August, pp.224-236.
Galbraith, Jay (1973). Designing Complex Organizations~ Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company.
Gansler, Jaques S. (1991). Affording Defense. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Garvin, David A. (1995). "Levering Process for Strategic Advantage: A Roundtable with
Xerox's Allaire, USAA·'s Herres, SmithKline Beecham's Leschly, and Pepsi's Weatherup."
Harvard Business Review, 73(5), September-October, pp. 77-90.
Garvin, David A. (1993). "Building a Learning Organization." Harvard Business Review, July-
August,pp. 78-91.
Giddens, Anthony (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structurations.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gluck, FrederickW. and Richard N. Foster (1985). "Managing Technological Change: A Box of
Cigars for Brad." Harvard Business Review, September-October.
Gobeli, David H., Harold F. Koenig, and Iris Bechinger (1998). "Managing Conflict in Software
Development Teams: A Multilevel Analysis." Journal ofProduct Innovation Management, Vol.
15, pp.423-435.
Goldratt, Eliyahu M. (1997). Critical Chain. Great Barrington, MA: The North Rivers Press.
Grady, Jeffrey O. (1994). System· Integration. Boca Raton: eRe Press.
202
Greenberg, Joel S. (1996). "Space Transportation Architecture Comparisons Explicitly
Considering Uncertainty and Risk." Paper No. IAA-96-IAA.l.1.05. 47 th International
Astronautical Congress, October 7-11, Beijing, China.
Griffin, Abbie and John R. Hauser (1996). "Integrating R&D and Marketing: A Review and
Analysis of the Literature." Journal ofProduct Innovation Management, Vol. 13, pp. 191-215.
Gulati,Rosaline K.and StevenD.Eppinger (1996). "The Coupling of Product Architecture and
Organizational Structure Decisions." MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper,
Number 3906, May 28.
Hatvany, Nina, and Vladimir Pucik (1981). "Japanese Management: Practices and
Productivity."OrganiZQtional Dynamics, Spring. Reprinted in Readings in the Management of
Innovation, Michael L. Tushmanand William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982..
Hauptman, Oscar and Karim Hirji (1996). "The Influence of Process Concurrency on Project
Outcomes in Product Development: An Empirical Study of Cross-Functional Team." IEEE
Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 43, No.2, May, pp. 153-164.
Hauser, John R. and Don Clausing (1988). "The House of Quality." Harvard Business Review,
Vol. 66, No.3, May/June, p.p. 63-73.
Hehs, Eric (1998). "F-22 Design Evolution, Part I." Code One, Lockheed Martin Tactical
Aircraft Systems, Vol. 13, No.2, April, pp. 2-17.
Helper, Susan (1991). "How Much Has Really Changed between US Automakers and Their
Suppliers?" Sloan Management Review, Summer, pp. 15-28.
Helper, Susan R. andMari Sako (1995). "Supplier Relations in Japan and the United States: Are
They Converging?" Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp. 77-84.
Henderson, Kathryn (1991 ). "Flexible Sketches and Inflexible Data Bases: Visual
Communication, Conscription· Devices, and Boundary Objects in Design Engineering." Science,
Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 16, No.4, Autumn, pp. 448-473.
Henderson, Rebecca M. and Kim B. Clark (1990). "Architectural Innovation: The
Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms.',~
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35,pp. 9-30.
Iansiti, Marco (1998). Technology Integration: Making Critical Choices in a Dynamic World.
Boston: Harvard Business School·Press.
Iansiti, Marco and Kim B. Clark (1994). "Integration and Dynamic Capability: Evidence from
Product Development in Automobiles and Mainframe Computers." Industrial and Corporate
Change, Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 557-603.
203
lansiti, Marco and Jonathan West (1997). "Technology Integration: Turning Great Research into
Great Products." Harvard Business Review, 75(3), May-June, pp. 69-79.
Imai, Ken-ichi, Ikujiro Nonaka, and Hirotaka Takeuchi (1985). "Managing the New Product
Development 'Process:How Japanese Companies.Learn and Unlearn." In The Uneasy.Alliance:
Managing the Productivity-Technology Dilemma, Kim B. Clark, Robert H. Hayes, and
Christopher Lorenz (eds.). Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Joint OSD/Services/Industry Working' Group (1994). Mil-Std 499B: Systems Engineering.
Draft, May 6.
Kalyanarurn, G. and V.Krishnan (1997). "Deliberate Product Definition: Customizing the
Product Definition Process." Journal ofMarketing Research, May, pp. 276-285.
Karlsson, Christer and Par Ahlstrom (1996). "The Difficult Path to Lean Product Development."
Journal ofProduct In.novation Management, Vol. 13, No.4, July, pp. 283-295.
Katz, Ralph,Michael Tushman, and Thomas J. Allen (1995). "The Influence of Supervisory
Promotion and Network Location .on Subordinate Careers in a Dual Ladder RD&E Setting."
ManagementScience,Vol. 41, No. 5, May, pp. '848-863~
Keeny, Ralph L. (1994). "Creativity in Decision Making with Value-Focused Thinking." Sloan
Management Review, 35(4), Summer, pp. 33-41.
Khurana, Anil and Stephen R. Rosenthal (1997). "Integrating the Fuzzy Front End of New
Product Development." Sloan Management Review,Winter, pp. 103-120.
Kitfield, James (1995). "Paul Kaminski." Government Executive, Vol. 27, No.8, August, pp.
32-38.
Klein, Janice A (1994).. "Maintaining Expertise in Multi-Skilled Teams." in Advances in
Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Vol. 1. JAI Press, Inc, pp. 145-165.
Klein, Janice A. and Gerald 1. Sussman (1995). "Lean Aircraft Initiative Organization & Human
Resources (O&HR) Survey Feedback -- Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)." Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Case Study, LEAN #95-03, April 7.
Kline, Stephen J. (1985). "Innovation is NOT a Linear Process." Research Management, Vol. 4,
pp.36-45.
Kline, Theresa J.B.and Yvonne P. Sell (1996). "Cooperativeness vs Competitiveness: Initial
Findings Regarding Effects on the P~rformanceof Individual and Group Problem-Solving."
Psychological Reports, Vol. 79,pp. 355-365.
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander (1992). "Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and
the Replication of Technology." Organizational Science, VoL 3, No.3, August, pp. 383-397.
204
Korzybski, Alfred (1994). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and
General Semantics, Fifth Edition. Englewood, NJ: Institute of General Semantics.
Krishnan, V.,·S.D. Eppinger, D.E,. Whitney (1997). "Simplifying Iterations in Cross-Functional
Design Decision Making." ASME Transactions:, Journal of Mechanical Design, Vol. 119,
December, pp. 485-493.
Krishnan, Visawanathan (1996) "Managing the Simultaneous Execution of Coupled Phases in
Concurrent Engineering." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 43, No.2, pp.
210-217.
Krishnan, Visawanathan, StevenD.·Eppinger, and Daniel E. Whitney (1992). "Ordering.Cross-
Functional.Decision Making in.·Product Development."·· Massachusetts Instituteof.Technology
Sloan School of Management Working Paper #3299-91-MS, Revised, October.
Krishnan, Visawanathao, Steven D. Eppinger, and Daniel E. Whitney (1991). "Towards a
Coop~rative Design Methodology: Analysis of Sequential Decision Strategies." .Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management Working Paper#3299-91-MS, May.
Lake, JeromeG. (1996). "Unraveling the Systems Engineering Lexicon." In James M. Martin,
Systems Engineering Guidebook: A. Process/or Developing Systems and Products. Boca Raton:
CRCPress, ·1997. Appendix A.
Lambert, William W. and· Wallace E. Lambert (1964). Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Larson, Nick and Andrew Kusiak (1996). "Managing Design Processes: A Risk Assessment
Approach." IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and
Humans, Vol. 26, No.6, November, pp. 749-759.
Laughlin, Patrick· R. and Bryan L. Bonner (1999). "Collective· Induction: Effects of Multiple
Hypotheses and Multiple Evidence in Two Problem Domains." Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology,.Vol. 77, No.6, pp. 1163-1172.
Lauglaug, AntonioS.(1992)."Why Technical Market Research?" Journal of Business
Strategy, Vol. 13, No.5, September/October, pp.. 26-35.
Laulheret, R., A. Cuquek,.Ch.Rouzies, andA. Benedetti (1996). "Risk Management· and RAMS
Activities: An Approach for Satellites." 47 th International Astronautical Congress, October 7-1 1,
Beijing, China.
Lave, Jean (1988). Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics, and Culture in Everyday Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
205
Lawrence, Paul R. and JayW. LOTsch (1967). Organization and Environment: Managing
Differentiation and Integration. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) (2000). "Lean Enterprise Model." Downloaded from
http://lean.mit.edu
Leonard-Barton (1995). Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining Sources of
Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Liker, JeffreyK., Rajan R. Kamath, S. Nazli Wasti, and Mitsuo Nagamuchi (1996). "Supplier
Involvement in Automotive Component Design: Are There Really Large US-Japan
Differences?" Research Policy, Vol. 25, pp. 59-89.
Liker, Jeffrey K~, DurwardK.Sobek, II, Allen C. Ward, and John J. Cristiano (1996).
"Involving Suppliers in Product Development in the United States and Japan: Evidence for Set-
Based Concurrent Engineering." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 43,
No.2 (May), pp. 165-178.
Loch, Christopher H. and Christian Terwiesch (1998). "Communication and .Uncertainty in
Concurrent Engineering." Management Science, 44(8), August, pp. 1032-1048.
Lorsch, Jay W. (1977). "Organization Design: A Situational Perspective." Organizational
Dynamics, Autumn. Reprinted in Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L.
Tushman and William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982., pp.477-488.
Loveridge, Denis (1997). "Technology Choice - Game, Set, or Match?" Managing R&D into
the 21 st Century: Theory and Practice: Tools o/the Trade. The R&D Management Conference,
14-16 July.
Lucas, William A., Gerald Noel, Edward Shroyer, and Brian J. Schwartz (2000). "The Wrong
Kind of Lean: Over-Commitment and Under-Represented Skills on Technology Teams."
LeanTEC Research Paper. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May.
Lynn, Gary S.,Richard B.Skov, and Kate D. Abel (1999). "Practices that Support Team
Learning and Their·lrnpact on Speed to Market and New Product Success." Journal of Product
Innovation Management, Vol. 16, pp. 439-454.
Maidique, Modesto A. and Billie Jo Zirger (1985)~ "The Product Development Learning Cycle."
Research Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 299-313.
Maier, MarkW. (1999). "Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems." Systems
Engineering, Vol. 1, No.4, pp. 267-284.
Maltz, Elliot (2000). "Is All Communication Create Equal?: An Investigation into the Effects of
Communication Mode on Perceived Inf<;>rmation Quality." Journal of Product Innovation
Management, Vol. 17, pp. 110-127.
206
Mansfield, Edwin (1961). "Technical Change and the Role of Imitation." Econometrica, Vol.
29, No.4, pp. 741-766.
Mansfield, Edwin, Mark Schwartz, and Samuel Wagner (1981). "Imitation Costs and Patents:
An Empirical Study." The Economic Journal, Vol. 91, December, pp.907-918.
March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon (1966) .. Organizations. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc.
Marples, David L. (1961). "The Decisions of Engineering Design." IRE .Transactions on
Engineering Management, Vol. 8, No.2, June, pp. 55-71.
Marqui, Donald G. (1969). "The Anatomy of Successful Innovations." Innovation, Vol. 1,
November. Reprinted in Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L.Tushman and
William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982., pp. 42-50.
Martin, George -C. (1978). "Boeing Aircraft Designs: 1928-1953." In Diamond Jubilee oj
Powered Flight: The Evolution of Aircraft Design. Jay D. Pinson, ed. Dayton-Cincinnati
Section of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Dec. 14-15, Air Force
Museum, Dayton, Ohio, pp. 41-50.
Martin, JamesN. (1997). Systems Engineering Guidebook: A Process for Developing .Systems
and Products. Boca Raton:. eRe Press.
McDonough, Edward F., III (2000). "Investigation of Factors Contributing to the Success of
Cross-Functional Teams." Journal ofProduct Innovation Management,VoI. 17, pp. 221-235.
Meyer, Marc H.and Alvin H. Lehnerd (1997). The Power of Product Platforms. New York:
The Free Press..
Meyer, Marc H.and James M. Utterback (1993). "The Product Family and the Dynamics of
Core Capability." Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp. 29-47.
Mills, Richard (1997).uThe Development and Utilization of Tools and Techniques for Defense
Planning." Managing R&D into the 21 s1 Century: Theory and Practice: Tools' of the Trade. The
R&D Management Conference, 14-16 July.
Manden, Yasuhiro (1998). Toyota Production System: An Integrated Approach to Just-in-Time.
Norcross, Georgia: Engineering and Management Press.
Morgan, Gareth (1983). "Rethinking Corporate Strategy: A Cybernetic Perspective." Human
Relations, Vol. 36,. No. 4, pp. 345-360.
Morgan, Gareth and Rafael Ramirez (1983).HActionLearning: A Holographic Metaphor for
Guiding Social Change." Human Relations, Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 1-28.
207
II!"'- •
Morris, Perter A., Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, and A. Lawrence Kolbe (1991). "When
Choosing R&D Projects, Go with Long Shots." Research-Technology Management,
JanuarylFebruary, pp. 35-40.
Morrison, Elting (1966). "Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study of Innovation." in Men, Machines, and
Modern Times, Cambridge: MIT Press. Reprinted in Readings in the Management ofInnovation,
Michael L.Tushman and William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982..
Morton, J.A. (1971). Organizing for Innovation: A Systems Approach to Technical
Management. New York: McGraw-Hill.'Book Company.
Mowery, David and Nathan Rosenberg (1979). "The Influence of Market Demand upon
Innovation: A Critical Review of Some Recent Empirical Studies." Research Policy, Vo1.8,pp.
102-153.
Murman, Earll' (2000). "Welcome and LAI Overview." Presented at Enhancing.Enterprise
Value: An LA] Plenary Conference, Cambridge, MA, March 29.
Nelson, Richard R. (1959). "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research." Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. '67, No.3, pp. 297-306.
Nelson, Dave,Rick Mayo and Patricia E.Moody (1998). Powered by Honda: Developing
Excellence in the Global Enterprise. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Next-Generation Manufacturing Project (1997). Next Generation Manufacturing: A Framework
for Action: Volume I: Summary Report. Bethlehem, PA.
Nichols, Nancy A. (1994). "Scientific Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO Judy
Lewent." Harvard Business Review, January-February, pp. 88-99.
Nishiguchi, Toshihiro and Alexandre Beaudet (1998). "The Toyota Group and the Aisin Fire."
Sloan Management Review, Fall, pp. 49-59.
Nobeoka, Kentaro and Michael A. Cusumano (1995). "MultiprojectStrategy, Design Transfer,
and Project Performance: A Survey of Automobile Development Projects in the US and Japan."
IEEE Transactions' on Engineering Management, Vol. 42, No. 4, November, pp. 397-409.
Noehren, William L. (1999). "Development and Empirical Investigation ofa Boundary Object
Richness Scale for Product Development Teams." Unpublished Master Thesis. MIT ·Sloan
School of Management.
Nonaka, Ikujiro and HirotakaTakeuchi (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company. New York:
Oxford University Press.
208
Noor, AhmedR. and Stephen .R.Ellis (1996)n "Engineering in a Virtual Environment."
Aerospace America, July, pp. 32-37.
Norman, David. (1993). Things that Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes in the Age of
the Machine. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
O'Brien, C.and SJE Smith. "Design Maturity Assessment for Concurrent Engineering
Coordination." International Joumaloj Production Economics, 41(1-3), pp. 311~320.
Otto, Kevin N and Erik K.A·ntonsson (1991). "Trade-Off Strategies in Engineering Design."
Research in Engineering Design, Vol. 3,pp. 87~109.
Pahl, G. and W.Beitz(1984). Engineering Design. London: The Design CounciL
Parnaby, J.(1991). "Designing Effective Organizations." International loumalof Technology
Management,Vol. 6, No. 1-2, pp. 15-32.
Pavitt, Keith (1990). "What We Know about. the Strategic Management of Technology."
CalifomiaManagement Review, Spring, pp. 17-26.
Pelled, LisaH. and Paul S. Adler (1994). "Antecedents of Intergroup Conflict in Multifunctional
Product Development Teams: A.Conceptual Model." IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, Vol. 41, No.1, February,pp. 21-28~
Pentland, Brian T. and Paul Carlile (1996). "Audit the Taxpayer, Not the Return: Tax Auditing
as an Expression Game." Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, pp.269-287.
Piore, Michael J., Richard K. Lester, Fred M. Kofman, and Kamal M. Malek (1994). "The
Organization of Product Development." Working Paper, Industrial Performance Center,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Pisano, Gary P. (1990). "The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis."
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, pp. 153-176.
Pisano, Gary P. and Steven C. Wheelwright (1995). "The New Logic of High-Tech R&D."
Harvard Business Review, 73(5), September-October, pp. 93-105.
Polyani, Michael (1966). The Tacit Dimension. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, Inc.
Pomponi, RenataA. (1998). "Organizational Structures for Technology Transition: Rethinking
Information Flow in the Integrated Product Team,"Massachusetts Institute of Techno}ogy
(Technology, Management and Policy Program), Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, June.
Porter, Michael E. (1996).
NovemberlDecember, pp.61-78.
"What is Strategy?" Harvard Business Review,
209
Product Development Consulting, Inc. (1996). Product Development Best Practices Survey.
Boston.
Pugh, Stuart (1991). Total Design: Integrated Methods for Successful Product Engineering.
New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Pula, Robert P. (1994). "Preface to the Fifth Edition of Science and Sanity." In Alfred
Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General
Semantics, Fifth Edition. Englewood, NJ: Ins~itute of General Semantics.
Rayport, Jeffrey F. and John J. Sviokla (1995). "Exploiting the Virtual Value Chain." Harvard
Business Review, 73(6), November-December, pp. 75-85.
Rechtin, Eberhardt and Mark W. Maier (1997). The Art of Systems Architecting. Boca Raton:
eRC Press.
Reinertsen, Donald G. (1997). Managing the Design Factory: A Product Developer's Toolkit.
New York:The Free Press.
Reinganum, Jennifer (1983). "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly." The
American Economic Review, Vol. 73, ,September, pp. 741-748.
Repenning, Nelson P.and John D. Stennan (~997). "Getting Quality the Old-Fashioned Way:
Self-Confinning Attributions in the Dynamics of Process Improvement." Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Sloan School of Management, Working Paper,Ver. 2.0, September.
Roberts, Edward B. (1988). "What We've Learned: Managing Invention and Innovation."
Research-Technology Management, Vol. 31, No.1, January-February, pp. 11-29.
Roberts, Edward B. and Charles A. Berry (1985). "Entering New Businesses: Selecting
Strategies for Success." Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp. 3-16.
Roberts, Edward B. (1979). "stimulating Technological Innovation - Organizational
Approaches." Research Management, Vol. XXII, No. 6, November, pp. 26-30.
Roberts, Edward B. and Alan Fusfeld (1981). "Staffing the Innovative Technology-Based
Organization." Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp. 19-34.
Robertson, David and Thomas J. Allen (1993). "CAD System Use and Engineering
Perfonnance." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 40, No.3, August.
Rosenberg, Nathan (1990). "Why Do Firms Do Basic Research (with Their Own Money)?"
Research Policy, Vol. 19, No.2, April, pp. 165-174.
210
.......
Rosenberg, Nathan (1982). Inside the Black Box: Technology and Environments. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rosenbloom, Richard S. and Michael Cusumano (1987). "Technological Pioneering and
Competitive Advantage: The Birth of theVeR Industry." California Management Review, Vol.
XXIX, No. 4, Summer, pp. 51-76.
Rothwell, R., C.Freeman, A.Horlsey, V.I.P·Jervis, A.B. Robertson, and J. Townsend (1974).
"SAPPHO ,Updated - SAPPHO Phase II." Research Policy, VoL 3, pp.258-291.
Rusinko, Cathy A. (1999). "Exploring the Use of Design-Manufacturing Integration (DMI) to
Facilitate Product Development: A Test of Some Practices." IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, Vol. 46, No. I,February, pp. 56-71.
Sabbagh, Karl (1996). Twenty-First-Centurylet: The Making and Marketing of the Boeing 777.
New York: Scribner.
Sage, Andrew P. and Charles L. Lynch (1998). "Systems Integration and Architecting:An
Overview of Principles, Practices, and Perspectives." Systems Engineering, 1(3), pp. 176-226.
Sako, Mari (1996). "Suppliers' Associations in the Japanese Automobile Industry: Collective
Action for Technology Diffusion." Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No.6, pp. 651-
671.
Salancik, Gerald R. (1977). "Commitment Is Too Easy.!" Organizational Dynamics, Summer.
Reprinted in Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L. Tushmanand William C.
Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982., pp. 207-222.'
Salancik, Gerald R. and Jeffrey· Pfeffer (1977). "Who Gets Power - And How They Hold onto
ItA Strategic~ContingencyModelof Power." Organizational Dynamics,Winter. Reprinted in
Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L. Tushman and William C. Moore (eds.),
Boston: Pitman, 1982., pp. 223~239.
Schein, Edgar H. (1992). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers.
Schon, Donald A. (1992). "Educating for Reflection-in-Action," in Planning for Human
Systems: Essays in Honor ofRusse.ll L. Ackoff, Jean-Marc Choukrounand Roberta M. Snow, eds.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 142-161.
Schimdt, Wolfgang. (1997). "Advanced.Information Technology in Design and Manufacturing
(AIT): A New User Driver Initiative in Europe." Daimler-Benz AG. Presentation to the Lean
Aerospace Initiative,Sept. 24~
211
•Schmookler, Jacob and Oswald Brownlee (1962). "The Economics of Research and
Development: Determinants of Innovative Activity." American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, Vol. 52, No. 2, May, pp. 165-176.
Scott, SusanneG. (1997). "Social Identification Effects in Product and Process Development
Teams." Joumaloj Engineering and Technology Management, Vol. 14, pp. 97-127.
Scott, William B. (1996). "Acquisition Refonn, Teaming Speed JSOW Development" Aviation
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 145, No.4; July 22, pp. 59-61.
Sekine, Kenichi and Keisu'ke Arai (1994). Design Team Revolution: How to Cut Lead Times in
Halfand Double Your Productivity. Translated by Warren Smith. Portland:' Productivity Press.
Senge, Peter (1990) .. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Leaming Organization.
New York: Currency Doubleday.
Sethi, Rajesh (2000). "New Product Quality and Product Development Teams." Journal of
Marketing, Vol. 64, April,pp. 1-14.
Shingo, Shigeo (1989). A Study of the Toyota Production System. Translated by Andrew P.
Dillon. Portland: Productivity Press.
Simon, Herbert A. (1969). The Sciences ofthe Artificial. Cambridge,MA:TheM.I.T. Press.
Smith, Robert P. (1997). "The Historical Roots of Concurrent Engineering Fundamentals."
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 44, No.1, February, pp. 67-78.
Sobek, Durward K., II (1997). Principles that Shape Product Development Systems: A Toyota-
Chrysler Comparison. PhD. Dissertation, Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of
Michigan.
Sobek, Durward K., II (1996). "A Set-Based Model of Design." Mechanical Engineering, Vol.
118, No.7, July, pp. 78-81.
Sobek, Durward K., II, Jeffrey K. Liker, and Allen C. Ward (1998). "Another Look at How
Toyota Integrates Product Development." Harvard Business Review, 76(4), July-August, pp. 36-
49.
Sobek, Durward K., II, Allen C. Ward, and Jeffrey K. Liker (1997). "Principles from Toyota's
Set-Based Concurrent Engineering Process." White Paper, Dept. of Mechanical and Industrial
Engineering, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT.
Stanley, William L. and John L. Birkler (1986). Improving Operational Suitability through
Better Requirements and Testing. Santa Monica: RAND ReportR-3333-AF, November.
212
----
Sterman, JohnuD. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex
World. Boston: IrwinIMcGraw-Hill.
Sterman, John D. (1992). "Systems Dynamics Modeling for Project Management."
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School 'of Management, Working Paper.
Stirling, Gloria and DavidW. Reid (1992). "The Application of Participatory Control to
Facilitate Patient Well-Being: An Experimental Study of Nursing Impact on Geriatric Patients."
Canadian Journal ofBehavioral Science, Vol. 24, pp. 205~219.
Stokke·, Per R., Thomas A. Boyce, WilliamK. Ralston, and Ian H. Wilson (1991). "Visioning
(and Preparing for) the Future: The Introduction of Scenario-Based Planning into Statoil."
Technology Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 40,pp. 73 - 86.
Suchman, Lucy A. (1990). Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine
Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suh,NamP; (1990). The Principles ofDesign. New York: Oxford University Press.
Suh, Nam P., David S. Cochran, and PauloC. Lima. "Manufacturing System Design." CIRP
Keynote Paper.
Susman, Gerald I. and Judith M. Ray (1999). "Testaf aModel of Organizational Contributors to
Product Development Team Effectiveness." Journal of Engineering Technology Management,
Vol. 16, pp. 223-245.
Taguchi, Genichi (1993). Taguchi on Robust Te'chnology Development: Bringing Quality
Engineering Upstream. Translated by Shih-Chung Tsai. New York: ASME Press.
Taguchi, Genichi and Don Clausing (1990). "Robust Quality." Harvard Business Review,
JanuarylFebruary, pp.65-75.
Teece, David J. (1987)., "Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, 'Licensing and ,Public Policy." In The Competitive Challenge, David J. Teece
(ed.). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, pp. 185-219.
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen (1997). "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 7, pp. 509-533.
Teitelbaum, Richard S. (1992). "Betting on the 21 SlCentury Jet." Fortune, Vol. 125, No. 8,
April 20, pp. 102-117.
Thompson, James D. (1967). Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative
Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
213
Tindale, R. Scott, Christine M. Smith, Linda S. Thomas, Joseph Filkins, and Susan Sheffey
(1996). "Shared .Representations and Asymmetric Social Influence Processes in Small Groups."
In Understanding Group Behavior: Consensual Action by Small Groups, Erich H. Witte and
James H. Davis (eds.), Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Tabrizi, Behnam, and Rick Walleigh (1997). "Defining Next-Generation Products: An Inside
Look." Harvard Business Review, 75(6), November-December, pp. 116-124.
Turnbull, Peter, Nick Oliver, and Barry Wilkinson·(1992). "Buyer-Supplier Relations in the UK
Automotive Industry: Strategic Implications of the Japanese Manufacturing Model." Strategic
Management ]ournal,VoI.13, No.2, pp. 159-168.
Tushman, Michael L. and Philip Anderson (1986). "Technological Discontinuities and
Organizational Environments." Administrative Science Quarterly, VoL 31, pp. 439-465.
Tushman, Michael L. and David A. Nadler (1980). "Implications of Political Models ·of
Organization." In Resource Book in Macro-Organizational Behavior,RH Miles (ed.), Santa
Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing. Reprinted in Readings in the Management of Innovation,
Michael L. Tushman and William C. Moore (eds.), Boston: Pitman, 1982, pp. 240-249.
Tyre, Marci J. and Wanda J. Orlikowski (1993). "Exploiting Opportunities for Technological
Improvement in Organizations." Sloan Management Review, Vol. 35, No.1, Fall,pp. 13-26.
Ulrich, Karl T. and Steven D. Eppinger (1995). Product Design and Development. New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Ulsamer, Edgar (1970). "The Designers of Dassault: Men Who Take One Step at a Time." Air
Force, August, pp. 32-39.
United States Air Force, Engineering Directorate (1998). "Manufacturing Development Guide."
Downloaded from http://www.wpatb.mil/asc/ensm.
United States Department of Defense. Regulation Number 5000.2-R, Change 3.
United States General Accounting Office (1998). "Best Practices: Successful Application to
Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD's Environment." GAO/NSIAD-98-56,
February~
Utterback, James (1994). Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Cambridge: Harvard Business
School Press.
Utterback, James M. (1982) .. "Innovation in Industry and the Diffusion of Technology." In
Readings in the Management of Innovation, Michael L. Tushman and William C. Moore (eds.),
Boston: Pitman, 1982., pp. 29-39.
Vander Meulen, Jacob (1995). Building the B-29. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
214
Van de Yen, Andrew H. (198'6). "Central Problems in the Management of Innovation."
Management Science, VoL 32, No.5, May, pp. 590-607.
Van de Yen, Andrew H. and Douglas Polley (1992). "Learning While Innovating."
Organization Science, Vol. 3, No.1, February, pp. 92-116.
VanDyke Parunak, H., Mitch Fleisher, John Sauter, and AI. Ward (1997). "A Marketplace of
Design Agents for Distributed Concurrent Set-Based Design." Advances in Concurrent
Engineering -- CE97,Fourth ISPE International Conference on Concurrent Engineering:
Research and Applicat,io~s..Oakland University, August 20-22,pp." 287-293.
von Meier, Alexandra (1999). "Occupational Cultures as a Challenge to Technological
Innovation." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 46, No.1, February, pp.
101-114.
Vincenti, Walter G(1990). What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies
from Aeronautical History. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
von Hippel, Eric (1995). "'Sticky Information' and" New Marketing Research Methods." Sloan
Working Paper #3753-95. Cambridge: MassachusettsInstitute of Technology Sloan School of
Management, January.
von Hippel, Eric (1990). "Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable." Research Policy,
Vol. 19, pp. 407-418.
von Hippel, Eric (1988). The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.
von Hippel, Eric (1986). "Lead Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts." Management
Science, 32(7), pp.791-805.
von Hippel,Eric and Stan N. Finkelstein (1979). "Analysis of Innovation in Automated Clinical
Chemistry Analyzers." Science and Public Policy, 6(1), pp. 24-37.
von Hippel,Eric and Marcie J. Tyre (1993). "How Learning by Doing is Done: Problem
Identification in Novel Process Equipment." Research Policy, Vol. 24, pp. 1-12.
Walsh, James P. (1995). "Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down
Memory Lane." Organizational Science, Vol. 6, No.3, May-June, pp.280-321.
Wanous, John P., Arnon E. Reichers, Christine Cooper, and Raghunandan Rao (1994).
"Effectiveness of Problem-Solving Groups: Process and Outcome Criteria." Psychological
Reports, Vol. 75, pp. 1139-1153.
Ward, Allen (1997). "Toyota, Tennites, and Zero Risk System Development." Presentation to
LAI Plenary Workshop, October 9.
215
Ward,Allen, Jeffrey K. Liker, John J. Cristiano, and DurwardK. Sobek, II (1995). "The Second
Toyota Paradox: How Delaying Decisions Can Make Better Cars Faster." Sloan Management
Review. Vol. 36, No.3, Spring, pp.43-61.
Ward, Allen (1990). "A Recursive Model for Managing the Design Process." DTM, 1990, pp.
47-52.
Warnecke, H.J. and M.Huser. "Lean Production." International Journal of Production
Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1-3, pp. 37-43.
Weick, Karl E. (1979). The Social Psychology o/Organizing. New York: Random House.
Wenger, Etienne (2000). "Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems."
Organ;zation, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 225-246.
Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark (1992). Revolutionizing Product Development.·
Quantum Leaps in Speed, Efficiency, and Quality. New York: The'Free Press.
Wheelwright, Steven C. and Kim B. Clark (1992). "Creating Project Plans to Focus Product
Development." Harvard Business Review, March-April, pp'. 70-81.
White, K. Preston, Jr. (1999). "Systems Design Engineering." Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No.
4, pp. 285-302.
Wilke, Henk, Heather Young, Ingebord Mulders, and Dick de Gilder (1995). "Acceptance of
Influence in Task Groups." Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 58, No.4, pp. 312-320.
W·omack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones (1996). Lean Thinking. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Womack, James P., DanielT. Jones, and Daniel Roos (1991). The Machine that Changed the
World: The Story ofLean Production. New York: Harper Perennial.
Xie, Jinhong, X. Michael Song, and Anne Stringfellow (1998). "InterfunctionaI Conflict,
Conflict Resolution Styles, and New Product Success: A Four-Culture Comparison."
Management Science, Vol. 44, No. 12, Part 2 of 2, December, pp. S192-5206.
216
ApPENDIX A: ANSWER SCALES ,USED DURING INTERVIEWS
Illustrated below are the answer scales used during the interviews for this research.
LeanAerospace ~Ini~ Your Satisfaction with ProblemSolution
1 2 34 5 6 7
,_~,_.....a.-I 1. , _....I..-I ,
Not at All Very
Satisfied Satisfied
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Lean Aerospace *"
':L: Did Problem Come Up Again?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I , I I I I I
Yes, Many NO,Never
Times (ame up
Again
Lean Aerospace ~1:;;./ Solution's Impact on ProductPerlormance
1 2
I I
Strong
Negative
Impact--
Worsened
Performance
3 4 5
I I I
No Impact
218
6 7
t I
Strong
Positive
Impact--
Improved
Performance
• I
L~.erospace... . ' ..'IniUalive Solution's Impact'on Product's
Cost
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i I J I I I I
Strong No Impact Strong
Negative Positive
Impact-- Impact--
Increased Lowered
Cost Cost
Lean Aerospace .".,.m:L ,Solution's Impact on ProjectSchedule
1 2
I I
Strong
Negative
Impact --
Missed
Deadlines
3 4 5
I I I
No Impact
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6 7
I I
Strong
Positive
Impact --
Finished
Ahead of
Schedule
Lean AerOspace .,In:L Number of DownstreamEngineering Changes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I I I , I I I
Many Few to No
Changes, o"r Changes
a Few Large
Changes .
'i:..~n.~.81OS.pace... -Jf'Im/iaIN Your Previous Experience with
Similar Problems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I I, I I I I I
Never Seen Solved
Anything Similar
Like this Problems
Before Many Times
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___ - I ....__
.--
Lean Aerospace. ,Ini? Estimated Complexity of theProblem
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I I I I , 1 I
Simple Very
Complex
Ls.:;:?/.Initiative Your Experience .Working withThat Team
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I I I I ( I I
Never Have Worked
Worked with with Those
Those People People Many
Before Times In the
Past
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Lean Aerospace ,1::;;/ Accuracy of Memory
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I I I I I I I
Do Not Do
.Remember Remember
this Case this Case
Very Well Very Well
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ApPENDlxB: FACTOR CITATION DATA FOR PAIRED. AND
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW CASES
Abbreviations
Following isa list of the abbreviations used in the tables. -
For all factors (e.g., management i~tervention,.use of tests, social.problems,e.tc:.}~."~" .indicates
that the factor was cited by the interviewee and a "0" indicates thatit was not cited.
A value of "99" indicates missing data or· no response supplied by interviewee.
Value-meanings are provided below for allbther data in the·table.
TEST
Use of tests.
TRADE
Use of trade studies.
CRIT_MEM
Critical team member.
ST
Show and tell.
Easy
Difficult
Difficulty level not specified
Difficulty level of case as reported by interviewee.
Values indicate:
1:
2:
99:
MGMT
Management intervention.
ENG_EXP
Reliance on engineering expertise.
TIME
Time pressure
eOLoe
Co-located team.
PHASE
Development phase during which dispute occurred.
Values indicate:
1: Conceptual Design
2: Preliminary Design
3: Detail Design
4: Product Improvement,
Engineering-Manufacturing Development (EMD), or
Prototype Testing
5: Mass Production
3: Engineering'vs.
ManufacturinglIndustrialEngineering
4: Engineering vs.'Supplier
5: Engineering vs. Customer
6: Manufacturing/Industrial
Engineering vs. Factory Line Operators
7: Manufacturing/Industrial
Engineering vs. Supplier
Group
ID
Case identification number
BTWN
What groups were involved in the dispute. Values
indicate:
1: Engineering group v. ,Another
Engineering Group
2: Factions within an Engineering
DIFF
MTGS
Frequent face-to-face meetings.
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OBJ
Shared objectives or well understood requirements.
WIN_WIN
Development of a win-win solution
REAS_WHY
Delineation of technical issues/"reasons why"
SOCPROB
Social problems. .
BAD_BO
Misuse of boundary objects or·test data.
BAD_MET
Poorly defined or understood requirements or lack of
shared metrics.
BAD_COM
Unclear or split lines of communication and/or
authority.
ALT
How design alternatives were considered. For
individual interview cases, values indicate:
1: Serial or iterative development of a single
design concept.
2: Parallel development of two design
concepts.
3: Parallel.developmentofthree or more
design concepts~
For paired interview cases, the values indicate:
]: Both said iterative/serial development
2: One said iterative/serial, the other said
two in parallel
3: One said iterative/serial, the other said
three or more in parallel.
4: Both said two in parallel
5: One said two in parallel, the other said
three in parallel
6: Both said three in parallel.
SAT
Satisfaction with solution. For individual cases,
values range from 1 (not satisfied) to 7 (very
satisfied). For paired interview cases, values are the
average ofa pair's responses. -
PERF
Solution's impact on the product's perfonnance(l =
worsened performance 'to 7 = improved
perfonnance). For paired cases, value indicates the
average of a pair's response.
COST
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Solution's impact on the product's cost (1 =
increased cost to 7= reduced cost). For paired cases,
value indicates the average of a pair's response.
SCH
Solution's impacton the project's schedule (1 =
. missed deadlines to 7 = finished ahead of schedule)~
For paired cases, value indicates the average ofa
pair's response.
EXP
Interviewee's previous experience solving similar
problems (1 = never solved similar problem before to
7 = solved similar problems·many times). For paired
cases, value indicates the average of a·pair's
.... response.
COMPL
Interviewee's estimate of.the problem's complexity,
including both social and technical factors.(l ::::
simple to 7 = very complex). For paired cases, value
indicates the average ofa pair's response.
TEAM
Interviewee's past experience working with the other
members of the team (1 = never worked with the
otherteam members before t07 = worked with them
many· times in the past).
MEM
Interviewee'srating of hislher memory of the details
of the case (1 = did not remember case well to 7 =
remembered case very well). For paired cases, value
indicates the average of a pair' s response.
- I I
Individual. Interview Case Data
ID BTWN PHASE DIFF MGMT CRIT MEM ENG EXP TRADE
1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
2 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 2 0 0 a 0
4 4 1 1 0 1 0 0
5 2 4 1 0 0 1 0
6 1 4 2 0 0 0 0
7 2 4 2 1 0 0 0
8 3 4 2 0 a 0 0
9 2 4 2 0 0 0 0
10 3 2 1 0 0 1 0
11 1 2 2 0 0 a 0
12 2 4 1 0 0 1 a
13 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
14 1 3 2 0 0 a 1
15 4 3 1 0 a 0 0
19 5 1 1 0 0 1 0
20 1 1 2 1 0 0 1
21 2 4 1 0 0 0 0
22 5 4 2 0 0 0 0
23 2 4 2 0 a 0 0
24 1 4 1 a 0 0 0
25 1 4 1 0 1 0 a
26 1 4 2 0 a a 0
,27 2 4 2 0 0 a 0
28 4 4 1 0 0 a 0
29 3 4 99 0 1 a a
30 3 4 2 0 0 1 0
31 3 4 1 0 0 1 0
,32 3 4 1 1 ',0 0 0
33 2 ,1 99 0 0 0 1
34 4 1 2 0 0 0 1
35 4 1 99 1 0 0 1
36 4 1 ' 2 1 .0 0 0
37 1 1 2 0 0 0 0
38 4 5 99 1 0 0 0
39 1 3 2 0 1 1 0
40 3 5 1 0 1 0 0
41 2 5 99 0 0 0 0
42 2 2 99 1 0 1 a
43 2 1 1 0 l' 0 0
44 4 3 2 0 0 0 1
45 4 1 99 0 0' ·0 0
46 3 4 99 0 0, 0 0
47 3 5 99 a 0 0 0
48 3 5 99 : 0 0 0 0
49 6 5 1 0 0 0 0
50 6 5 2 0 0 0 0
51 6 5 1 0 1 0 0
52 6 5 2- 0 0 0 0.,
53 6 5 1 0 0 0 0
54 6 5 2 0 ·0 0 0
55 6 5 1 a 0 0 0
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ID BTWN PHASE DIFF MGMT CRIT MEM ENG EXP TRADE
56 6 5 2 0 0 0 0
57 6 5 1 0 0 0 0
58 6 5 2 0 0 0 0
59 6 5 2 0 0 1 0
60 6 5 2 0 0 0 0
61 6 4 1 0 0 0 0
62 6 4 2 0 0 0 0
63 3 4 2 1 0 0 0
64 7 5 2 0 0 0 0
65 3 4 1 0 a 0 0
66 3 5 99 0 1 0 0
67 3 5 99 0 0 0 0
68 3 5 99 0 0 0 0
69 2 2 99 a 0 1 0
70 3 5 99 0 0 0 0
71 1 3 99 1 0 0 0
72 3 " 3 99 0 0 0 0;
73 5 4 99 1 0 1 a
74 2 3 '9"9 a 0 0 :'!' 0
75 3 5 99 1 1 0 0
76 5 3 99 1 0 0 0
77 2 4 g,g 0 a 0" iii"!,i •. 0
7Si 2 99 99 1 0 0 0
79 2 99 99 1 0 0 I'i 0
80 1 )' 4 99 G 1 0 'TT 0
81 1 ", 4 ~ Q 0 0 1
82 1 99 1 0 0 0 0
83 2 99 2 0 0 0 : a!
84 1 99 1 d 0 0 : " ,Q
85 6 99 2 1 0 0 I 0
86 2 ,I', 99 1 0 0 o ! 0
87 '1 9,,9 2 0 0 0 0
88 2 9.9 1 Q 0 0' 1,,1: 0
89 1 b 9'9 1 0 0: 0
90 7 5 1 1 1 0 0
91 6 £; 99 Q 0 0 0
92 2 4: 'l e 0 () 0
93 6 ·~t9 2 0 0 0 0
94 2 ~ 1 6 a 0 a
95 3 5 2 0 0 0 0
96 4 ~ 2 i 0 0 0
97 4 ,~' 1 () 0 () 0
98 1 5 '1 0 0 0 0
99 4 ~ 2 1 '1 6 ii, 0
100 1 4 2 1 0 0 1
101 3 5 1 0 a 0 0
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_I_I __-~__"",,--------
ID ST TEST TIME COLOC MTGS OBJ
1 1 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 0
4 1 0 0 0 1 0
5 0 1 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 0 0 a
9 1 1 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 0 0 0 a
11 1 a 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 1 a 0 0
14 a 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 1 0 0 0 1
19 0 0 0 0 0 1
20 0 1 0 0 0 1
21 0 1 0 0 0 0
22 0 1 0 0 0 0
23 1 1 0 0 0 0
24 1 1 1 0 0 0
25 1 1 0 0 1 0
26 1 1 0 '0 1 '0
27 0 1 0 1 0 0
28 0 1 0 a 1 0
29 1 1 0 0 0 0
30 0 1 a 0 0 0
31 0 1 0 0 0 0
32 1 0 0 0 0 1
33 0 1 0 0 0 1
34 0 1 0
..
0 0 0
35 1 0 0 0 0 0
36 1 0 0 a 0 0
37 1 a 1 1 0 0
38 1 a 1 0 1 0
39 0 0 1 0 0 0
40 0 0 1 1 0 a
41 1 1 0 0 0 0
42 1 0 0 0 1 0
43 1 0 0 1 0 0
44 0 1 0 0 0 1
45 1 0 0 a 0 0
4£5 1 1 0 1 0 0
47 0 1 0 1 0 0
48 1 1 0 1 0 0
4~ 0 1 0 6 0 0
50 0 1 1 0 0 0
si 0 1 0 1 0 0
52 1 1 0 1 0 0
5~ 1 a a 1 0 0
54 0 1 0 1 0 0
55 1 1 0 1 0 0
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ID ST TEST TIME COLOC MTGS OBJ
56 0 1 0 1 0 0
57 0 1 0 1 0 0
58 1 0 0 0 1 0
59 0 1 1 0 0 0
60 1 1 0 0 a 0
,61 1 1 0 0 a 1
62 1 0 0 0 1 0
63 1 1 0 0 a 0
64 0 1 0 0 0 0
65 0 ·1 0 0 0 1
66 1 1 0 0 1 1
67 1 1 0 0 0 0
68 0 1 0 0 0 0
69 0 1 1 0 a a
70 0 1 0 0 0 0
71 1 0 0, 0 1 a
72 1 0 0 0 1 0
'73 1 1 0 0 a 0
74 a ,1 0 0. 1 0
75 0 1 0 a 0 0
76 1 1 0 0 0 0
77 1 a 0 0 1 1
78 0 0 0 '0 0 0
79 0 a 0 0 0 0
80 0 1 .0 0 0 1
81 1 1 0 0 1 0
82 1 1 0 1 0 1
83 1 0 0 0 0 1
84 0 0 0 b 1 1
85 1 0 0 0 1 0
86 0 0 0 0 1 0
87 0 1 0 0 1 0
88 0 1 0 0 1 1
69 1 0 0 0 1 1
90 0 1 1 0 1 0
91 0 1 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 1
93 0 1 0 0 0 0
94 1 ;" 0 a 0 1 0
95 1 0 1 0 a 0
96 0 0 0 a 0 0
97 1 0 0 0 0 1
98 1 0 0 0 0 0
99 0 0 0 0 1 0
10,0 1 a 1 0 0 0
101 1 1 0 0 0 0
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ID WIN_WIN REAS WHY SOCPROB BAD BO BAD_MET BAD COM
1 a a 1 0 0 0
2 1 a 0 0 a 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 a
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 1 0
7 0 0 0 0 1 0
8 0 0 1 0 0 0
9 0 0 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 1 0 a 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 1 a a 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 1 1 0
15 0 0 1 0 0 1
19 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 1· 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.6 0 0 1 0 0 1
27 0 0 0 0 0 1
28 0 1 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 1 0 0 0
30 0 0 1 1 0 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 1 0 1 0 0 1
33 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 1 0 1 0
36 0 0 1 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 a 1 0 1 1
39 0 0 0 0 () 0
40 a 1 0 0 0 0
41 0 0 1 0 ,0 0
42 0 0 0 '0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0 0 0
4:4 '0 0 a 0 0 0
4:5 0 0 0 0 0 0;
46 a 0 0 0 0 o·
47 0, 0 0 0 0 0
48 0 0 0 0 0 0
4'9 0 0 0 0 0 0
'50 0 a a 0 0 0
Sl 0 0 0 0 0 0
~2 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 0 0 0 a 0 0
54 0 0 1 0 0 0
55 0 0 1 0 0 0
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ID WIN WIN REAS WHY SOCPROB BAD BO BAD_MET BAD COM
56 0 0 1 0 0 0
57 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 0 0 1 0 0, 0
63 a 0 1 0 0 1
64 0 a 1 0 0 1
65 a 0 1 a a 0
66 0 0 1 0 0 0
67 0 0 1 0 0 0
,I 68 0 0 0 0 0 0,
69 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 0 0 ': 0 0 0 0,
72 0 1 0 0 0 0
I, 73 0 0 0 a 1 0
74 0 1 1 0 0 0
75 0 a 1 0 1 1
76 0 0 0 1 0 0
77 0 0 1 0 0 0
78 0 0 0 0 1 0
79 0 0, 1 0 1 0
80 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 0 0' 1 0 1 0
82 a 0 0 0 a 0
83 0 0 0 0 1 0
84 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 0 0 0 0 0 0
86 0 1 0 0 0 0
87 0 0 l 0 0 0
88 0 0 0 0 0 d
89 0 0 1 0 0 a
90 0 0 1 0 0 d
91 0 0 1 0 0 1
92 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 0 0 i 0 0 0
S34 0 1 0 a a 0
95 0 0 1 1 0 1
96 0 0 0 0 0 i
~7 0 0 0 a 0 0
98 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 1
101 0 0 0 1 0 0
230
--------
ID ALT SAT, PERF COST SCH EXP
1 2 6 6 4 4 7
2 1 6 3 3 2 2
3 1 6 6 4 2 6
4 1 6 7 4 5 6
5 1 7 7 4 4 6
6 3 7 6 2 4 3
7 2 2 3 4. 4 6
8 2 7 7 4 4 7
9 1 6 5 6 2 6
10 1 7 4 2 2 7
11 3 3 4 3 3 3
12 1 ,.. 6 4 3 3 5
13 2 7 ·6 3 4 5
14 3 3 6 5 4 5
15 3 6 6 3 4 7
-- 19 2 6 6 7 .- 6 5
20 3 6 4 7 7 -- 6
21 1 5 7 6 6 3
22 1 7 7 6 7 2
23 3 5 4 4 4 7
24 1 6 7 4 4 -6
25 3 5 5 4 4 4
26 3 6 5 "4 4 2
27 3 5 6 2 3 2
28 3 E) 4 5 4 5
29 1 7 3 5 4 7
30 1 3 3 6 3 2
31 2 7 3 6 5 1
32 1 6 6 6 5 7
33 3 5 6 5 5 5
34 3 7 4 6 6 3
35 2 3 3 4 4 "6
36 1 5 5 4 3 6
37 1 6 6 2 2 3
38 1 6 6 3 3 5
39- 1 4 4 3 4 2
40 3 6 6 2 4 2
41 1 6 ~ 4 6 5
-;12 2 6 3 3 5 6
43. 1 6 6 99 99 1
44 3 7 5 6 6 6
45 1 99 99 99 99 3
46, 3 6 6 7 4 4
47 1 7 6 4 4 7
48 1 7 7 7 4 4
49 1 5 6 5 5 6
50 1 6 5 7 6 2
51 1 6 7 6 6 3
52 3 7 5 6 6 2
53 1 5 6) 6 7 5
S4 1 5 7 7 7 6
55 1 7 7 5 7 7
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1D ALT SAT PERF COST SCH EXP
56 1 4 6 6 4 4
57 1 7 7 4 5 6
58 1 5 6 5 5 3
59 1 6 5 5 6 6
60 1 4 5 5 5 4
61 3 7 6 7 7 1
6'2 1 4 4 4 4 7
63 1 4 6 6 7 7
64 1 4 5 6 6 6
; 65 1 7 6 6 6 4
66 1 5 5 6 6 5
67 1 5 7 6 5 3
68 3 7 6 6 6 7
69 1 6 6 5 1 2
70 3 " ,5 6 4 4 2
'0
71 1 6 4 6 2 7
72 3 6 3 5 4 7
73 3 6 5 4 3 7
74 2 5 6 4 4 4
75 3 ::;\ 99 5 4 3 2 :,
76 2 2 4 4 3 5
77 2 6 2 4 5 6
78 2 1 2 2 3 6
79 2 iii"'" 5 4 3 3 4
80 2 1:', ,4 .! 6 ~ 3 6'I;.",::",. I
81 3 5 4 4 4 6
82 1 7 6 6 6 6
83 1 7 4 4 4 1
84 3 '::. 6 5 5 4 3
85, 3 6 6 2 2 4
86 3 6 6 3 6 3
87 2 5 4 1 1 1
88 99: 7 6 5 5 1
89,: 3 6 6 6 7 1
gO 3 6 7 5 3 2
9J. 9.9, 6 7 7 4 1
92" 2 'I 6 6 6 5 5
~3 1 6, 7 5 4 2
94 2 :: 7 4 4 4 7
95 99, 6 5 6 6 4
96 99:;' 3 4 4 1 5
97, l ::' 5 3 5 6 6
98 99::: 7 4 3 3 5
99 3 7 4 4 3 1
100 3 3 5 99 1 3
101 3" 6 3 4 3 6
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ID COMPL TEAM MEM
1 5 2 99
2 5 2 99
3 6 2 99
4 6 6 99
5 4 4 99
6 6 4 99
7 2 1 99
8 5 1 99
9 5 5 99
10 1 6 99
11 4 1 99
12 5 3 99
13 4 3 6
14 6 5 5
15 5 6 6
19 5 3 6
20 6 1 6
21 4 1 7
22 7 1 7
23 5 6 5
24 7 7 6
25 6 5 7
26 7 3 7
27 6 4 7
28 2 5 5
29 6 3 6
30 5 1 7
31 7 1 7
32 6 7 6
33 6 2 6
34 7 1 7
35 5 7 7
36 6 1 6
37 4 7 6
38 6 4 7
39 6 2 5
40 5 3 6
41 2 4 7
42 6 6 7
43 7 6 7
44 6 6 7
45 7 5 7
46 6 7 6
47 2 7 6
48 2 1 7
49 6 6 99
50 6 1 99
51 6 5 99
52 5 6 99
53 5 3 99
54 5 3 99
55 6 7 99
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ID COMPL TEAM MEM
56 6 6 99
57 3 6 99
58 6 1 99
59 4 5 99
60 4 4 99
61 5 2 6
62 7 6 6
63 7 6 7
64 7 4 7
65 3 3 7
66 6 5 5
67 3 6 6
68 6 5 6
69 6 7 7
70 6 1 6
71 4 6 5
72 6 6 7
73 3 3 5
74 7 4 7
75 6 5 6
76 6 4 4
77 5 4 7
78 3 2 6
79 6 5 5
80 5 4 .5
81 7 1 6
82 2 6 7
83 5 4 7
84 3 1 6
85 5 2 6
86 5 2 6
87 7 1 5
88 3 5 6
89 6 1 5
90 7 4 7
91 6 3 6
92 2 6 6
93 7 3 7
94 5 1 7
95 6 1 7
96 5 4 7
97 4 2 7
98 4 6 7
99 5 2 5
100 5 2 6
101 3 2 6
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Paired Interview Case Data
ID BTWN PHASE MGMT CRIT MEM ENG EXP TRADE ST
7 2 4 1 0 0 0 0
20 1 1 1 0 0 2 0
33 2 1 0 0 0 2 0
34 4 1 0 0 0 2 0
40 ,3 5 0 2 0 O' 1
43 2 'I 0 1 0 0 2
66 3 5 0 2 0 0 2
67 3 5 0 0 0 0 2
68 3 5 0 0 0 0 1
69 2 2 0 1
...
1 a 1
, 70 3 5 0 1 0 0 1
73 5 4 1 0 1 0 1
76 5 3 1 a 1 0 1
77 2 4 0 a 0 a 2
80 1 4 1 1 0 0 0
82 1 99 0 b 0 0 2
83 2 99 0 0 0 0 2
86 2 99 0 0 0 0 1
87 1 99 0 0 0 0 0
88 :2 99 0' 0 0 0 0
98 1 5 0 0 0' 0 2
100 1 4 1 0 0 1 2
101 3 5 0 0 0, 0 2
102 1 3 0 0 0 2 2
103 1 4 0 2 0 0 2
104 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
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It.
ID TEST TIME COLoe MTGS OBJ WIN WIN
7 0 0 a 1 0 0
20 2 0 0 0 2 0
33 2 0 a 0 2 0
34 2 0 0 a 0 a
40 1 2 1 1 0 0
43 0 1 1 1 0 0
66 2 0 0 2 2 0
67 ' 2 0 0 0 0 0
68 2 0 0 1 0 0
69 2 2 0 0 0 0
70 1 0 0 1 0 0
73 2 0 0 1 0 0
76 2 0 a a 0 0
77 0 0 0 2 ," 1 0
80 2 1 0 0 1 a
82 2 a 1 1 1 a
83 0 a 1 1 2 0
86 0 0 0 2 1 0
87 2 a 0 2 a 0
88 2 0 0 2 2 0
9'8 0 0 0 0 a 0
100" a 2 0 1 0 0
101' :2 0 0 1 0 0
102 0 0 0 1 1 0
lOJ 2 :j: 0 0 0 0 0
104:" 2 0 0 0 0 0
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ID REAS WHY SOCPROB BAD BO BAD MET BAD COM ALT
7 0 0 0 2 1 2
20 0 0 0 0 0 6
33 0 1 0 0 0 6
34 a 0 0 0 0 6
40 1 1 0 0 1 3
43 1 0 0 0 0 3
66 0 2 0 0 0 3
67 0 1 0 0 0 3
68 0 0 0 0 0 5
69 0 0 1 0 0 3
70 0 0 0 0 0 6
73 0 0 0 1 0 6
76 0 0 1 0 0 4
77 0 1 0 0 0 4
80 0 0 0 0 0 5
82 0 0 0 0 0 1
83 0 0 0 1 0 2
86 1 0 0 0 a 3
87 0 2 0 0 1 2
88 0 0 0 0 0 99
98 0 0 0 0 1 99
100 0 0 0 0 2 6
101 0 0 1 '0· 0 6
102 0 0 0 1 0 5
103 0 0 0' 0 0 1
104 0 1 0 0 0 6
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ID SAT PERF COST SCH EXP COMPL
7 3.5 3.5 3 3 5 2.5
20 5.5 5.0 6 99 6 6.5
33 5~5 5.5 5 4 5 6.0
34 6 .. 5 5.0 6 6 5 7.0
4'0 5.5 6.0 4 5 , 4 5.0
43 6.0 6.0 99 99 3 6.5
66 5.5 6.0 7 7 4 5.5
67 4.5 7.0 5 4 5 3.0
68 7.0 5.0 5 5 7 4.5
69 5.5 5.0 4 2 2 6.0
70 5.5 4.5 4 4 4 4.0
73 5.0 4.0 3
,
3 6 4.5
76 4.0 5.0 4 4 6 6.0
77 6.0 4.0 5 6 6 4.0
80 3.0 4.5 3 4 6 5.0:
82 7.0 6. O. 6 6 7 3.0'
83 6.0 4.'0 4 4 1 5.5
86; 6.0 6.0 5 5 5 5.5
87 3.5 3.0 2 1 3 7.0
S8, 7.0 4.0 6 5 3 3.5
·98':: 6.5 4.0 3 3 6 5.0
100 4.0 5,,0 99 2 3 5.0
101 6.5 4.5 6 99 7 2.0
102 6.0 5.0 5 5 6 3.5
103 6.0 4 .:'5 9:.9 5 6 3.0
104, 5.0 4.5 99 3 3 6 .. 0
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ID TEAM MEM UNIQCRIT UNIQPROB
7 2.5 99 99.00 99.00
20 2.0 6 99.00 99.00
33 3.0 6 99.00 99.00
34 3.5 6 99.00 99.00
40 3.0 6 99.00 99.00
43 3.5 6 99.00 99.00
66 6.0 6 .56 .50
67 6.5 6 .50 .50
68 4.5 6 .60 .75
69 5.0 7 .33 .00
70 3.5 6 .50 .00
73 4.0 5 .25 .00
76 5.0 6 99.00 99.00
77 4.5 7 .20 .00
80 4.5 5 1.0.0 .50
82 6.5 7 .43 .00
83 3.0 6 .71 .00
86 2.5 6 1.00 .00
87 3.0 6 .20 .50
88 5.0 7 1.00 1.00
98 6 .. 0 7 .50 .67
100 1.5 6 .56 .00
101 4.0 7 .-14 .00
102 4.5 6 .50 .50
103 4.8 99 .50 .67
104 5.5 99 1.00 .50
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'ApPENDIX C:CRITERIALISTS FOR PAIRED INTERVIEW CASES
Following are the criteria lists for all paired interview cases. The criteria are listed in the
order in which.,they were described by the interviewees, and no special significance should, be
attributed to their sequence. In most instances, criteria are cited as direct quotes from the
interviewees. However, in order to ensure confidentiality and protect proprietary information,
some tenninology has been altered.
Arrows between criteria indicate that they are shared by both interviewees. Numbers in
parentheses after each criterion indicate which problem th~ criterion is addressing, and problem
labels, are 'provided below thecriteria,list'for each case.
Case ID Number: 66
Problem Description: Aircraft fuselage access door failing to fit properly
Criteria Lists:
Engineering Lead Tooling Lead
Door fit (1)~,Control door trim (1)
Door stiffness (1), Control hinge location (1)
Minimize door size (1) Door fit (1)
Ensure door
interchangeability (1)
Allow for bigger gaps (1)
Eliminate operator error (2)
Total Number of Criteria: 9
Number of Unique Criteria: 7
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.7 B
Problems:
(1) Door fit and design
,Manufacturing process
(2) design
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number Of Unique Problems: 1
Uniue Problem Ratio: 0.50
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Case 10 Number: ·67
Aircraft component manufacturing quality problem
Problem Description: associated with tooling error
Criteria Lists:
pesign Engineer Tooling Engineer
Part fit (1) ~ Avoid· past mistakes (1)
. -----........ Tool performance (1)
Avoid adding process steps
(2)
Total Number of Criteria: 4
Number of Unique. Criteria: 2
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.50
Problems:
Part fit and tool
(1) performance
Impact to manufacturing
(2) process flow
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 1
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.50
Case 10 Number: 68
Failure of a reaming process to meet hole diameter
Problem Description: tolerances for an aircraft component
Criteria Lists:
process Engineer pesign Engineer
Meet part acceptance Do not invalidate fatigue
criteria (1) " article test data (2)
Ensura worst case part still
meets acceptance criteria
(1 )
Do not impact aircraft
aerodynamics (3)
Do not. affect part
interchangeability (4)
Total Number of Criteria: 5
Number of Unique· Criteria: 3
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.60
Problems:
Ensure part meets
( 1) acceptance criteria
Maintain validity of fatigue
(2) test dats
Avoid changes to aircraft
(3) aerodynamics
(4) Part interchangeability
Total Number of Problems: 4
Number of Unique Problems: 3
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.75
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Case 10 Number: 69
Problem Description: Design of a rocket engine support· structure
Criteria Lists:
Design Engineering Lead
Comply with maximum
diameter of forging
Minimize stress on
individual bolts
Cost to produce
Simple,robust
Communicate with customer
Stress Analyst
Receive correct loads from
customer
Composite properties
Failure criteria
Geometric issues
Total Number of Criteria: 9
Number of Unique Criteria: 3
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.33
Problems:
( 1) Design of support structure
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
CaselD .Number: 7 0
Problems with quality of a rocket engine starter
Problem Description: cartridge
Criteria. Lists:
Process Engineer
Cast grain
Good concentricity
Interviewee 2
. . Concentricity
....----- Scrap rate
Problems:
Total Number of Criteria: 4
Number of Unique Criteria: 2
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.50
Manufactured quality of
(1) starter cartridge
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of· Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
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Case ID Number: 73
Problem Description: Design an aircraft power system control unit
Criteria Lists:
Hardware Engineer Electrical Engineer
Safety· (1) ~ Schedule (2)
Being a respo.. nSiV8. s.uPPlier ... .(2) . . Technical feasibility (1)
Schedule· (2) Safety (1)
Contractural requirements
Successful test program (1) (2)
Total Number of Criteria: 8
Number of Unique Criteria: 2
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.25
Problems:
( 1) Control unit design
(2) Customer relations
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
Case ID Number: 77
Design of an automated test stand for testing aircraft
Problem Description: power distribution control units
Criteria Lists:
Testing Equipment Engineer , Testing Eguipment Engineer
Test stand configuration
control ~ 'Speed
Speed~ Simple to use
Ease of use ..------
Total Number of Criteria: 5
Number of Unique Criteria: 1
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.20
Problems:
( 1 ) Test stand design
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
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Case ID Number: 8a
Problem Description: Design of 'an aircraft subsystem control board
Criteria Lists:
Software Engineer
Better hardware
performance (1)
Support object-oriented
development method, (2)
Total Number of Criteria: 5
Number of Unique Criteria: 5
Unique Criteria Ratio: 1.00
Problems:
(1) Control board design
Implementing object-
(2) oriented methods
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 1
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.50
Hardware Engineer
Risk (1)
Commonality (1)
Time (1)
Case 10 Number: 82
Problem Description: Design ala drill for aircraft component manufacturing
Criteria Lists:
Design Engineer Design Engineer
Ability to'bU,ild part~", ,Lightweight
Part quality ,Ease of use
., Cycle time ' "Conform to surface
, Ergonomics
Total Number of Criteria: 7
Number 'of Unique Criteria: 3
Unique Criteria' Ratio: 0.43
Problems:
(1) Tool design
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: '0.00
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Case 10 Number: 83
Design of a manufacturing tool for aircraft component
Problem Description: production
Criteria Lists:
Electrical·Engineer Mechanical Engineer
Reproducibility Simple
Robustness ......._-----r... Robust
Functionality Safety
"PatentabilityH
Total Number· of Criteria: 7
Number of Unique Criteria: 5
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.71
Problems:
(1) Tool design
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: a
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
Case ID Number: 8 6
Design of a manufacturing tool for aircraft component
Problem Description: production
Criteria Lisls:
Electrical Engineer
Adequate power
Adequate control
Mechanical Engineer
Small machine
Self-indexing
Self-supporting
Easy to use
Little process qualification
Total Number of Criteria: 7
Number of Unique Criteria: 7
Unique Criteria Ratio: 1.00
Problems:
( 1) Tool design
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
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Case 10 Number: 87
Installation of a new manufacturing tool for aircraft
Problem Description: component assembly
.Criteria Lists:
Manufacturing Engineer Manufacturing Engineer
Hold true to fatigue life (1) .Protection to product (1)
Speed at which force is ..Generate all· needed features
applied (1) (1)
Cycle time (2)
Total Number of Criteria: 5
Number of Unique Criteria: 1
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.20
Problems:
(1) Part quality
(2) Production. rate
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 1
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.50
Case 10 Number: 88
Problems· with test machine during testing of rivet
Problem Description: process characteristics
Criteria· Lists:
Manufacturing Engineer
Integrity of experimental
design (1)
Buy..infrom materials
technology (2)
Team comfort (2)
Manufacturing Engineer
Avoid damage to machine (3)
Total Number of Criteria: 4
Number of Unique Criteria: 4
Unique Criteria Ratio: 1.00
Problems:
( 1) Experiment quality
(2) Team dynamics
(3) Damage to testing machine
Total Number of Problems: 3
Number of Unique Problems: 3
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 1.00
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Case I0 Number: 98
Problem· Description: Manufacturing quality problems during ·aircraft assembly
Criteria Lists:
Lead oesjgnEngjneer Manufacturing Engjne~
Ensure all aircraft made .....
prior to problem detection Ensure all prior aircraft are
are okay (1) okay (1)
Adjust planning paperwork
Fix engineering drawings (2) (3)
Total Number of Criteria: 4
Number of Unique Criteria: 2
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.50
Problems:
Ensure aircraft made prior
to problem detection are
(1) okay
(2) Fix engineering drawings
(3) Fix -planning paperwork
Total Number of Problems: 3
Number of Unique Problems: 2
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.67
Case 10 Number: 100
Redesign and replace a part that was routinely damaged
Problem Description: during aircraft assembly
Criteria Lists;
Design Engineer Design Engineer
Meet stress requirements~ Load requirements
Resistant to change Feasibility
Cost .....1--------....... BUdget
Weight
Repeatability
Corrossion resistant
Total Number of Criteria: 9
Number of Unique Criteria: 5
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.56
Problems:
Design fix for problematic
(1) part
Total Number of Problems: 1
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
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Case 10 Number: 101
Fix operator access/assembly problem during aircraft
Problem Description: production
Criteria Lists:
Design Engineer Design Engjneer
Load criteria for splices (1) ... Do not change splices (1)
Design criteria for bulkhead
(1)· '-. Simplicity (1)
Ability of mechanics to dO_ ~
installation (2) ~. - Pass stress (1)
~ Producibility (2)
Total Number of Criteria: 7
Number of Unique Criteria: 1
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.14
Problems:
Ensure part meets design
(1) requirements
(2) Facilitate operator access
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 0
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.00
Case 10 Number: 102
Problem Description: Internal configuration alan· ·aircraf"s subsystems
Criteria Lists:
Configurationist Structural Engineering Lead
Space for fuel (1) Maintainence access (3)
Design of refueling sYstem~
(1 ). ... Physical arrangement (1)
Takeoffllanding issues (2) .. Effects on. structure (1)
Maintainability (3) Takeoff/laning issues (2)
. ~ Interface/routing
Wire routing (1) .........---- requirements (1)
Weight (4)
Performance .(4)
Total Number of Criteria: 1 2
Number of Unique Criteria: 6
Unique Criteria Ratio: 0.50
Problems:
(1) Internal arrangement
(2) Takeoff/landing issues
(:3) Maintainability
(4) Aircraft performance
Total Number of Problems~ 4
Number of Unique Problems: 2
Uni us Problem Ratio: 0.50
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Case 10 Number: 103
Problem Description: Repair of a fatigue crack in an aircraft's fuel tank
Criteria Lists:
Tool Design Design Engineer
Tool design/how to do it? '
(1) . \einforce or just clear? (3)
Do not damage nearby
Control. of tOI.erances (1) .. titan.ium structure .(1)
Accessibility (2) . Avoid removing parts (1)
Cut as drawn? (2) Cbuldit be done? (1)
Total Number of Criteria: B
Number of Unique Criteria: 4
Unique Criteria Ratio: a.5a
Problems:
Tool feasibility and repair
(1) process
(2) Humanaccessability
(3) What type of repair to make
Total Number of Problems: 3
Number of Unique· Problems: 2
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.67
Case 10 Number: 104
Problem Description: Repair of fatigue cracks on an aircraft's bulkhead
Criteria Lists:
Stress Analyst
Provide a mechanical
failsafe (1)
Do not change hole diameter
(1)
Maintain stiffness
characteristics (1 )
Design Engineer
Ensure. fix is statically
stable (1)
Accessibility (2)
Provide needed tools. (2)
Do not damage wing box (1)
Problems:
Total Number of Criteria: 7
Number of .Unique Criteria: 7
Unique Criteria Ratio: 1.00
Design affix for cracked
(1) structu re
(2) Design of repai r process
Total Number of Problems: 2
Number of Unique Problems: 1
Uni ue Problem Ratio: 0.50
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ApPENDlxD: MANN-WHITNEY TESTS
DIFFERENCES IN OUTCOME MEASURES
FOR SIGNIFICANT
U•• ofT.... \IS.
Frequenl F~rrw=ec.
tI.t1np
T..t
Rink. SUtIIUc.
Meln Sumo'
TEST MTG N Renk Rinks SAT PERF COST SCH
Mlnn-
SAT 1.000 47.000 31.766 1493.000 WhitneyU 3"0.000 244.000 204.500 273.500
2,000 15.000 30.667 "60.000 Wilcoxon W 460.000 3&4.000 324.500 393.500
Total 52.000 Z -lf217 .1.938 -2.581 -1.4""2"6'
*~ ..PERF 1.000 48.000 3".417 1852.000
2.000 15.000 24.267 364.000 Grouping VIriIb1e: TEST_MTG
Total --s3.000
COST 1.000 48.000 35.240 1691.500
2.000 15.000 21.833 324.500
Totll 63.000
SCH 1.000 48,000 33,802 1622.500
2.000 15.000 26.233 393.500
Total 63.000
U_ofT"r.w.
..~,
Intenl..II011
T...
Rink. 8a.tiltlc.
Meln Sumo'
TEST MGM N Rink Renk' SAT PERF COST SCH
Mlnn-.
SAT 1.000 51.000 35,Hl6 1846.000 W'litnev U Z45OO0 209.000 201.000 191.000
2.000 1~ 24.333 365.000 Wt\alJlonW 365.000 3291)00 ~on 3fTQOO
ota 66.000 Z ~2.185 - . rJ9 -2.562 ~n
gi-PERF 1.000 51.000 36.902 1882.000
Grouping VlrI.ble:
2,000 15.000 21.933 329,000 TEST~MGM
Tolil 66,000
COST 1.000 51.000 Jti.O:i8 1639.000
'.000 14.000 21.85' JOti.OOO
Tolal 65~000
6CH ,:000 "5"nrOO 3'.137 18IM.DOO
2.000 15.000 21.133 31 .000
Totll 86,000
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Sltered Objectitl_ w.
Shollllend Tel'
Test
Ranks Statislics
Mean Sum or
oBJ ST N Rllnk Ranks
SAT 1.000 10.000 28.300 283.000
2.000 38.000 23.500 893.000
Total 048,000
PERF 1.000 10.000 29.750 297.500
2.000 38,000 23,118 878.500
lotel 4llUJOO
COST 1,000 10.000 30.200 ·302.000
2,000 36.000 21.639 779.000
Totlll 046.000
SCH .oou 10.000 32,200 322.000
2.000 J ,000 2 . '84 80l),OOU
Shared ObjecIltl_ '118.
F,.,,~..,Feeeat.':Ke
IIHrInga
Tnt
Rlnb 8t.ultlcl
Me.n Sum or
OBJ MTGS N Rink Renks SAT PERF COST SCH
Mlnn-
SAT '.000 14,000 19.393 271.500 Whitney U 99.500 104,000 58.500 0/17.500
2.000 19.000 15.237 289.500 WiIco.w:onW 289,500 294.000 248.500 237.500
Totel 33.000 Z ·1.328 ·'.136 ·2.788 ·3,197
~"a;".PERF 1.000 '4.000 19,071 267,000
Exect Sig.
12,,(,-teiled
2.000 19.000 15,474 294.000 Sill.)] 0.226 0.304 0.005 0,001
Total. 33.000 II Not corr&et.a lOr 11116,
COS .000 .000 22,3;l 312.0UO b Grouping Veriable: OBJ_MTGS
2,000 19.000 13,079 :,248.500
Totel 33.000
5CH 1 ODD 14.000 23.107 323.500
O!.OOO 18,000 12,OUO 23 .:lOU
Total 33.000
Sit.,. Objecll~ n.
"'.,.."....,
'nlernlJtion
Tnt
Ranh Itlltletlcl
Meln 'Sum or
OBJ MGMT Renk Ranks SAT . PERF COST SCH
SAT 1,000 15,000 20.233 303.500
2.000 11:5.000 12.UJ 192.500
Totll 3 ,000
PERF 1.000 15.000 19.533 293.000
2.000 17,000 13.824 235,000
Total 32.000
COST 1.000 15,000 20,400 306.000 Grouping Ven-blll: OBJ_MGMT
2.000 Ul-.OOO 11.11':' 190.000
Total 31,000
SCH 1.000 15.000 23.000 345.000
2.000 17.000 10.765 183.000
Totll 32.000
Sho• .ndTeIln.
F,.,.,.,., F.C'e-ro-F~
....tin".
T....
R.nlll SId.tic.
M.ln Sum or
sT MTGS Rink Renks SAT PERF COST SCH
Menn-
SAT 1.000 32.000 20.703 ElS2.S00 Whitn.y U 134.500 133.500 102.000 105.500
2.000 9.000 22.056 198.500 WilcoxonW 662.500 861.5DO 147.000 150.500
TOlal 41.000 Z -0.31. ·0.343 ·1.132 ·1120lil
1\9'PERF 1.000 32.000 20,872 681.500
E••ct SIg.
12·(1-h1i1ec1
2.000 9.000 22187 199.500 Sig.)] 0.789 0.745 O.28oi 0,278
ot., •. 000 I NOI corrtdlKllOr bes
COST .000 JO.OOO 2 100 53J.000 b Grouping Varilbte: ST_MTGS
2.000 9.000 16.333 147.000
Totel 39.000
SCH .000 31,000 21.~87 tiDB,:JOO
.000 9.000 16. '22 150.:100
Totll .0,000
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ShoW' _nd T.II V5.
Man_lIemen'
tntervMlJon
Mean Sum of
ST MGMT N Rank Ranks
SAT 1.000 34.000 22.441 763.000
2.000 7.000 14.000 98.000
Total 41.000
PERF 1.000 34.000 22.926 779.500
2.000 8.000 15.438 123.500
Tolal 42.000
COST 1.000 33.000 21.938 724.000
2.000 8.000 17.125 137.000
Tolal 41.000
SCH 1.000 33.000 22.985 758.500
2.000 8.000 12.813 102.500
Total 41 ..000
t=r.qu.,., F_c.,o-F.c.
",..l1nll$ "'S.
"-n.gem.n'
InletYentlon
Test
St.listics
Meln Sum of
MTGS MGM N Rank Ranks
SAT 1,000 17.000 18.812 321,500
2,tJOo 13.000 11.038 143.500
Tolal 30,000
PERF. 1.000 17,000 17.235 293.000
2.000 14.000 14.500 203.000
Tolal 31;000
COST 1.000 17,000 15.853 269.500
2.000 13.000 15.038 195.500
Total 30.000
SCH 1.000 17.000 18,3204 311.500
2.000 14.000 13.179 184.500
Total 31.000
C04ocellon ",... Us. of
ruts
SAT
0,0'"
Not correded for ties.
Grouping Variable:
MTGS_MGM
PERF COST SCH
Mean Sum of
COL TEST N Rank Ranks
SAT 1.000 4.000 204,125 86.500
2.000 45.000 25,078 1128.500
Total 49.000
PERF 1.000 4,000 32.500 130.000
2.000 46.000 24.891 1145,000
Total 50. 100
COST 1.000 3.( DO 14,:)00 43.500
2.000 46. 100 25.685 1181.500
Total 49. 100
SCH 1.000 3,( DO 23.657 71.000
2.000 46.000 . 25.087 11504.000
Tolal 49.000
Co-Ioc.rJon .... Sherwt/
Obj.eU".$
Meln 5umof
COL OBJ N Rank Ranks
SAT 1,000 1•.000 16.643 233.000
2.000 18.000 15.388 2B:),ODO
ToIsI 32,000
PERF 1.000 14.000 21.4604 300.500
2.000 18.000 12.639 227.500
Toral 32,.000
COST 1.000 13.000 15.577 202.500
2.000 18.000 la.306 293,500
Torsl 31.000
SCH 1.000 13.000 14.500 188.500
2.000 18.000 17,083 307.500
Toral 31.000
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Co-loc.tJon VB. Show
.nd Te"
Mean Sum of
COL ST N Rank Ranks
SAT 1.000 7.000 24.786 173.500
2.000 39.000 23.269 907.500
Total 46.000
PERF 1.000 7.000 37.786 264.500
2.000 39.000 20.936 816.500
Total 46.000
COST 1.000 7.000 23.643 165,500
2.000 38.000 22.882 869.500
Total 45,000
SCH 1.000 7.000 27.429 192.000
2,000 39.000 22.795 889.000
Total 46.000
Co-/ocdon va. Ftequent
F.c.fo.F.ce "eetlng_
Mean Sum of
COL MTGS N Rank Ranks
SAT 1.000 15.000 22.500 337.500
2,000 24.000 18.438 442.500
Total 39.000
PERF 1.000 15.000 27.267 409.000
2.000 24.000 15.458 371.000
Total 39.000
COST 1,000 14.000 23,714 332.000
2.000 24.000 17.042 409.000
Total 38.000
SCH 1.000 14.000 23.250 325.500
2.000 24.000 17.313 415.500
Totat 38.000
Co-Ioc.,lOn va.
M.n·llement
ImerventJon
Mean Sum of
COL MGMT N Rank Ranks
SAT 1.000 15.000 22;500 337.500
2.000 20.000 14.625 292.500
Total 35.000
PERF 1.000 15,000 25.833 387.500
2.000 21.000 13.262 278.500
Total 36.000
COST 1,000 14.000 20.357 285.000
2.000 20.000 15.500 310.000
Total 34.000
SCH 1.000 14.000 22.750 318,500
2.000 21.000 14.633 311.500
Total 35.000
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SAT
0.788
Nolcorreeted for ties.
Grouping Variable:COL_ST
SAT
0.283
Not corrected for Ues.
b' Grouping Variable:COL_MTGS
SAT
0,023
Not corrected for ties,
Grouping Variable:
COL_MGMT
PERF
PERF
PERF
COST
COST
COST
SCH
SCH
SCH
ApPENOlxE: CHI..SaUAREOCOMPARISONSOFFACTOR
CITATIONFREaUENCIESBETWEEN EASY AND DIFFICULT
CASES
Following are chi-squared analyses comparing the frequency with which factors were
cited in easy and· difficult cases. Instances of significant difference are highlighted and labeled
"Significant".
Easy VB. Difficult Factor Frequency Comparisons
Note: 1 degree of freedom: significance at 0.05 level requires 3.84
Total NIS
Easy I 33
Difficult I 65
Factor: Management Intervention
Number of Times Cited
Easy 12
Difficult 119
~~~-+---..;;,..;;;;....;;...,..-.;.....,Residuals
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65
Residuals
Frequencies 1------+-----1
98 =N
Factor: Critical Team Member X"2=1.05
Number of Times Cited
Easy ~ 16
Difficult 17
Residualsr------+-----.,
Difficulty Eas 33
Di fficult .10.- ....... 65
Residuals
Frequencies I--~-:-~:......:IIo-----:-~:__:1
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98 =N
Factor: Engineering Expertise X"2=0.77
Number of Times Cited
Easy 15
Difficult 16 Difficulty Eas
Difficult
Residuals
Factor
Absent Present Residuals
28 5 33
59 6 65
87 11 98 =N
7.303.7°1Frequencies
Factor: Trade Studies
Number of Times Cited
Easy 10
Difficult Is
Residuals
r-------ir------,
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65L-__---..I........__-.I
Residuals 98 =N
Frequencies
Factor: Show and Tell X1\2=O.86
Number of Times Cited
Easy 114
Difficult 134
Residuals
r------t------,
Difficulty Eas 33
Diff icu It L-.-~__A....-__o-.I6 5
Residuals 98 =N
. Frequencies
Factor: Used Tests X"2=O.01
Number of Times Cited
Easv 119
Difficult 138
Residu8Js
...----t--------.
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65L- '----..;.._---..I
Residuals 98 =N
Frequencies
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•
Faclor: Time PressUre XI\2=O.OO
Number of Times Cited
Easy 14
Difficult la Difficulty Eas
Difficult
Residuals
Frequencies
Factor
Absent Present Remdua~
29 4 33
57 8 65
86 12 98 =N
Factor: Co-Located
Number of Times Cited
Easy 17
Difficult 18
Residuals
_---1-------...,
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65L....- L....-_........-'
Residuals
Frequencies
98 =N
Factor: Frequent Flce-Io-Face Meelings Xi\~=O.OO
Number of Times Cited
Easy Ie
Difficult 116
Residuals
----1------.........,Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65L....- ..........-__-'
. Residuals
Frequencies
98 =N
Factor: Shared Objectives C X"2=3.79
Number of T;mes Cited
Easy 11 0
Difficult 19
_---.....--.;;...;;;...-..., Residuals
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65
Residuals
Frequencies
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98 =N
Factor: Win-Win Solution Created
Number of Times Cited
Easy 13
Difficult 10 Difficulty Eas
Difficult
Residuals
Frequencies
Factor
Absent Present Residuals
30 3 33
65 0 65
95 3 98 =N
Factor: Explained Reasons Why X"2=1.86
Number of Times Cited
Easy 14
Difficult 13
.,--.;.~;;"",;;".;;,~~......;;;..,;;....;;.......;....., Residuals
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65
Residuals 98 =N
Frequencies
2.,
361.
4.64
Factor: Social Problems
Number of Times Cited
Easy 15
Difficult 127
,..--;....;.;;;..;;:;....;;;..;..;..;.....~~~....;...;...... Residuals
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult L..........~.::...-........._...=...;._....J65
Residuals 98 =N
Frequencies
Factor: Misused Boundary Objects X"2=1.27
Number of Times Cited
Easy 11
Difficult 16
,.......;.....;;.;.;;;..;:;....;;;..;..;..;.....~~~....;...;...... Residuals
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65
Residuals
Frequencies
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98 =N
Factor:
Factor:
Lack of Shared Metrics/Objectives
Unclear Lines of Comm/Auth
Residuals
,................_-+-----,
Difficulty Easy 33
Difficult ""'-- .....-..__..... 65
Residuals
Frequencies
C X"2=2.24
98 =N
Number"of Times Cited
Easy 12
Difficult 11 1
Residuals
~---t-------.
Difficulty Eas 33
Difficult 65
----------'
Residuals
Frequencies
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98 =N
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ApPENDlxF: REGRESSIONS ANALYSES
(Begin oD.the·next page)
Regression, Stepwise, for
Performance
Variables Entered/Removed
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method
Stepwise
(Criteria:
Probabilit
y-of-F-to-
enter <=
.050,
Probabilit
y-of-F-to-
remove >=
1.000 COLOC .100).
a
Dependent Vanable.
PERF
Model Summary
Model
1.000
a
R
0.357
Predictors: (Constant),
COLDC
ANOVA
(
COLOC
Dependent Variable:
PERFb
a
Model Sum of Squares df' Mean Square F Sig.
1.000 Regression 13.540 1.000 13.540 10.065 0.002
Residual 92.826 69.000 1.345
Total 106.366 70.000
Predictors: [Constant I
Coefficients
Unstandard ized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
I Model I B I Std. Error Beta
I 1.000 I (Constant) '5.085 I 0.151 33.673 0.000
I t COLOe 1.165 . I 0.367 0.357 3,172 0.002
a
Dependent Variable:
PERF
Excluded Variables
Partial Collinearity
Beta In t Sig. Correlation Statistics
Model Tolerance
1.000 MGMT 0.002 0.019 0.985 0,002 0.963
CRIT MEM 0.098 0.853 0.396 0.103 0.972
ENGEXP -0.175 -1.549 0.126 -0.185 0.974
TRADE -0.106 -0.931 0.355 -0.112 0.981
80 -0.109 -0.968 0.337 -0.117 0.998
TEST 0.147 1.310 0.195 0.157 0.991
TIME 0.093 0.829 0.410 0.100 0.999
MTGS 0.048 0.413 0.681 0.050 0.941
OBJ 0.078 0.684 0.496 0.083 0.983
WIN \NIN -0.015 -0.129 0.898 -0.016 0,991
REAS. VVHY -0.116 -1.036 0.304 -0.125 0,999
SOCPROB 0.149 1.329 0.188 0,159 0,999
.BAD_BO ..0.021 -0.188 0.852 -0.023 0,981
BAD. MET -0.111 -0;976 0.332 -0.118 0.985
BAD..COM 0.066 0.583 0.562 0.071 0.994
Predidors in the
a
b
Model: (Constant),
COLOe
Dependent Variable:
PERF
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Reg.....ion,Stepwi.e, For
Cost
V.rllbles
Entered/Removed
Model
1.000
2.000
Vanables
Entered
TEST
OBJ
Dependent
Variable: COST
Variables Removed Method
Stepwise (Criteria:
Probability-of-F-to.enter
<= .050,· Probabilily-of-F-
to-remove >= .100).
Stepwise <Sriteria:
Probabilily-of-F-to-enter
<= .050, Probability-of-F-
to-remove >= .100).
Predictors: .
(Constant), TEST
Predictors:
(Constant),
TEST,OBJ
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1.000 Regression 16.812 1.000 16.B12 8.864 0.004
Residual 130.000 67.000 1.940
Total 146.812 68.000
2.000 ReCiression 34.493 2.000 17,246 10.134 0.000
Residual 112.319 66.000 1.702
Total 146.812 68.000
PredicloB:
(Constant), TEST
Predictors:
(Constant),
TEST,OBJ
Dependent
Variable: COST
excluded V.riabl••
Partial COllinelnty
Beta In t Sig. Correl8tion Statiltics
Model Tole,..nce
1.000 MGMT 0.090 0.755 0.453 0.093 0.946
·CRIT _MEM -0.095 -0.817 0.417 -0,100 0.977
ENG..EXP -0.031 -0,268 0.789 -0.033 0.999
TRADE 0.156 1.352 0.181 0.164 0.9S4
BO -0.043 -0.359 0.721 -0,~4 0.932
TIME -0.116 -1.027 O.JOB -0.125 1.000
MTGS -0.193 -1.682 0.097 -0.203 0,975
OBJ 0.348 3.223 0,002 0.369 0.993
WIN _WIN -0.049 -0.424 0.673 -0.052 0.989
REAS..WHY -0,161 -1.374 0.174 -0.161 0.95'-
SOCPROB 0.069 0.583 0.562 0.072 0,951
BAD__ BO 0.141 1.233 0.222 0.150 0.998
BAD__MET -0.080 -0.680 0."99 ·0.OB3 0.954
BAD COM 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
COLOC 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.983
2.000 MGMT 0.060 0.540 0,591 0.067 0,939
CRIT MEM -0.066 -0.604 0.548 -0.075 0.971
ENG..EXP -0.008 -0.070 0.9045 aD.OOB 0.994
TRADE 0,106 0.966 0.338 iO.119 0.963
BO -0.033 -0.292 0.772 i'~0.OJ6 0,932
TIME -0.051 -0.466 0.643 -0.058 0.961
MTGS -0.153 -1.401 0.166 -0,171 0.961
W1N.~W1N -0.071 -0.650 0.518 -0.080 0.885
REAS WHY -0.106 -0.945 0.348 -0.116 0.928
SOCPROB 0,064 0.578 0.565 0.072 0.951
BAD__ BO 0.202 1,689 0.063 O~228 0.872
BAD MET -0.073 -0.662 0.511 -0.082 0.953
BADuCOM -0.006 -0.055 0:956 -0.007 0.999
COLoe 0.040 0.361 0.719 0,045 0.971
PredictOR in the
Model:
(Conltlnt), TEST
Predictors in 1he
Model:
(Conla.nt),
TEST.OBJ
Dependen'
Varillble: COST
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2.000 OBJ
peh enl
Varillble: SCH
r. dora:
(Constllnt), TEST
Predictors:
(CQnal8nl), TEST I
OBJ
Model
1.000
2,UOO
MGMT
CRlf MEM
BO
"IME
MTGS
WIN WIN
B lBO
B.c lET
MGS
WIll ,WIN
REA~ -,NHY
SOCPROB
.BAI: .1::10
BAD.MI:T
BAD COM
COLOC
Predtdon IIllhe
Model: (Constant),
TEST
Predtctan in Itte
Model: (c:or-t.nt) ,
TEST, OBJ
[)eopendenr
V....;SCH
Beta In
-0.0'
-0.U7'
U.U;;'
0.02
-0.08:
-t1.18
-0.06
D.DJ
-0.031
-~. D6
. ~,
IJ
-0.146
-0.D8B
D,DB:!
-0.080
0.020
-0.00
-0.109
U.21"
-1,143
-0.Hi8
-D.~l
0.286
0.20
-D. 12
-I. i9
-D. 4
O. ,9
-D. !5
-0. a
-D.
-D.
c.
c.
-J.
-1.1
-0.
o.
-0. 10
O. 80
-0, JOti
-0.998
1.950
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S1g.
0,25'
0.81~
0,52,
0.77'
0.83
D"Ui'
0.12
0.568
D. rS7
O. ~J"
O. 88
.1 3
... 8
.4 Ii
.4 a
.9 15
0.3 2
-o.IJ8
.a.01B
-0.078
0.035
0.025
-0.089
-0.188
·0,070
0.032
-0.076
-0.033
,1
.Il
I.e
-0,160
-0.098
0.092
-0.087
0.022
-0.001
-0.122
0.2:13
Toler.nee
0.932
0.B80
0.9li18
0.997
0.925
0.8!H
0.978
0.990
0.8:17
O.Bote
0,998
,866
.98ti
.9J3
0,848
0.973
0.856
0.'97
D.1I70
ApPENDlxG: METHODS TUTORIAL
Introduction
The following sections are intended as a tutorial for future. researchers who might wish to
make use of the methods pioneered in this study. This tutorial first discusses when these
methods should be used and then describes how to calculate the measures upon which its relies.
Examples of potential hypotheses are presented, along with potential.performancemeasures,
interview questions, and. other suggestions about conducting a successful case interview. The
tutorial·concludes with a·discussion of how the methods co~ld be adapted for near-real~time data
collection.
Why and When This Method Should Be Used
The following data collection approach was developed in order to study communication
practices on product development teams. Specifically, these methods are intended to provide
insight into how engineers interpret design problems, how those interpretations can vary, what
factors can change those interpretations, and what .impact differences in interpretation can have
on problem solving performance. The approach was initially applied using case interviews; as of
this writing, no attempt had been made to use it as part·of a written survey. It is the
recommendation of the author that any researcher planning to use this approach in a survey first
conduct interviews. to gain experience with the methods, and only then attempt to modify for
them use in written surveys.
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The benefit of the approach developed for this study was that it provided a means of
quantifying the differences between two (or more) engineers' interpretations of a design
problem. While previous studies have noted that engineers from different groups tended to focus
on different aspects· of a design problem, few researchers have been able to ·quantify such
differences. By comparing criteria lists, as described below, the approach used in this study
facilitated such numerical· comparisons, opening up a broad range of potential statistical"analyses
and perfonnance assessments.
The following instructions reflect lessons learned during the original"study and include
several modifications and improvements.
The Unique Criteria Ratio and the Awareness Ratio: The Basics
The method· to quantify problem interpretations centers on collecting criteria lists from
study participants. For each problem solving case that i~ described, .the interviewee is asked .to
provide two lists of criteria (see "The Basic Historical Interview" below). First, the interviewee
should list the criteria or factors that he or she used to judge the benefits or drawbacks of
potential solutions. Then, the interviewee should be prompted to provide a list of the criteria he
or she believes were important to the other members of the team. Examples of criteria include
recurring cost, ease of use, number of parts, range, weight, etc.
For a given case, at least two interviews must be conducted. If possible, each interviewee
should be from different specialty groups, though the method still works even if the interviewees
are from the same specialty group. The difference in ·problem interpretation between two
individuals .can then be quantified using the unique criteria ratio, which measures h~w similar
twO" engineers' interpretations of a problem are, and the awareness ratio, which measures how
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well one ,engineer understands, another engineer's concerns. The following paragraphs use
illustrative examples to demonstrate how each· ratio is calculated and these calculations are
depicted in the tables below.
The .unique criteria ratio is determined by dividing the number of criteria that were cited
by only one person by the totalnumber·of criteria cited by both interviewees. Thus, the closer
this ratio ,is to zero, the more similar two individual's interpretations of a problem were. 'For
example, suppose the first interviewee cited weight,cost, number of new manufacturing
processes, number of assembly steps, and manufacturability asher criteria, while the second
interviewee cited performance, cost, weight, and payload capa'city. The total number of criteria
cited is nine. Since both cited cost and weight, those two criteria are not unique. The criteria
number o!parts, number of assembly steps, number 'of new manufacturing processes,
manufacturability, performance, and payload capacity, on the other han.d, were each only cited
by one of the two interviewees~ Therefore, those criteria are considered "unique" and the ratio
would be 0.56 (five unique criteria divided by nine total criteria).
The awareness ratio is calculated in a similar fashion. The numerator for this ratio is the
number of criteria that the first interviewee incorrectly cited as important to the second
interviewee plus the number of criteria cited by the second interviewee that first failed to cite.
The denominator is the total number of criteria actually cited as ,important by the second
interviewee. Therefore, when the awareness ratio is zero, the first interviewee was able to
exactly cite the criteria list of the second interviewee. (Note, then, that both the awareness ratio
and the unique criteria ratio improve as they approach zero). So, suppose in the example above,
the first interviewee had stated that she believed that the other interviewee's criteria were
performance, weight, and manufacturability. The numerator of the awareness ratio would be
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three (she failed to mention cost and payload capacity and incorrectly cited manufacturability),
and the denominator would be fOUf (since the second interviewee actually cited fOUf criteria:
perfonnance, cost, weight, and payload capacity). Thus, the awareness ratio for this example
would be 0.75.
These calculations 1 are illustrated in the tables below:
Criteria Lists (arrows Indicate non-unique criteria):
Weight
Cost .......--_........ii~--....-:::::~-t---------..
Number of new manufacturing processes
Number of assembly steps
Manufacturabilit
Interviewee A's Criteria
Interviewee A's list· of criteria she
believes B considers important
Performance
Weight
Manufacturability
Unique Criteria Ratio Calculation
I
Total number of criteria:
Number of unique criteria:
UniQue Criteria Ratio:
5+4 = 9
5
5/9
Awareness Ratio Calculation (for A relative to B)
Number ·of incorrect criteria: 1
Number of ommitted criteria: 2
Numerator: 1+ 2 = 3
Total number of criteria actual! cited b B: 4
Awareness Ratio: 3/4
In the original study, only two people were interviewed for each .case. If more than two
individuals are interviewed, the·ratios.should still be calculated in a paired fashion..The team's
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performance as a whole can then be judge by calculating an average unique criteria ratio and an
average awareness ratio.
Hypotheses to Test
Using these. two measures, ·two sets of hypotheses can be tested. The first .set .. relates to
the effect of problem interpretations on problem solving performance. Thus, one might
hypothesize that the closer the unique problem and awareness ratios are to zero, the better the
team will be able to solve the problem (see "Measuring Problem Solving Performance" below).
The second set of hypotheses address how problem interpretations can be affected. For
example, one could hypothesize that engineers from the same specialty· will· have smaller .. unique
criteria .ratios than engineers from different specialties. In addition, onecould.investigate the
effects of various design tools and methods on problem interpretations. For instance, one might
propose that members of design teams that conducted extensive testing will have smaller
awareness ratios (that is, tests help engineers understand one another's needs). Any study of
design team problem solving should endeavor to address both types of questions.
Measuring Problem Solving Perfonnance
The original study used subjective measures of performance. A major improvement to
thesernethods,however, would be to replace these subjective measures with more "concrete"
values. Potential data that could be used to measure problem solving performance include:
Number of engineering changes made to the product element under study.
Number of parts or components that were changed.
Number ofsubsystems that were affected by the solution.
Time required to solve the problem.
Impact of solution on product perfonnance (for example, increased weight, reduced range,etc.).
Impact of solution on product cost (non-recurring andlor recurring).
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In general, researchers should attempt to gather data on as many performance measures as
possible - individual measures can be unreliable, so having multiple options will improve the
"likelihood of finding meaningful relationships. A variety of studies exist on what measures best
indicate product development performance, and future researchers are encouraged to supplement
the above list with metrics used in other studies.
The Basic Historical Interview
The fundamental aspect of the method is the case interview. A study participant is asked
to describe a recent problem that he or she solved while working as part of a product
development team. The interview has fourdistinct,but related, goals: (1) to understand the
context and basic details of the case under investigation; (2) to ascertain how the problem was
solved and identify· the most important factors facilitating or inhibiting the problem solving
process; (3) to collect data on how the participant interpreted the problem; and (4) to collect
perfonnance data.
It is .important that the interviewer initially ask. a series of questions that .allow the
participant to discuss the case at his or her own pace. Such questions facilitate recall and help
the participant to "get back into" theexperienceR Then, as the details of·the case emerge,ffiore
targeted questions can be asked. Finally, it is worthwhile to ask the same question in several
different ways. Such repetition ensures that the interviewer has captured the details that the
participant considers important and also aids the participant's recall of the case's details.
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Example Interview Questions
Following is an example of the set of questions that might be asked during an interview.
Note that questions are included to collect criteria lists as well as to elicit other specifics about
the problem solving effort. Additional suggestions and guidelines are given in italics under
some questions.
(1) Please briefly describe the initial situation - what was the problem?
(Note: The interviewer should allow the inleliJiewee to provide an overall perspective of the case when he
or she. responds to this question. Such details will allow the interviewer to tailor later questions based on
the information provided by the interviewee.)
(2) What design criteria did you ,use to evaluate potentia] solutions to the problem?
(Note: If the interviewee is confused by this question,the interviewer might first consider rephrasing it (for
example, HHowdidyoujudge whether or not a design was good or bad?"], and then, if the interviewee is
still having trouble, by providing examples [such as cost or weight]. However, providing examples
introduces the risk o/biasing the interviewee [he might respond by citing the examples just given to him],
so the interviewer should avoid this option.)
(3) What design criteria do you believe [the other team member] used to evaluate potential solutions to the
problem?
(Note: This question must be asked once for each of the other team members participating in the study - if
there are jive people on the team (other than the current intervi~weeJ, the question must be asked five
times, once for each person.)
(4) How was the problem finally resolved, or what was the solution to the problem?
(5) What specific events do you believe were most important to reaching a solution?
(6) Were any tools (drawings, CAD mode]s, prototypes, etc.) useful in reaching aconsensus?
(7) Was any on~ person most responsible for the solution or in .changing your opinion of the situation?
(8) How many. design alternatives did you consider in attempting to resolve the· problem, and how were
those alternatives considered: in series, in parallel, etc.?
(-9) What events or factors were most critical to resolving the issue?
As noted above, several of the questions are somewhat repetitious. During the initial
study, such repetition was found to be beneficial: asking the same question in a different way
often elicited additional >details about a case and helped to clarify earlier points. If the
interviewer feels as though a question may appear extremely repetitious1 he or she may say to the
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interviewee, "You have already touched on some of these issues, but let me ask... " and then go
on to ask the next question. This researcher made extensive use of such techniques, and found
that interviewees responded positively to them.
Once the descriptive questions have been completed, the" interviewer should then collect
perfonnance data. The nature of the performance data that is acquired (subjective or "concrete")
will clearly affect the details of this next phase of the interview. No attempt will be made,
therefore, to provide specific instructions for such efforts. "' ".
Other Notes about the Interview
Prior to starting the interview, several points should be made clear to each interviewee.
First, assure him or her that his or her personal performanc'e is not being evaluated. Second, be
sure to inform the interviewee that.all of his or "her responses will be kept confidential. Finally,
review with the "interviewee any proprietary information protection agreements that may be in
place with his or her company. An example of such introductory infonnation follows:
The goal of -this interview is to learn about how you have solved problems in a multidisciplinary
environment. There are no right or wrong answers, nor am levaluating your personal performance.
Please be aware that I will consider our entire discussion confidential. No details of our talk will be
released publicly without prior approval from your company. Furthermore, your name, your company's
name, and your project's name will never appear in any of the written or el.ectronic papers or presentations
that result from this study.
Adapting the Methods/or Near-ReaL-Time Use
The original version of this study collected data using historical case interviews. A
significant improvement to the approach, however, would be to collect data in near-real-time.
Such a study would. consist of three main phases.Firs~, initial interviews are conducted with
each participant. During these interviews, participants are" briefed about the goals of the study as
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'well as what will be asked of them. Each participant is asked to provide a description of the
problem to be followed from his or her point of view. The interviewee is also prompted to
provide a list·of his or her own criteria as well as the criteria he or she believes to be important to
each of the other members of the team.
The second phase of study occurs as the team is trying to· solve .the problem. On random
days, the participants are asked to again state their criteria lists and their guesses as to the other
members' lists. The researcher should evaluate the potential drawbacks or benefits of providing
the participants with their previous responses -providing such information could simplify the
respqnse process for the participants but it could also bias their responses. Several possible
methods could be·used to solicit these updated lists, including a web page,email, a telephone
call, an interview, or a mailed letter. In general, the researcher should strive to interfere as little
as possible. in the participants' day-to-day activities.
The frequency of sampling should be scaled with. the problem under study. For complex
problems that are solved over several months, data may only need·to be collected once a week.
Problems with shorter cycle times may require more frequent data collection, such as twice a
week or once a day.
Unique criteria and awareness ratios are calculated for each sample. When significant
changes are noted, the researcher should then conduct a quick interview (by phone Of, if possible,
in person) to ascertain what might have caused the change. During such an interview,. the
researcher should not say, "I noticed a significant change in your criteria list, Maya... " ·Instead,
the researcher should begin the interview simply by asking the participant to explain what has
happened recently. Such an open-ended question will likely be answered with a description of
recent major events, some of which are likely to explain the change in criteria lists. Additional
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· standardized questions co.uId then be asked (refer to the example interview. questions given
above).
Finally, once the problem has been solved, performance data is collected (see above).
This performance data can then be linked to any trends that were noted in the unique criteria
ratio, awareness ratio, or to any major events that occurred during the problem solving effort.
Such a study would likely provide even greater insights into problem solving processes and
problem interpretation thall haye historical investigations.
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